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'A aomparative study o:f the philosophy o:r act:lo11 
of' Hadl1usudana Sarasvatr and the ethical thought 
of' J"oseph Butler. ' 
Thesis presented to the University of Dtu~ham i'or 
Ph. D. Degree b~/ S • 8. Sl1arma. 
Abstract 
·1'1e have made a comparative s•Gucly o:f the ethical and moPal 
teachings of' two c;reat thinkers - one Br:i. tish and the otheP 
Indian: Joseph Butler and L·iadhusuclana Sai·asvat!. 'l'hey were 
selected because there is sul1stantial agreement l1etween them 
on the basis of virtue, the concer>t of duty, on the relation 
lJetween ethics and religion and on the fundamental topics. 
In the fix•st half of' the thesis we have given an exposi-
tion of' Butler's moral philosophy explaining the hierarchy of' 
the different principles of action in human natupe and Butler's 
refutation of HoblJes' s psychological egoism. Vle have also 
tried to determine whether virtue, according to Butler, can 
lJe equated vv"i th self-love or benevolence and then to establish 
the nature of' conscience according to him. The cliscussion has 
been concluded by showing that virtue, in his view, is its own 
end and is to be pursued fop its m•;n sake. 
In the se·cond half we have f'irst discussecl Macll1usudana' s 
ethics and then compared the tv10 thinlcers. In explaining 
Madl1usilc.lana' s ethics it has been shown that viPtue accoi•dtng 
to him lies in doing tlle duties of' the station to which one 
belongs in life. In other words lt means doing one's caste-
duties, which are determined by one's f'nndamental nature. 
·--~-· ._·· 
Eeither self-love nor benevolence are permissible motives for 
actions. An action is to be done l)ecause it ought to be done. 
Lastly it has been show·n that accol"di:ng to MadJ1usudana mol"'ali ty 
ultimately culminates in the realisation o:i: ... Goo .• 
'Pollow-nature' is the dict1..un of both thinlcers. V:il~tue 
lies in actine; accorc1ing to nature and vice in deviation from 
it. Again they l)oth advocate the cultivation of benevolence 
though vti th a difference in the psycholoc;ical att:Ltude. A 
comparison has also i)een clr•awn l)etween Butler; s conscience and 
Iviadl1usudana' s enJ.j.ehtened intellect. (hucl(1hi). Finally it has 
l)een shm1n that according to l)oth the ultimate ol)ject of man's 
search is God Himself. 
~-·~~-__._ 
I wish to express here my great indebtedness to 
Mr. J. Harrison and Mr. A. Basu who have guided me 
throughout my worlc. Himself deeply versecl in the 
sphere of ethics ivlr. I-Iarri son has directed my falter-
ing steps in the understanding of Butler's ethical 
ideas. Mr. Basu, with his clear and thorough grasp 
of the problems of Indian philosophical thought, has 
always shown me the way to an understanding of them. 
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Introduction. 
The importance of understanding bet'\oJ"een the different 
peoples of the '\ororld carmot be over emphasised. Conditions 
of life, improved communications and so on have made the 
world much smaller and nations much closer to each other. 
But the minds of men have not yet become as close to one 
another as is desirable. If men are to live together in unity 
the approach and attitude to life that different people have 
must be understood and perhaps also appreciated. Philosophy 
fundamentally represents an attitude towards life and its 
meaning. This is not to say that philosophy need not be 
logical and rational. But '\ole are using the term in a very 
wide sense and wish to suggest that every man, and every 
people have some idea about existence and life. One man may 
have analysed these basic ideas and attitudes better than 
another. We shall call him a better philosopher but that is 
not to say that the other man has no philosophy at all. F'or 
an unified life ·or the whole world therefore what different 
people understand by life, its responsibilities and value, 
must be understood by others. 
A very good way of effecting this understanding is to 
study the comparative philosophy of the different nations. We 
have chosen two thinkers, one English and the other Indian 
for our comparative study. Having studied Western, particu-
larly British, philosophy in the colleges and universities and 
being particularly interested in ethics, we think a comparison 
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bet'\lreen the t'\oro thinkers, one of England and the other of 
India, might contribute a little towards mutual understanding. 
It is true;that during the last hundred years or so a good 
deal has already been done in this direction but we feel that 
there is still much to be done. 
When we had to choose a British thinker Butler '\•ras an 
obvious choice because of his preeminence as an ethical '\ITriter 
and because his inf·luence is recognised even today. The 
second reason for this choice is that the basic ethical 
principles of Butler, as we have tried to show in the thesis, 
are very close to those of Madhusudana, the Indian thinker we 
have chosen. On the basis of virtue, the concept of duty, on 
the relation between ethics and religion, and on other funda-
mental topics there is substantial agreement between Butler's 
thought and that of Madhusudana. We have tried to show that 
according to Madhusudana duty is to be done solely far the 
sake of d~ty. This might lead some readers to think that on 
this point Butler differs from 1\iadhusudana in so far as the 
former does not hold that duty or virtue is to be practised 
for the salte of virtue only. Butler certainly maintains that 
a·ctions done for- self-love and benev6lence ar-e virtuous. ·But 
we have tried to show that according to him the ultimate 
authority, deciding what is virtue and what is not, is con-
science, which always decides a particular course because it 
is virtuous. To say this is not to contradict what Butler 
says about self-love and benevolence, for acts done in 
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consequence of these are approved by conscience for the reason 
that they are virtuous, so that it can certainly be said that 
virtue is the true standard. 
Madhusudana was selected because he is considered to be 
one of the greatest dialecticians of the Vedanta school of 
philosophy, indeed in all Indian philosophy. But it is more 
his metaphysical works that have been studied till nm·r and 
his importance as a writer on ethics has not been emphasised. 
ijis commentary on the Bhagavadgita, which is a universally 
a-ccepted Indian Scripture of unquestioned authority in both 
religious and ethical matters, is the particular text which 
we are studying in our thesis. While there are other commenta-
tors on the Bhagavadgita belonging to the Vedantic school, 
Madhusudana's originality consists in emphasising the role of 
devotion and love for God in ethical life. The metaphysics of 
his school underestimates the value of devation and love for a 
personal God. But Nadhusudana f'elt that the ethical ideal 
cannot be fulfilled except in and through such love. In this 
school of philosophy, lmo\orledge of the self which is one and 
indivisible is the means of realising the Pighest good of life. 
This standpoint has·led other philosophers of the school to 
overlook the value of love for God. But Nadhusudana· emphasi-
ses the great importance of fulfilling one's duty both as an 
ethical discipline and also after one has attained the high-
est spiritual value. The bringing together of spiritual 
knO\..rledge and works is effected in I•Iadhusiidana by bhakti or 
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devotion to God. We have shown in our thesis that he asserts 
that the attainment of the sununum bonum does avray vri th duties 
as such but he also holds that even though duties do not re-
main as duties, one still has to continue one's appointed 
work because it is a means of the continuance of God' s vrork. 
There is no contradiction between liberation, towards \'lhich 
all ethics moves, and a life of activity, even though there is 
an opposition bet'\oreen liberation and activity in the sense of 
duty. 
The second reason why this text '\oTas chosen is that many 
vrri ters on Indian philosophy feel inclined to hold that there 
is lack of any ethical thought in Hindu philosophy. While it 
is true that ethics was not treated separately and independent-
ly in Indian thought, this was probably because all life and 
existence was considered to be unitary so that the discussion 
of any asp;ect of life both presupposed and implied the others, 
and it is not correct, as we have sho\~ in our thesis, to say 
that there is no ethics ~~ ~lx in Hindu philosophical litera-
ture. It is also true that Hindu thought accepts a sphere of 
experience and activity which is beyond the moral and ethical 
but thfs does not mean that the problems of morality did not 
exercrlse the mind of Hindu thinkers. 
Madhusudana vrhile discussing the set problems of ethics, 
like duty, standard of duty etc. examines these not for their 
O'\~ sake but against the background of what he considers to be 
the highest value of life. In the last analysis this value 
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turns out to .be religious and spiritual and not what is 
ordinarily considered to be a moral value. From this it may 
seem that our use of the term •ethics• is not quite correct. 
But ethics is as much an attempt to determine what is the good 
as it is an attempt to determine what is right. In the mind 
of our author, Madhusudana, the two are taken up together, 
though the question oif condu~t is not important only as a 
starting point but also as leading to the good. If ethics is 
concerned with the concept of the Should and the Ought, in 
other words if ethics is the science of the ideal as against 
the actual the business of self-improvement is a burning moral 
problem. For r4adhusudana this self-improvement cannot be com-
plete unless and until the true self of man has been l{nown, 
and that is how the question of the highest good comes into 
his ethics. 
The study oif our text is also appropriate for another 
reason, that it illustrates the common standpoint of the 
Vedanta regarding the relation of ethics to religion. Religion 
is more than ethics but is based on ethics. Ethics is the 
beginning of religion which is its fulfilment. In our compar-
ison between Butle!! and Ma.dhusudana we have-tried to say-that 
the general tren~ of Butler's thought not only does not 
vontradict the above view but confirms it. Butler tries to 
explain his ethics independently of religion. Indeed his 
conscious purpose seems to be· a desire to establish virtue on 
a basis of its own - analysis of human nature - apart from 
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religious support. But it appears to us that he feels somehow 
convinced that morality is not complete by itself. Indeed we 
think that according to Butler a man could not be properly 
moral unless he were also religious, if not consciously yet 
in effect and actually. To be fully good and Jnoral one must 
perform certain positive and religious duties as vrell. One 
must fulfil one•s obligations which one owes to God, the 
Saviour. Furthermore, though Butler does not derive morality 
from Scriptures directly, vre do feel that his ethics would 
not have been what it is if Butler's general view of the 
universe and man's life in it were not a religious one, which 
in tlus context is Biblical. Butler was a firm believer in 
God and to him God is no mere prime mover or first cause of 
philosophy but a reality, a being, perfectly moral and 
deserving all reverence and worship. Butler's ethics is 
thus not religious in the sense that it is derived from 
Scriptures directly, but it may be said to be religious in 
the sense that it would have been different if Butler's 
metaphysical outlook were not what it is, namely religious. 
A vrord with regard to the procedure that has been 
follO\'ied in-this is, we think, -n-ecessary. Instead-of start-
ing the com pari son bet\ofeen the t\'io thinkers straight away we 
have first tried to give an exposition of their ethical 
teaching separately. The reasop for following this procedure. 
is that there is a controversy on almost every important 
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point in Butler. It was therefore necessary to establish 
our o~m views before drawing up the comparison and in order 
to be able to do so we had to give a separate exposition of 
Butler's moral philosophy. The reason for giving a separate 
exposition of Madhusudana's ethics is not the same. Though, 
as we have said above, J!.ladhusudana 1 s metaphysics has been 
studied, his ethics has not been emphasised yet. We there-
fore thought it would make ~or a better appreciation of the 
comparison to give a separate account of his ethics also. We 
are conscious that this procedure results in some repetitions 
though we have tried to avoid this as much as possible. 
We have divided the thesis into ten chapters. In the 
first five we have given an exposition of Butler's moral 
ph~losophy and in doing so we have tried to be both critical 
and sympathetic as far as possible. We have further sub-
divided four (six to nine) of the remaining five Chapters 
each into two sections, A and B. In sections A of each of 
these four Chapters we have explained t-iadhusudana 1 s moral 
philosophy and in sections B we have drawn the comparison 
between the two thinkers. In the last Chapter (Chapter ten) 
we have given the conclusion. 
For the purpose of our thesis we have follo\ored W.E. 
Gladstone's edition of Butler's Works, Oxford, 1896, which 
seems more popular though J.H. Bernard's edition in two 
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volumes, London, 1900, is also perfectly adequate for all 
purposes. Also throughout the present thesis by 'Sermons' we 
have usually meant 'Fifteen Sermons 1 'at the Rolls except \oJ"hen 
otherwise stated. 
For lviadhu sudana Is 1Gudhartha-dipika I we have follm-red the 
Anandasrama edition, Poona (India), 1912. 
F'or an English translation of 'l~ianusm:rti 1 we have followed 
G. Buhler's translation in the Sacred Books of the East Series; 
Vol. XXV, Oxford, 1886 and for 'Upani~ads' '"e have consulted 
Dr. Radhakrishnan' s 'The Principal Upanisads 1 , London, 1953 
. 
and Hume's 'The Thirteen Principal Upanishads', Oxford, 1949. 
In the matter of transcription the spelling of the 
authorities ~~oted has been retained. 
Chapter [ 
Virtue and Human Nature in Butler. 
Joseph Butler \•Tas born at Wantage in Berkshire on the 18th 
May, 1692. It was also the birth place of Alfred the Great, 
one of' the most renmmed of England's monarchs •1 Joseph Butler 
was the youngest of the eight children of a well-to-do linen 
draper, Thomas Butler, who had retired from business and occu-
pied a house called 'The Priory' on the outskirts of the tmm. 2 
He was first sent to a Grammar School, under Mr. Philip Barton, 
upon whom he afte~~ards, on becoming Dean of St. Pauls, 
best~ved the rectory of Hutton in Essex. Butler's father, a 
leading Presbyterian, intended him for the Presbyterian ministry. 
He was therefore sent to a dissenting academy established by 
Mr. Samuel Jones at Gloucester which academy subsequently 
moved to Tewkesbury. Among Butler's fello'\tr-pupils were some 
who became distinguished in their later life. They "'ere: 
Thomas Seeker, afterwards Archbishop of Canterbury; Isaac 
Maddox, afterwards Bishop of Worcester; Samuel Chandler, a well-
known Non-Conformist divine and John Bowes, afterwards Lord 
Chancellor of Ireland. 
Butler's intellectual development is proved by the corres-
-
pondence which he carried on while still a student at Tewkes-
bury "Ti th Samuel Clarke who \vas then regarded as the foremost 
philosopher of the age. He in his first letter (Nov. 4, 1713) 
advances with great acuteness t\~o objections which had struck 
1. Thomas Bartlett. 'Memoirs of the life, character and writings 
of Joseph Butler', London, 1839, p. 1. 
2. An article on Butler in 1 Di~tLonary of ~~~ional ~iography', 
London, 1~86, vol. v111, p. 67. 
- 10 -
him in reading the book 'Demonstration of the Being and Attri-
butes of God'. Butler doubts whether it is a contradiction 
to assert the •self-existence of a finite being', but he 
declares himself convinced in his fourth letter by Clarke's 
arguments. He also doubts whether it is a contradiction to 
suppose the existence of two indepenaent self-existing beings. 
This latter objection, after some discussion, resolves itself 
into a question as to the nature of time and space; and at the 
close of the correspondence Butler is still in doubt. At a 
later period he professes himself to be fully satisfied on this 
point also. Butler also declares in his fourth letter to 
Clarke that he intends 'the search after truth as fhe business 
of my life'. 
The correspondence between Butler and Clarke took place 
during the last year of Butler's stay at Tewkesbury and it was 
at this period that he decided to join the Anglican Church and 
persuaded his father to allm-1 him to enter at Oriel College, 
Oxford on the 17th March, 1714. His academic experiences at 
Oxford were not happy. He was dissatisfied '\>Tith the academic 
atmosphere there and contemplated going to Cambridge but 
subseq_u_ently __ gave up the idea and remained at Oxford till his 
graduation on 18th October, 1718. Meanwhile he had become 
intimate with Edward Talbot, son of the then Bishop of Salis-
bury, and afterwards of Durham. This intimacy had much 
influence on his later career. 
Only ten days after taking his B.A. degree Butler was 
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ordained deacon in the private Chapel of the Palace by the 
Bishop of Salisbury on the 28th October, 1718 and received 
Priests• orders from the same hands in St. James•, Westminster 
on the 21st December of the same year. Shortly afterwards 
Butler was appointed preacher at the Rolls Chapel and he 
retained this office of preacher until 1726. 
Two years after, in 1720, Butler's friend Edward Talbot 
died bpt he had recommended Butler strongly to the kind offices 
of his father. In 1722, on his translation to the See of 
Durham, Bishop Talbot assigned to Butler the Rectory of 
Haughton-le-Skerne, near Darlington which he exchanged for that 
of Stanhope in 1725. In 1726 Butler resigned his preachersl1ip 
at the Rolls and in the same year published his celebrated 
•Fifteen Sermons' \-ri th a dedication to the Master of the Rolls. 
After this Butler had a quiet and restful period of seven 
years at Stanhope and it is during this period that he complet-
ed the matured work of his life 'The &1alogy of Religion' 
wllich was published in May, 1736 with a· dedication to his 
patron Lord Chancellor Talbot, the elder brother of Butler's 
friend Edward Talbot. 
In_l733 Lord Chancellor Talbot drew Butle::l! out from his 
quiet life at Stanhope and appointed him his Chaplain. Short-
ly after Butler was brought to the notice of ~een Caroline 
through his old friend Seeker who l-Tas then her 1-laj~sty• s 
chaplain. It was at tlus time when the queen said that she had 
- 12 -
believed Butler to have died that Archbishop Lancelot Black-
burna of Yorl{ corrected her saying: "No, J.'.1adame, he is not dead, 
but he is buried". Iviean\orhile Butler had added to his academic 
distinctions by taking B.C.L. from Oxford on the 11th June, 
1721 and D.C.L. on the 8th June, 1733· 
In 1736 Butler was appointed Clerk of the closet to the 
queen and in the same year the .Lord Chancellor presented him 
to a Prebend of Rochester Cathedral. Unfortunately the queen 
died in November, 1737 but while she was still on her death-
bed she had recomntended Butler to the Archbishop of Canterbury 
and probably this was the only recommendation she had ever 
made. In 1738 Butler was appointed to the Bishopric of Bristol, 
't-Thich post he accepted not \vi thout reluctance. On the 24th May, 
1740 he was presented to the deanery of St. Paul when he re-
signed his rectory of Stanhope and his prebendary at Rochester. 
In 1746 Butler was made Clerk of the Closet to King 
George II, and the offer of the Bishopric of Durham came to him 
in 1750 when Bishop Chadler died. But Butler was not long 
Bishop of Durham. He died in 1752 and his remains were taken 
to Bristol and interred in the cathedral there. 
Butler 1 s worlts are: (J.:-) Fifteen Sermons preached at the 
Rolls Chapel, 1726. A second edition of the same, to which he 
added a long preface, was brought out four years after the 
first, on the 16th September 1729 when Butler "toras still at 
Stanhope. (2) The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, 
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to the constitutions and course of nature. To this are added 
two dissertatio~s: (a) Of Personal Identity, (b) Of the Nature 
of Virtue. (3) Six Sermons preached upon different public 
occasions, between the years 1738 to 1748. (4) A charge deliver-
ed to the clergy at the primary visitation of the Diocese of 
Durham in the year 1751. 
We are, hm"ever, mainly concerned with his 'Fifteen Sermons' 
preached at the Rolls and the Analogy of Religion, and the 
Dissei·tation on virtue appended to the Analogy. 
For a complete and adequate comprehension of Butler's moral 
philosophy, it may be useful to refer to the background against 
which his whole ethical teaching is cast. 
The prevailing spirit of the age when Butler preached his 
Sermons at the Rolls Chapel was narrow selfishness and a contemp-
tuous disregard of religion. It was a period when both morals 
and religion were at a low ebb. As it appears from Butler's 
own writings, he himself held that decline of religious belief 
and excessive self-regard were the two dominant vices of the 
age. Butler says: "I suppose, it may be spoken of as very much 
the distinction of the present to profess a contracted spirit, 
and greater regarwto self-interest, than appears to have been 
done formerly~' ~l He again refers to the religious position 
in his charge to the Durham clergy when he says: "It is 
impossible for me, to forbear lamenting with you the general 
.1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Sermon XI, sect. 1, 
ib. 185. 
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decay of religion in this nation; which is now observed by 
every one, and has been for some time the complaint of all 
serious persons. The influence of it is more and more wear-
ing out of the minds of men, even of those who do not pretend 
to enter into speculations upon the subject: but the number of 
those who do, and who profess themselves unbelievers, increases, 
and with their numbers their zeal 11 • 1 
There is another point which should be mentioned here. 
Among subsequent writers on Butler there is a good deal of 
confusion and misconception about his vie\.,r of morality, with 
the result that he has been very differently interpreted. 
Perhaps few thinlters have been interpreted as variously as 
Butler. It seems to us that there are two main reasons for 
this confusion. The first is the belief of some writers2 on 
Butler that his ethical teaching is exclusively confined to 
his 'Fifteen Sermons' only, and that the Analogy is a \-Tork 
dealing exclusively with religious controversies. This has 
been the main cause of the controversy about the nature of 
conscience, benevolence and self-love. It is no doubt true 
that the nucleus of Butler's ethical teaching is contained in 
hi-s .Sercmons. a-t the Ralls Chapel-, especially t-he first -three 
which contain his fundamental ideas and which thus provide the 
1. 1The Works of Joseph Butler•. Vol. II, A charge to the 
clergy, sect. 1, P· 397· 
2. We shall have occasion to refer to such writers later on. 
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foundations of' his \oJ"hole ethical teaching. But it must not be 
forgotten that his moral ideas are to be found in his later work, 
e.g. that 'Analogy• especially the first part of it, and for a 
complete and adequate appreciation of Butler's moral teaching 
the study of his 'Analogy' is very essential. 
The second reason for this confusion about Butler's ethical 
teaching is the belief among some readers that his original 
etlucal view underwent a change and that he thus preaches quite 
a different ethical theory in his later work. They hold that 
Butler puts forward one theory in his 'Fifteen Sermons• and a 
different ethical theory in his •ru1a~ogy•. This seems to me to 
be a completely mistaken notion. It is true that there was a 
long gap of ten years between the publication of Butler's 
Fifteen Sermons (1726) and that of his Analogy (1736) but this 
by itself is no proof of the fact that he changed his view in 
the Analogy. A patient perusal of Butler 1 s \frorks does not give 
any indication that his original ethical view, which he out-
lined in the Sermons, under\-rent any radical change. It must 
be admitted, however, that in some respects Butler seems more 
emphatic in his Analogy than he is in his •sermons•, but this 
does_ not me1;1n th~t h~ changed his vi_~w a~19- prQpo~~<;led an al-
together new ethical theory in his 'Analogy•. On the contrary, 
far from propounding any new theory, the 1Ana+ogy' supports 
and relies on the fundamental position of 'Sermons•. Indeed 
the nucleus or the germs of the Analogy are found in his 
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'Sermons• especially •on the ignorance of man•. The suggest-
ions which Butler makes in this Sermon are expanded, elabora-
ted and applied with great force ~n the Analogy. 
Again, the long preface and the foot-notes which Butler 
adds to the second edition of his $ermons at the Rolls do not 
suggest any change in his vie\or. They are only aimed at remov-
ing certain ambiguities and obscurities about which there was 
complaint by the readers \onlen the first edition came out. 
They should therefore be taken as merely elucidatory and 
explanatory and not suggestive of any change in the original 
vie'llr of Butler 1 s moral philosophy. 
\'le now come to Butler 1 s main ethical teaching. 'l'he 
central point about his moral theory is contained in his view 
of' hliman nature. Butler's main thesis is that virtue consists 
in f'ollo\oring nature, and vice in deviation from it. He is 
not of' course the pioneer in this respect. The theory is at 
least as old as stoicism. It was the famous tenet of the 
stoics. 'fhey had already taught that virtuous life was life 
according to nature. Butler probably refers to them when he 
says: "That the ancient moralists had some in'llrard feeling or 
othe~, which th_~y clwse to express in this manne_r_; tha_t man 
is born to virtue, that it consists in following nature, and 
that vice is more contrary to this nature than tortures or 
death, their ,.,orl{s in our hands are instances" •1 
1. 'The Works of J-oseph Butler', Vol. II, Pref. to Sermons, 
sect. 8, p. 6. 
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In the modern times the theory was developed by Thomas 
Hobbes and was then later adopted by Shaftesbury who expanded 
and elaborated it. 
At first sight it appears strange to say that virtue 
consists in acting according to human nature • It seems a 
meaningless assertion altogether. There can be no mode of 
acting which will not be in conformity to nature. To aslc people 
to do an action when it is impossible for him to do otherwise is· 
a mere absUl~dity. ?nus it appears that it is not only idle to 
recommend and exhort people to do what they cannot avoid doing, 
but also absurd to prescribe it as a rule of right conduct. 
Butler was well aware of this position. In fact his only justi-
fication and excuse for making a restatement of the old classical 
view is that the expression 'follow·. nature' is not properly 
understood in modern times and in many cases it is grossly 
misrepresented. Wollaston's remark against Sha~tesbury that to 
1 place virtue in flollowing nature is at best a 'loose way of talk' 
was in Butler's mind. He therefore first of all analyses the 
different wrong interpretations of the expression 'follow nature' 
or simp~y 'nature'. 
In the first place Butler points out that by 'nature' is 
- -
often meant no more than some principle in man without regard 
either to the kind or degree of it. But in this sense it would 
1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Pref. to lermons, 
sect. 9, p. 8. 
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be absurd to do any action contrary to man's nature, as any 
~eature whatever o~ a person may be called part o~ that person's 
nature. There will be no action which will not be in con~ormity 
to nature. It will be tantamount to doing as an individual 
pleases. "If by following nature were meant only acting as we 
please, it would indeed be ridiculous to speak of nature as any 
guide in morals 11 • 1 Butler therefore rejects this view of nature. 
'I'here is another sense also in which 'nature' is often used. 
In this sense it is frequently spoken of as consisting in those 
passions which are strongest and which most influence the 
actions. It seems that there is much truth in this sense of 
'following nature'. A man's action is invariably determined by 
the predominant impulse, he is moved to action by the impulse 
which predominates in him at the moment. 
But a little reflection shows that even in this sense 
'nature' cannot act as any guide in morals. It does not help us 
to distinguish between the vi:.rtuous and the vicious. A virtuous 
man will act according to the dominant virtuous principle in the 
same way as a vicious man will act according to the dominant 
vicious principle. Thus according to this view qf nature both 
the virtuous and t.b.e v:j._cious sail in the same boa-t a-s- ·they both 
act according to their dominant nature. Butler goes further. 
He holds that in this sense of following nature there is no 
difference between the actions of a man and those of a brute. 
He gives an example to explain the point. "Suppose a brute 
1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Sermon II, sect. 6, 
p. 56. 
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creature by any bait to be allured into a snare, by which he is 
destroY,ed. He plainly followed the bent of his nature, •••• 
there is an entire correspondence between his whole nature and 
such an action: such action therefore is natural. But suppose 
ta .. -
a man, foreseeing the~danger of ~ certain ruin, should rush into 
it for the sake of a present gratification; he in this instance 
would follow his strongest desire, as did the brute creature: 
but there would be as manifest a disproportion, between the 
nature of a man and such an action, as between the meanest work 
of art and the skill of the greatest mas·ter in that art". 1 Thus 
Butler rejects this view of nature also. 
It may be asked why does Butler mention these two views 
about 'nature' ? Possibly he does so for two reasons. Firstly 
he does it to emphasise that virtue does not consist in follow-
ing nature in these two senses of the term, especially the second, 
as most people then wrongly thought and believed. Professor 
Taylor probably refers to this when he says that Butler's aim 
is also directed to that type of people "who admit the reality 
of the promptings of virtuous impulse, but see no reason why we 
should be virtuous when we do not happen to be strongly under 
the influence of,' these irnpulse_s. ._._.. They_ hold that the 
natural and proper course of life is to have no settled rule of 
action whatever, to let every impulse, good or evil, 'take its 
turn as it happens to be uppermost'" 2: Secondly Butler tries 
to bring out conspicuously, and in sharp contrast against the 
1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol.II, Sermon II, ~ect.l3,p.6~. 
2. A. E •. yTaYlor. 'Some Featur~s of Butler's Ethics6', Mlbnd @L~XXXV, lNew series), No. 139, July, 192 , P• 284. 
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background of these wrong notions which he dismisses, the third 
view of nature which according to him is the right view and 
which thus provides a criterion of what we should do, Butler 
takes 'human nature' in the sense of a system, a constitution. 
It is something like a concrete whole made up of several parts. 
Again it is not merely a sum total·of the different parts. It 
is, as we have said, a system in which the different parts are 
all arranged in a hierarchical order. According to Butler, to 
understand human nature it is not enough merely to know the 
several parts of which it is made up, but we must need to know 
their relations and the respects which they bear to each other. 
To make the idea clear Butler draws an analogy between the 
human nature and a watch. He says: 11 Suppose the several parts 
of it t~cen to pieces, and placed apart from each other: let a 
man have ever so exact a notion of these several parts, unless 
he considers the respects and relations which they have to each 
other, he will not have anything like the idea of a watch •••• 
let him for.m a notion of the relations which those several parts 
have to each other - all conducive in their respective ways to 
this purpose, showing the hour of the day; and then he has the 
S.o_ it is with regard _to the. inward frame_ 
of man. "It is from considering the relations which the several 
appetites and passions ~ft the inward frame have to each other, 
and, above all, the supremacy of reflection or conscience, that 
we get the idea of the system or constitution of human nature. 
1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Pref. to aermons, sect. 
II, pp. 8-9. 
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And from the idea itsel:e it will as fulJ.;y- appear, that this 
our nature, i.e. constitution, is adapted to virtue, as from 
tlle idea of a V1atcl1 it appears, that its nature, i.e. consti tu-
., 
tion OI' system, is adapted to measure time'1 • .L 
But despite this analogy Butler admits that there is an 
important difference also. "A machine is inanimate and passive: 
but we are agents. Our constitution is put in our mv-n power. 
\'\ie are charged wi til it; and therefore are accotmtable. ·for any 
disorO.er o:..-· . 2 -violEd~iou u.L l L:'. 
Befor•e proceeding further it may be useful to point out 
that Butlel' is said to have borrowed the idea or"' human system 
01 ... constitution fr·om ShaftesbtU'y. Rev. Dr. 1\iatthews says: "In 
working out this conception Butler makes use of the idea of a 
system which had been employed by ShaftesbtU'y11 • 3 
It is no doubt tr·u.e that Shaf'tesl)ury believed and empha-
si sed perhaps moPe strongly than ~:u1y did. before that human 
nature not only contains self-affections but also social or 
natural affections as he C8.lls them. Nay, according to him it. 
also contains unnattli'al affections. Shaf'tesbtll'y also held that 
vir·tue can be attained only when there is a balance or· harmony 
LL 
among the cl.if'ferent impulses in the htunan natlll ... e. · 
---------· ·----·---
1. 'The Horl{S of .Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Pref. to Sermons, 
sects, 12 & 13, pp. 9-10. 
2. do. Vol. II, Pref. to Sermons, 
sect. 13, p. 10. 
3. VI.R. Matthews. 'Butler's Fifteen Sermons', London~ 19L~9, 
p. XXII (Introduction). 
··--·---' 
4, L.A. Selby-Bigge. 'British MoraJ.j_sts', Vol. I, OxfoPd, 1897, 
pp. 32-33. 
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Martineau summarises Shaf'"tesbury.'.s analysis of human nature 
in a beautif'ul passage which though long is worth quoting. It 
is thus: "He (Shaftesbury) groups the springs of' action in three 
sets: (1) Natural af'fections towards the good of' others; (2) 
Nattn~al affections (self-af'fections) towards one's own good; 
both of which admit of being either right or wrong; and (3) un-
natural affections towards no good at all; which can never be 
anything but wrong. The others have all of them a legitimate 
function, so that in themselves they are right enough; and when 
any one of' them goes wrong, it is by l.1ecoming relatively too 
strong - a fact which might be equally well expr·essed by sayine 
that its opposite is too weak; such excess or defect being 
mmBtural, because by nature there is a given right proportion 
among the sevez·al affections; the test of rightness being the 
economy of social welf'are. The mind or character• of a man or a 
society is a composite system for a concordant end, like a 
musical instr,.unent, which is spoiled for its perf'ormance if' even 
one or two of···ims strings should have a tension too great or too 
small for the pitch of the rest. Di stu.rbances of character, that 
is vices, arise from (1) the public aff'ectio~s being too weak; 
(2) the private being too strong; (3) the presence of unnatural 
af'f'ections that tend to no good at all. To be in the f'irst of 
these conditions is to f'orf'eit the chief source of' enjoyment; to 
be in the second is to court unhappiness; and to be in the third 
is utmost misery". 1 
1. James Martineau. 'Types of' Ethical lheory' 1 Vol. II, Oxf'ord, 1885, pp. 462-463. 
- 23 -
Shaftesbury's account of human nature sounds very impressive 
and of course egoism and altruism receive equal consideration at 
his hands. Virtue, accorcling to him, does not lie in the preva-
lence of any of the two but in the harmony and balance of both. 
This is all per:f.'ectly correct up to a point, but the f'act is that 
Shaftesbury' s account does not go far· enough, despite his genuine 
effort to reconcile self-interest and social good. 
The great defect of ~haftesbury's system is that he does 
not point out how the balance or harmony among the different 
elements of nature can be achieved. He does not suggest any 
mechenism through which harmony can be effected. It is not enough 
to multiply the number of affections in the hL~an mind. Again 
it is not enough to say that balance or harmony is needed. The 
important point is how it can be brought about. Butler not only 
suggests that virtue consists in the harmony among the different 
elements of nature but he also provides us with a detailed and 
elaborate mechanism through which this balance can be brought 
into being. In Butler's scheme is found the subordination of the 
lower elements to those which are higher and more authoritative. 
His system is a hierarchy in which some principles naturally 
govern and regulate while others naturally yield and submit to 
their government. 
Again there does not seem any logical connection between 
moral obligation and conscience in Shaftesbury. His conscience 
does not carry any authority with it. Butler visualises this 
inadequacy in Shaftesbury's system when he remarks: "The not 
taking into consideration this authori tyi;: which is implied in 
- 2L~ -
the idea of reflex approbation or disapprobation, seems a 
material deficiency or omisston in Lord Shaftesbury's 'Inquiry 
concerning Virtue'". 1 
According to Butler conscience carries the highest author-
ity. It is most authoritative, in spite of the fact that it is 
often overpowered by passions and affections. We all therefore 
ought to obey conscience. Butler says: "But allowing that man:-
kind haih the rule of right within himself, yet it may l)e aAked.; 
'What obligations are we under to attend to and follow it ?' I 
answer: It has been proved that man by his nature is a law to 
himself, ••• The question then carries its own answer along with 
it. Your obligation to obey this law, is its being the law of 
2 your nature". 
Thus it seen1s obvious that though Butler no doubt borrows 
the idea of a constitution from Shaftesbury it must not be 
forgotten that in his hands the conception of a human constitu-
tion changes altogether. It acquires a new meaning, new signi-
ficance. Professor Sidgwick remarks: "Moreover, the substance 
of Shaftesbury's main argument was adopted by Butler, though it 
could not pass the scrutiny of that powerful and cautious intell-
ect without receiving important modifications and additions11 • 3 
1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Pref. to Sermons, 
sect 20, p. 14. 
2. do. Vol. II, Sermon III, sect. 6, 
pp. 70-71. 
of Ethics', London, 3. H. Sidgwick. 'Outlines of the History 
1886, P• 187. 
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Sir James Nackintosh also observes: "He (Butler) o'\ored more to 
Lord Shaf'tesbury than to all other writers besides ••... Jet, 
whoever carefully compares their writings, will without diffi-
culty distinguish the two builders, and the larger as well 
as more regular and laboured part of the edifice, which is 
1 the '\tTork of Butler". 
After this diagression we come back to our main subject 
namely Butler's account of human nature. He analyses human 
nature and his analysis reveals that in it there are the 
appetites, the passions and affections, the principle of self-
love, the principle of benevolence and conscience. These 
five faculties are all distinct and they have their O'\Y.n 
respective functions in the economy of nature. 
An appetite is a desire to satisfy a bodily or physical 
urge, for instance, hunger, sexual desire etc. 
A passion or affection is a desire to satisfy a mental 
urge, for example, desire of esteem, revenge, compassion etc. 
Self-love is a general - rational principle \vhich aims at 
the individual's welfare and happiness. 
Benevolence is a similar general rational principle whic::h 
aims at the well--being and happiness of ot:hers. 
Conscience is the sovereign principle in man. It has 
authority over all other instincts and principles of action. 
There is a tendency among writers on Butler to overlool{ 
1. Sir J·ames Ivlackintosh. 'Dissertation on the Progress of 
Ethical Philosophy', London, 1851, P• 54-. 
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the distinction between appetites on the one hand and passions 
and affections on the other~ They·· seem to use all these 
synonymously, th~ugh Butler clearly maintains the distinction 
between them. His examples, as we have stated above, of appe-
tites are hunger, sexual desire etc.; while his examples of 
passions and affections are desire of esteem, revenge, com-
passion etc. Butler says: "Hunger is to be considered as a 
private appetite •••• .aesire of esteem is a public passion". 2 
It must be admitted hmo~ever that Butler does not emphasise 
their differences probably because it was not so much necessary 
to his purpose. 
Butler holds that, of the passions and affections, some 
tend more especially to private good and some to public good. 
But he does not think that there is any rigid distinction 
between these private and public affections. Butler says: 
11If any or all of these may be considered likewise as private 
affections, as tending to private good; this does not hinder 
them from being public affections too, or destroy the good 
influence of them upon society, and their tendency to public 
good".3 
· Self-love is a superior principle and should be clearly 
distinguished from the particular impulses. It is a r'egulative 
1. Professor Broad in his 'li'ive Types of Ethical Theory' uses 
passions, affections and appetites synonymously as if 
Butler meant to treat them as different names for the same 
thing. 
2. 'The Works of Joseph Butler•, Vol. II, p.4o {foot-note). 
3· do. Yol. II, Sermon I, sect. 6,p.40. 
- 27 -
principle. It aims at maximising the general happiness of the 
individual. In fact private happiness or good is all which 
self-love is concerned about. Its object is thus internal as 
opposed to the particular passions which are particular exter-
nal:. objects. "The principle \ore call self-love never seeks any 
thing external for the sake of the thing, but only as a means 
of happiness or good". It "belongs to .1. man as a reasonable 
creature reflecting upon his own interest.(~ happiness 11 • 1 
The function of self-love consists in organising those 
particular impulses which tend to the private good of the 
agent. It assists these private affections and allm.,rs them 
gratifications within their due degree. 
But though self-love is a higher rational principle men 
do not always act from it. They often act from one of the 
particular affections or appetites overpowering the promptings 
of self-love. In such cases self-love is not exercised. It 
is said to be exercised only when one coolly and calmly thinks 
about the human nature containing different impulses, abou~ 
the situation and the circumstances then obtaining and then in 
the light of these decides whether or not a particular impulse 
should be allo\'red gratification and if so in what degree or to 
what extent. In short self-love is exercised when private 
affections seek their gratifications under its guidance and 
supervision. 
1. 1The Works of' Joseph Butler•, Vol. II, .Sermon XI, sect. 3, 
P· 187. 
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Butler holds that an action in which self-love, in fact 
any higher principle, is overpowered by the strength of the 
particular impulse is an unnatural action. It is a wrong 
action. It is a case of usurpation, as there is in it a 
violation of the constitution of our nature. According to 
Butler it is also detrimental to the real interest of the 
individual. Eor, in any action, \-rhich is in conformity \olith 
the economy of human constitution, reasonable self-love must 
have its due place. 
The position of' benevolence in Butler's hierarchy of 
human nature is said to be a little uncertain. This has given 
rise to a good deal of controversy among writers on Butler. 
Such writers and critics of Butler can be broadly divided 
. 
into t\vo classe.s. There are on the one hand those, for 
instance Professor Duncan Jones1 and Mr. McPherson2 , who hold 
that Butler treated benevolence as a particular passion. There 
are on the other hand those, for instance Professor Broad3 , 
and Professor Barnes4, who hold that Butler meant to take 
benevolence in the sense of a general principle. We shall 
therefore discuss this vexed question in some detail. 
1. Austin Duncan-Jones. 'Butler's Moral Philosophy', (A volume 
of the Pelican Bhilosophy series), 19,2, PP• '8-'9· 
2. Thomas McPherson. 'The Development of Bishop Butler's 
Ethics', Philosophy, Vol. xxiii, No. 87, Oct. 1948, p.322. 
3· C.D. Broad. 'Five Types of Ethical Theory', London, 1951, 
P• 71. 
4. W.H.F. Barnes. 'Joseph Butler: 11 oralist', 'rhe Durham Univ-
ersity Journal, \Vol. XII, New Series, No. 2, Narch,l951, 
p. 41. 
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Our own view is that Butler means to treat benevolence 
as a general principle. The reasons for this view are the 
follov1ing: 
The first three Sermons of Butler are basic in the sense 
that they provide the theoretical frame-v10rk of his vlhole 
ethical teaching and the remaining twelve sermons are only an 
application and amplification of what is contained therein. 
It is in these Sermons that Butler tries to point out and fix 
the relative position of the different elements in the hier-
archy of nature. Now it is commonly agreed that a thing can be 
properly understood only when it is put in its proper context. 
Therefore to our mind any controversy about the position of 
benevolence, in fact of any particular element in the hierarchy, 
should be decided by a reference to these Sermons. 
Butler in the very first Sermon points out, I think, very 
unambiguously the position of benevolence in human nature. He 
says: "There is a natural principle of benevolence in man; 
which is in some degree to society, what self-love is to the 
individual" •1 Nothing could be more definite, and categorical 
about the position of benevolence than this. There seems no 
reason why this statement should not be regarded as sufficient 
and decisive as to Butler's view about benevolence. l\ir. NcPher-
son referring to this says that this is the only place where 
1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler•, Vol. II, Sermon I, sect. 4, 
PP• 35-36. 
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Butler speAks of benevolence as a general principle. 1 To this 
our reply is that this is not the only passage, there are 
various other such passages in Butler \'/here he refers to bene-
volence as a general principle. 
here. 
We shall quote some of them 
(1) "Is it possible any cap. in earnest think, that a pub~ic 
spirit, i.e. a settled reasonable principle of benevo-
lence to mankind, is so prevalent and strong in the 
species, as that ,.,e may venture to throw off the under 
affections, '\oThich are 1 ts assistants, carry it fonrard 
and mark out particular courses for it; •••• our 
country•?". 2 
(2) 11Thus the principle of benevolence would be an advocate 
'\odthin our own breasts, to take care of the interests 
of our fellow creatures •••• and the state we are in".3 
(3) 11Thus, when benevolence is said to be the sum of virtue, 
it is not spoken of as a blind propension, but as a 
principle in reasonable creatures, and so to be directed 
4 by their reason": 
(4) "'rhi s '\-Till further appear, from observing that the 
several passions and affections, which are distinct both 
1. T.H. McPherson. 'Development of Bishop Butler's Ethics'-1'. 
Philosophy, Vol. XXIII, No. 87, Oct.l948, P• 32:2. 
2. 'The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Sermon v, sect. 10, 
p. 103. 
3· do. Vol. II, Sermon XII, sect.4,p.212. 
4. do. do. do. sect. 19, 
p. 223· 
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from benevolence and self-love, do in general contribute 
and lead us to public good as really as to private 11 • 1 
(5) 11The sum is, men have various appetites, passions, and 
particular affections, quite distinct both from self-
love and from benevolence": 2 
I think that our list is ~airly exhaustive and it points 
out clearly that Butler takes benevolence as a general princi-
ple. We can, however, pursue the discussion a little further. 
It can be asked here that if it is as '\·Te have sho"m above that 
Butler is very explicit about the position of benevolence in 
human nature, "Thy then is coP_fusion and controversy about it ? 
Why is it that writers on Butler are divided on this issue ? 
Is it that Butler contradicts himself in some passages ,.,here 
he seems to treat benevolence as a particular passion ? These 
are some of the questions which naturally arise in this connec-
tion and we have to consider these. 
It appears to us that there are t\>IO main reasons 'for this 
confusion in Butler. 
(1) There are passages, mainly in sermons XI and XII and 
probably one or two in the preface to the 'Fifteen sermons• 
from which it appegrs that Butler treats benevolence as a 
particular passion. But it should be remembered in this connec-
tion what is the main purpose of Butler in these two sermons. 
His main thesis in these Sermons, especially the eleventh 
1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler•,_ Yol. II,- 5ermon I, sect. 6, 
pp. 3ti-40. 
2. do. Vol. II, Sermon I, sect.6,p.41. 
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Sermon, is that there is no conflict between self-love and 
benevolence. Butler tries to establish this point by shm.·Ting 
that benevolence is no more contrary to self-love than i·s any 
of the particular:·i~pulses. He himself very clearly says in 
sermon XI: "Thus it appears that there is no peculiar contra-
riety between self-love and benevolence; no greater competition 
between these, than between any other particular affections and 
self-love 11 • 1 Thus it seems quite obv:i.ous that Butler is only 
emphasising here the fact that benevolence is not more un-
friendly than other particular passions are to self-love and 
the emphasis on this point is probably due to the fact that in 
Butler's time people could not reconcile themselves to the view 
that self-love and benevolence could work together. Of course 
in this context benevolence stands in the same line as other 
particular passions in relation to self-love and I think this 
is a very important reason '\•Thy bene...volence is taken by some 
as a particular passion. But this obviously is not the inten-
tion of Butler. It can never be taken to mean that Butler 
meant to take benevolence as a particular passion. It is just 
~ type of argument which he adopts. One can very well chall-
enge his mode of argument but his spirit, his intentions, 
cannot be doubted. His argument is analogical here. Just as 
there is no conflict between self-love and particular passions, 
1. 1The Works of ·Joseph Butler•. Vol. II, 6ermon XI, sect. 11, 
P• 196. 
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so also there is no conflict between self-love and benevolence. 
It thus never means that benevolence is treated as a particular 
passion. It may also be pointed out here that the one or two 
passages in the preface to the §ermons where Butler seems to 
treat benevolence as a particular passion are also in the same 
context as we have in Sermon XI. There also Butler is explain-
ing the same principle, namely that benevolence is not more 
contrary to and stands in the same relation as other particular 
passions do to self-love. Butler says: "for whoever will 
consider all the possible ~aspects and relations which any 
particular affection can have to self-love and private interest, 
will, I thiruc, see demonstrably, that benevolence is not in any 
respect more at variance with self-love, than any other particu-
lar affection whatever, but that it is in every respect, at 
least, as friendly to it 11 • 1 
Moreover the argument that benevolence is not more contra-
ry than particular passions are to self-love should not be made 
the basis of proof that Butler treats benevolence as a particu-
lar passion only. It is just a matter of context. In one con-
text Butler seems to treat self-love also on the same level as 
particular passions and affections. As far as the question of 
working 'within due limit'and degree' is concerned self-love 
stands in the same line, or we should say, comes in the same 
1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler'. Vol. II, Pref. to iermons, 
sect. 32, p. 24. 
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category as particular passions. In fact in the preface to 
sermons Butler says that self-love in its due degree is as 
good as any other affection. But this does not mean that self-
love is a particular passion. 
The second reason of confusion is that Butler is not very 
precise and exact in his use of the language. He probably did 
not care very much for it. He was more anxious to get at the 
truth than about his expressions. Rev. John Eaton quotes with 
approval: 11 Butler was a close observer of phenomena and not a 
genius for language that cares principally for poetic effect 
and takes the thoughts at second-hand11 • 1 
Butler sometimes uses 'affection' also for general princi-
ple. In sermon XI, speaking about self-love he says: "it is 
an affection to ourselves; a regard to our own interest, 
happiness and pi•ivate good!'. 2 Whatever the reason for this 
lack of preciseness in expression may be, it is true that this 
is very largely responsible for a good deal of confusion and 
controversy in Butler. 
'rhere is one more point which should be remember•ed in this 
connection. Much controversy about benevolence is probably 
also due to its very nature. It is no doubt true that we mU.s:~ 
be calculating and prudent in the exercise of benevolence, that 
we blame imprudent benevolent men, but then it should not be 
'----·-·--·-------------·---------------
1. Rev. J.R.T. Eaton. 'Bishop Butler and his Critics', Oxford 
and London, 1896, pp. 4-5. 
2. {The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Sermon XI, sect. 5, 
p. 189. 
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forgotten that in actual life and practice it is very difficult 
to stick to this principle so rigidly. It often becomes 
impulsive in character. We are not always as calculating as 
Butler's theory of benevolence implies. In actual life when 
we come across a beggar or some such person, we, ~ery often, 
without much reflection help such persons. 
Again it is difficult to explain the nature of benevolence 
without referring to particular individuals or particular 
groups of individuals. Probably Butler himself gets into such 
, 
a difficulty when explaining benevolence he says: if there be 
any such thing as the paternal or filial affections; if there 
be any affection in htunan nature, the object and end of which 
is the good of another; this is itself benevolence, or the love 
of another". 1 
From all this we can see that a good deal of apparent 
inconsistency in Butler's treatment of benevolence is due to 
its very nature. But there is absolutely no reason for think-
ing that Butler treats benevolence as a particular passion. 
We thus conclude that despite apparent inconsistency Butler 
regards benevolence as a gene~al rational principle in human 
nature. 
We have briefly explained self-love and have also deter-
mined the nature of benevolence. We can now deal in some detail 
with the relation between these two general principles. 
1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Sermon 1, sect., 4, 
pp. 37-38. 
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Apparently it seems that self-love and benevolence are 
opposed principles. The former is concerned with individual's 
happiness and well-being as a whole and the latter with the 
general happiness of others. Self-love looks to the self and 
benevolence to others. Butler holds that there is, really 
_speaking, no opposition between reasonable self~love and benevo-
lence. In fact one of the great merits of Butler's,ethical 
teaching has been to establish a synthesis between these two 
seemingly opposed principles, the reconciliation of the claims 
of which has been a perennial problem in moral philosophy. It 
is really surprising that this important point in Butler's 
ethical philosophy is often overlooked by l1is interpreters with 
the result that some of them interpret him as 'an egoist', 
while others 'an altruist'. It must be remembered here that 
Butler is not satisfied merely with championing the cause of 
benevolence to overbalance selfishness. He goes further and 
is at great pains to show that it is abslblutely a mistalce to 
think, as is commonly done, and especially was in his ovrn time, 
that there is any inherent or peculiar antagonism between self-
love and benevolence. Butler discusses this principle in his 
preface to the Sermon~, and in Se~_ons I and III. But it is 
worked out more fully in the two Ser.mons 'Upon the Love of our 
Neighbour' (Sermons XI and XII). Butler always and everywhere 
insists on the principle that there is no peculiar contrariety 
between self-love and benevolence. In fact they involve each 
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other in the sense that they tend to realise the one and the 
same end. In other words the end which self-love tends to 
realise, namely the general happiness of the man as a whole, 
is exactly the end which benevolence also tends to realise. 
We cannot thus promote self-love by repressing benevolence 
any more than we can promote benevolence by repressing self-
love. Thus self-love and benevolence are perfectly coinci-
dent and the greatest satisfactions to ourselves depend upon 
our having benevolence in a due degree. 
Again it must be borne in mind here that a reasonable 
regard to our own happiness and well-being is not selfishness. 
It is the weakness of social affections and the strength of 
private affections which constitute selfishness. But a life 
according to reasonable self-love is a life in \'lhich private 
affections are neither very strong nor very weak. In it both 
private and social affections are well balanced. Thus there 
is no conflict, no rivalry, no trial bet'\oreen reasonable self-
love and benevolence. 
But if it is so, as Butler says, it may be asked here, 
how is it then that the opposition bet\·Teen self-love and 
benevolence is commonly supposed to exist ? Butler ho-lds 
that all this talk about opposition between self-love and 
benevolence is based on a false supposition that "our happi-
ness in this world consists in somewhat quite distinct from 
regards to others"; whereas the truth is that "all the common 
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enjoyments of life, even the ~leasures of viee, depend upon 
these regards of one kind or another to our fello\'r-creatures"~ 
Again at another place Butler points out that 11lbe general 
mistake, that there is some greater inconsistence between 
endeavouring to promote the good of another and self-interest, 
than between self-interest and pursuing anything erse, seems, 
to arise from our notions of property; and to be carried on 
by this property's being supposed to be itself our h~ppiness 
or good 11 • 2 From this \ole jump to the conclusion that 11 as 
by increasing the property of another, you lessen your own 
property, so by promoting the happiness of another you must 
lessen your own happiness 11 .3 
But the fallacy involved in this position is obvious 
enough. There is a confusion of means and ends here. We are 
taking the means as an end and losing sight of the end alto-
gether. Jvloney is not an end in itself. It is only a means 
to the attainment to the other goods. i~ioney itself' is not 
happiness though when used in certain ways it produces 
happiness. Thus if we confine ourselves to means only and 
lose sight of the end it will no doubt appear true that out 
of a certain sum of money the more \ole spend on others the 
less we are left with. But if we care to avoid confusion 
----- ----------------------------1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Sermon III, sect. 8, 
PP• 71-72· 
2. do. Vol. II, Sermon XI, sect.l9,p.204. 
3· do. do. do. sect.20,p.205. 
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between means and ends and hold that money is only a means to 
happiness, we can at once see that there is no unique contra-
riety between self-love and benevolence. Even a small sum of 
money spent on others may produce far greater happiness in us 
than the large sum spent on our O\~ account. 
Then again the mistaken idea that there is an antagonism 
between self-love and benevolence ignores a very important 
truth upon which Butler always insists. He argues that a 
benevolent temper is itself agreeable. It is itself the temp-
er of satisfaction and enjoyment. On the contrary a malevo-
lent temper is .itself disagreeable. It is itself the temper 
of uneasiness and dissatisfaction. The gratification of 
benevolence, compassion and good-will generate that temper 
of mind in men which, i~ not identical with general happiness, 
undoubtedly makes a great contribution to it. The gratifica-
tions of these are, at any. rate, accompanied by much less 
uneasiness and fe\·Ter disappointments in life than are the 
gratifications of revenge and malice. The life of a revenge-
ful man is comparatively very uneasy. He is always in fear 
of retaliation from his victim. All this Butler ~mself very 
clearly pq_i_nts out. He first raises a number of questions_: 
i 
·~s benevolence less the temper of tranquility and freedom 
than ambition or covetousness ? Does the benevolent man 
appear less easy with himself, from his love to his neighbour? 
Does he less relish his being ? Is there any peculiar gloom 
seated on his face ? Is his mind less open to entertainment, 
- ~-
to any particular gratification ? 11 And then he answers: 
11Nothing is more manifest, than that being in good humour, 
,.,hich is benevolence whilst it lasts, it itself the temper of 
satisfaction and enjoyment, 111 At another place he again very 
clearly says: "Let it not be taken for granted that the t'emper 
of envy, rage, resentment, yields greater delight than meek-
ness, forgiveness, compassion and good-will; especially when 
it is acknowledged that rage, envy, resentment, are in them-
selves mere misery; and the satisfaction arising from the 
indulgence of them is little more than relief from that misery; 
whereas the temper of compassion and benevolence is itself 
delightful; and the indulgence of' it, by doing good, affords 
new positive delight and enjoyment 11 • 2 Thus it is clear that 
"benevolence contributes more to private interest, i.e. enjoy-
6LA-
ment or satisfaction, than anyl-of the particular common 
affections, as it is in a degree its own gratification 11 • 3 
Butler by identifying the claims of self-love and bene-
volence seems to vindicate a great truth the importance of 
which is unfortunately not generally a~d commonly recognised. 
Most people notJ ~nly believe, but also act on the false 
supp-osition, that by injuring others (those-they fear) they 
can do good to themselves. But though it may sound paradoxi-
1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, iermon ~;.XI, sect. 13, 
P· 198 
2. do. do. §ermon III, sect. 10, 
P• 73. 
3. do. do. .Sermon XI, sect. 20, 
P• 205. 
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cal there is much truth in the view which Butler propounds 
that actions which promote the happiness of others are also 
those which are conducive to the happiness of the self. Also 
actions which are harmful or injurious to others are such as 
in the long run injure the interest of the self also. 
It may be objected here that Butler exaggerates the coin-
cidence between self-love and benevolence. It is possible to 
imagine situations where his theory does not work~ where the 
two principles would be opposed. But in reply it may be 
pointed out that the reconciliation between self-love and 
benevolence has been the standing difficulty in moral philoso-
phy. It is extremely difficult to provide any comprehensive 
ethical principle which can cover all situations, real and 
imaginary, immediate and remote. Butler by his new interpreta-
tion and evaluation of human nature, and especially of self-
love, has developed and areued for a principle which undoubt-
edly goes a long way towards solving the difficulty. If people 
act on this principle, if all nations form a world-unit and 
adopt this principle as their policy and sincerely work on it, 
there would be much happiness in the world and it would be a 
-
much better place to live in. Nay more, if all men act on 
this principle Utopia might well be realised. 
With regard to the relative position of self-love and 
benevolence in the hierarchy of human constitution there seems 
some confusion among writers on Butler. Professor Barnes holds 
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that Butler does not treat benevolence as of equal importance 
with self-love in the individual's make-up. 1 Professor Broad 
again while holding self'-love and benevolence as co-ordinate 
principles believes that conscience rates benevolence higher 
than self-love. 2 It is difficult to say whether Butler him-
self would have accepted either of these interpretations~- '!'he 
question whether self-love is more important or benevolence 
is so in the individual make-up does not arise in Butler. 
There are two points which may be submitted here. 
(i) In Butler's scheme of human nature all elements, 
appetites, passions and the general principles of action are 
equally necessary. They are not only equally necessary, 
but equally important too. They all have their respec-
tive functions in the economy of nature. For the proper 
functioning of the nature as a whole, all elements have to 
piliay their role and contribute their share. If' an element 
goes wrong the entire machinery is paralysed. It might be 
a~id that no doubt the particular impulses 8De all mecessary 
and good provided they are within their due degree. This is, 
of course, true but then this proviso equally applies to 
the higher principles - self-love and bemevolence. Thus 
it seems obvious that all elements are equally important in 
---
1. W.H.F'. Barnes. 'Joseph Butler: M01,alist', The Durham liJniver-
sity Journal, Vol.XII, New series, No.2, March 1951, p.41. 
2. C.D. Broad. 'Five Types of Ethical Theory' J I,ondon, 1951, 
p. 73. 
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Butler 
~~ 
{ii) Then again~self-love and benevolence are 
distinct principles they necessarily imply each other, so 
much so that we cannot promote the one without considering 
the other. True self-love always implies the good of 
others and the good of others always implies the good of 
the self. In this sense self-love includes benevolence 
~1d conversely b~~ev~lcnco includes self~love, both hav~ng 
the same end. If we lack in benevolence, we equally lack 
in self-love though we may manifest much selfishness; if 
there is not too much benevolence, there is not too much 
self-love either. Indeed a great deal of unhappiness and 
misery in life is due perhaps more to lack of sufficient 
self-love than close attention to it. It may be mentioned 
here that Professor Broad in order to prove his contentioD 
that conscience rates benevolence higher than self-love 
points out that from a psychological point of view self-
love and benevolence cannot be quite co-ordinate. He proves 
this point by saying that self-love gets something out of 
every transaction which the agent undertakes but benevolence 
does not. To take his own example, if I lose my temper and 
blindly strike a man, self-love gets something out of the 
transaction but benevolence gets nothing out of it. It seems 
to us that Professor Broad probably overlooks the signifi-
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cance of Butler's self-love. We do not think that real 
self-love, which Butler means when he says self-love, \•Till 
get anything out of' the transaction instanced here. Butler 
would not have accepted the interpretation. Real self-love 
cannot get anything out of the transaction \>Thich an agent 
undertakes blindly or at the promptings of any impulse 
disregarding altogether the authority of self-love. 
We conclude that in Butler both self-love and 
benevolence are equally important principles. The question 
whether conscience rates one principle higher than the 
other does not arise in Butler's account of human nature. 
Conscience would approve both courses of conduct provided 
the constitution of human nature is not violated. 
Conscien~e is the highest principle in the hierarchy 
of the human constit~tion. Butler holds that no one can 
deny that there is such a prtnciple of reflection or conscience 
in human nature. Its existence can be immediately experienced 
through introspection. Its existence in others can be 
inferred from their action, their bahaviour. We all have 
an irresistible tendency to pass moral judgments both in reg-
ard to our 0\10 acts and in that of others, which unmistakably 
proves that all possess a moral faculty which approves or 
disapproves our acts. We may call it moral reason, moral 
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sense or divine reason. Butler calls it conscience. It is 
the sovereign principle to \·rhich all elements of human nature 
irrespective of their strength are subordinated. It is 
through this principle that all elements are finally organised 
and redirected. The passions and affections, no doubt, have 
power, but conscience alone has authority. "Had it strength, 
as it has right; had it pmofer, as it has manifest authority; 
it \·TOuld absolutely govern the world 11 • 1 No action can be 
said to be right unless the authority of this principle is 
recognised. "It is by this faculty, natural to man, that he 
is a moral agent, that he is a la\'r to himself: by this faculty, 
I say, not to be considered merely as a principle in his 
heart, which is to have some influence as vrell as others; but 
considered as a faculty in kind and in nature supreme over 
all others, and which bears its m·m authority of being so". 2 
Although conscience is the highest principle to which 
one can appeal or look for guidance and advice in actual 
cases it is often overpowered by inferior orinciples like self-
love and benevolence, just as they are often overpowered by 
particular passions and affections. However it should be 
remembered that though conscience does not of-ten have full say, 
nevertheless it should. The fact that it is often over-
po\'rered, due to lack of necessary power, does not mean that 
1. 1The Works of Joseph Butler•, Vol. II, Sermon II, 
2. do. do. do. 
sect. 19, 
P• 64. 
sect. 11, 
P• 59. 
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it forfeits its moral right of making moral judgments. 
It n1ay be stated here that there is a good deal of contro-
versy even among the modern writers about the re~Ation 
between self-love and conscience in Butler. Some writers, 
to whom we shall have occasion to refer at the appropriate 
place, go so far as to hold that Butler is a rational egoist. 
The consideration of this problem will involve much discuss-
ion; and we shall therefore devote a separate chapter 
(Chapter III) to it. 
Chapter II. 
Butler's Refutation of Psychological Egoism. 
In order to comprehend and appreciate fully Butler's 
~ 
refutation of the doctrine of universal selfishness it is 
necessary to know something abou.t how ttte problem arose for 
him. Thomas Hobbes had published h.is Leviflthan in 1651. 
In this he had advocated a moral theory on the basis of the 
analysis of human nature. But his account of hwnan nature 
was so perverted that 'Butler regarded it as dllngerous to 
purnlie:·. and(lppiirate morels' •1 
Hobbes was the most uncompromising advocate of selfish 
philosophy. He preached the doctrine of universal self'ish-
ness. Man is completel.¥ selfish, devoid of social feelings 
altogether. He thus s·truck the social affections out of the 
map of human nature and made self the ultimate object of all 
human action. Personal gratifi~ation is, according to him, 
the sole end of all human activity. This principle 
enunciated by Hobbes was pushed to its cynical extreme by 
Bernard Mandeville in his 1The Fable of the Bees' in which he 
gave perhaps the lowest estimate of morality. 
- -·- -Hobbes-1·s -theory··-o f' ·-human- nature · was -·bound ·to· ·-rous-e-and -
stir the most violent reaction. It led to a tremendous ~nount 
of' opposition and discussion which continued f'o;r more than a 
centur,y and the ethics of the period is a series of' attempts 
to demolish Hobbism. 
1. 'Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics ~ 1 Edinburgh, 1910. 
- Vol. III, p. 48. 
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The opposition to Hobbes's moral theory took three main 
directions. Ralph Cudworth, who was the most distinguished 
in the group of thinkers called the 'Cambridge Platonists 1 , 
and Samuel Clarke were the first to question Hobbes's view of 
, 
morality as being a mere matter of convention. Their aim is: 
directed agains·t Hobbes 1s· viev1 that morali-ty is a mere matter 
of calculation and moral law is a collection of arbitrary 
state enactments.. They held that there is something more 
abou.t rightness and wrrongness than mere external authority. 
Moral 1aw is rooted in the nature of things. Morality is 
eternal and immu:table and moral truths are unalterable 1ike 
mathematical truths, independent of both human and divine 
1 
will. 
The sec-ond line of opposition to Hobbes •s moral. 
philosophy is found in Richard Cumberland. As opposed to 
Hobbes's view of man as naturally evil and in a state of war 
when::. every man is eneiiW" to every man, 2 Cumberland holds that 
man is not by nature at war with his fellow--beings. Every 
man is not enemy to every man. There is, according to him, 
no conf~ict"between the good of the society and that of the 
individual.. 
1. L..A. Selby-Bigge. 
2. do. 
'British Moralists', Vol~ II, Oxford! 1897l 
pp. 11, 248-249. 
do. p. 291. 
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The fUndamental principle of Cumberland's system of 
Ethics is that the greatest benevolence of every rational 
agent to all others is the happiest state of each individual, 
as well as of the whole.1 
In Shaftesbury we find the third line of opposition 
to Hobbes's view. As opposed to Hobbes•·s that man is a 
completely selfish being, devoid of all social feelings, 
Shaftesbury holds that in addition to self-affe-ctions there 
are also natural or social affections in man's nature. Nay: 
more, according to h~, there are also unnatural affections 
in human nature. 
But But1er was probably not satisfied with all these 
criticisms directed against Hobbism. 
Despite Shaftesbury's genuine desire to vindicate the 
existence of social affections in human nature Butler does 
not seem happy with his psycholo·gical analysis which he 
considers inadequate and in need of further and fuller 
e!Xamination 
It appears that Butler was not satisfied with the 
. 
criticisms of Cudworth and Clarke either. This is probably 
for two reasons. (1) Rather than criticisdng Hobbes, Cudworth 
and Clarke- had substituted a new theory. They had in fact 
advanced a new theory of morality. (11) -Butler was 
1. Richal'd Cumberland. 'A Treatise of the Laws of Nature', 
Eng. trans. by John Maxwell, London, 1~27, Chap. I, pp.53,55, 
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probably not happy with the a priori or rationalistic 
apProach to1 morality, despite the fact that he considers it 
as one of the two ways in which the subject of 1norals may be 
1 treated. The fact is that Butler wanted to bring morality 
closer to life which he felt could not be done by mere 
speculation or over-refinements. He says: "let me just take 
notice of the danger of over-great refinements; of going beside 
or beyond the plain, obvious, first appearances of things, 
upon t.h~ subject. of moi·als and religion. The least. 
observation will show, how little the generality of men are 
. !' 2 
capable of speculat1onel. · 
Butler therefore himself takes up the task of refuting 
Hobbes's moral theory .and in order to give it a final blow 
he decided to meet h~n on bis own ground. 
We may begin with Butler's critical examination of 
Hobbes's notion of 1 benevo~ence 1 • Butler, while criticising 
~ 
Hobbes's int.erpretat ion of benevolence, makes a very judie ious 
remark. He says those who exclude social elements altogether 
from the map of human nature have perforce, in order to conform 
to their theory, to give some such explanation of those facts 
of human mind, the existence of which they themselves cannot 
1. 'The Works or. Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Pref. to Sermons, 
sect. 7, p. s. 
2. do Vol. II, Sermon v, sect. 15, 
p. 106 
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deny. Butler says: "Suppose a man of' learning to be writing 
a grave book upon Human Nature, and to sho"' in several parts 
of it that he had an insight into the subject he was consider-
ing; •••• that this learned person had a general hypothesis, 
to 'llrhich the appearance of good-'llrill uould not otherwise be 
reconciled ? 111 In regard to this remark Professor Duncan-
Jones rightly observes: "This remark, rather than the particu-
2 lar refutations, really gives the essence of the matter." 
Butler then proceeds to examine Hobbes's view of 
benevolence. Hobbes defines it thus: 11There is ~et another 
passion someti1nes called love, but more properly good-will 
or charity. There can be no greater argument to a man, of his 
m·m power, than to find himself able not only to accomplfush 
his 0\~1 desires, but also to assist other men in theirs: and 
this is that conception \..rherein consisteth charity. 113 Against 
this view of benevolence Butler points out the difficulties, 
rather the absurdities that are involved in it. He says that 
if Hobbes be right ho\oT is it then that \·Te sometimes wish good 
to another which we cannot do for him, yet we rejoice and feel 
delighted when some one else does it for him ? Obviously 
in this case there is no ·opportunity fcbr the exe1·cise of power 
--1. 'The WorRs of Joseph Butler•, Vol. II, pp. 35-36 (foot-note).-
2. Austin Duncan-Jones. •Butler's J'lioral Philclsophy 1 , (A 
volume of the Pelican Philosophy series), 1952, p. 109. 
3· L.A. Selby-Bigge. (British l·•Ioralists•, Vol. II, Oxford, 
1897, P· 299. 
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on our part as we ourselves do not have any share in the 
transaction but the joy is there neveii'theless. There is 
thus no denyine; that \.,e all rejoice and feel delighted, T.imless 
G>f course we are evilly disposed, at the prosperity of others 
even though "'e have no hand in leading to their prosperity. 
Hobbes's account of benevolence cannot account for the 
existence of such a tendency in man, which undoubtedly every 
man has. By this crucial instance Butler conclusively proves 
that benevolence is not a mere exercise of power or egoism 
in disguise as Hobbes contends. 
Again it sometimes happens that we often prefer to help 
A rather than B though vTe l:r_novl full well that helping the 
latter would provide a greater exercise of power. As in the 
first instance, so here Hobbes's theory fails tm account for 
such facts. 
Furthermore, if Hobbes's vie"' be true, if all acts spring 
from the mere desire to exercise pmver then there remains no 
distinction between acts of good-\.,ill and charity on the one 
hand and mischief and crueltyj on the other. Because to do 
mischief is also to have delight in the exercise of pm·Ter. 
Restraints are put on man's doing mischief, but they may not 
always-oe there. He could in those circumstances exercise 
greater pm.,er in doing mischief. Thus on this vi.e\.J' charity 
and cruelty become one in essence as they both equally gratify 
our sense of pm•Ter. 'l'his is a manifest absurdity. If 
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goo~will and cruelty be both merely different modes of the 
exercise of power, as on this showing they are, then the very 
distinction between the two is obliterated and one cannot be 
preferred to the other. This is obviously an absurd 
proposition. Butler remarks: "These are the absurdities 
which even men of capacity run into, when they have occasion 
to belie their nature, and will perversely disclaim that 
image of God which was originally stamped upon it, the traces 
of which, however faint, are plainly discernible upon the 
mind of man". 1 
Butler does not stop here. He gives yet another blow 
to Hobbes's theory. He points out that the existence of 
benevolence ~ be proved by direct observation. "If' any 
person can in earnest doubt, whether there be such a thing 
as good-will in one man towards another; l.et it be observed, 
that whether man be_ thus, or otherwise constituted, •••• is a 
mere question of fact or natural history, not provable 
i.mmedia t ely by reason. It is therefore to be judged of·and 
determined in the same way other facts o~ matters of natural 
history are: by appealing to the external senses, or inward 
perceptions, respectively, as the matter under consideration 
-- -
is cognizable by one or the other: by arguing from 
acknowledged facts and actions i .•••• and lastly, by the 
2 
testimony of' mankind." Butler thus proves the existence of 
1. 'The Woz•ks of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, p. 37 (foot-note). 
2. do Vol. II, p. 37 (foot-note). 
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benevolence in man's nature. 
Butler is equal1y damaging in his criticism of Hobbes's 
account of 1pity1 to which we now turn. Hobbes defines 
pity thus: 'tPity is imagination or fiction of future 
calrunity to ourselves, proceeding from the sense of another 
man's calarnity11 • 1 Butler examines Hobbes's account of 1pity1 
. ~ 
in Sermon five 'Upon conqJassion' and tries to point out the 
practical difficulties as he does in his examination of 
benevolence. Butler contends that if pity be regarded as 
the imagiMtion of future calamity to ours·elves proceeding 
from the sense of another man's calamity as Hobbes holds, 
then on this definiti~n 1fear and compassion would be the 
same idea, and a fearful and a compassionate man the same 
character, which everyone immediately sees are totally 
different•.2 It is obviously not true that fear and 
compassion are the same. Again were Hobbes's contention true, 
the conception of a compassionate man changes altogether. 
According to Hobbes's definition a compassionate man is he who 
.. 
fears for his o\vn safety and the more he fears about himself 
the more compassionate he is. T.his is obviously contrary 
to our acknowledged facts_ C?_f experience. 
1. Selby-Bigge. 'British Moralists•, Vol. II, Oxford, 1897. 
p. 298. 
2. 'The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, p. 94. (foot-note). 
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experience shows that one who fears· ve~ much his own safety 
is not usually sympathetic. Then again our attitude towards 
the compassionate and towards the timid or fearful is not the 
same. We often love, revere, and admire a compassionate 
being. We treat him vd th kindness and think very favourably 
or one who has been mercifUl and benevolent throughout the course 
or his life, i~ unfortunately he happens to fal1 into 
circumstances of distress, but surely we do not think so of 
one who is most concerned about himself and utterly callous 
to others' pain and suffering. Again Hobbes holds that we 
pity our friendS in distress more than strangers. Butler 
here raises a very serious and sound objection. He points 
out that if this were so, it would then obviously mean that 
we feel more fear for ourselves when we see our friends in dis-
tzoess than when we see other people in the same condition. 
This is certainly not the case. It is no doubt tr.'Ue that we 
feel more conpassion fQr our friends when we see them in 
distress than when we see strangers in the same plight but 
we do not see any reason why on that account we should fear 
more for ourselves. All this proves that pity is not the 
same as fear for ourselves as H.obbes says. 
- - - - -
After having thus refuted Hobbes's notion of pity Butler 
proceeds to give his own view about it. Pity according to 
Butler invol.ves three elements. (1) Real BJorrow and concern 
(genuine sympathy) for the misery ~f our fellow creatures. 
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(2) Satisfaction from a consciousness of our freedom from 
that misery. (3) Reflection on our·own liableness to the 
same or other calamities. Now in a particular case all these 
three elements may or may not be present or they may be 
present in varying proport-ions but according to Bu tJ.er it is 
only the first by which pity is generally meant by the prople. 7 
Butler thus demolishes Hobbes's theory of univeJ;"sal selfishness. 
The fact is that Hobbes advocated egoistic philos.ophy and he 
thus forces sympathy, in fact all other such social feelings, 
to fit in with his general egoistic philosophy. Sir James 
Mackintosh remarks: ·~uch were the expedients to which a man 
of the highest c1ass of understanding was driven, in order to 
evade the admission of the simple and evident truth, that 
there are in our nature perfec~ly disinterested passions, which 
seek the well-being of others as their object and end, 
without looking beyond it to self, .or pleasure, or happiness. 
A proposition, from which such a man could attempt to escape 
1 
only by such means, may be strongly presumed to be true." 
We have shown how Butler proves the existence of social 
affections in human ·nature. We s~ll just mention one point 
here. It seems to us that Butler is perfectly right in h_!_s_ "!~ew~ 
He has pleaded h·is case str·ongly and has established his point 
n..& 
quite ably and satisfactor~. The fact~there are social 
feelings in human nature cannot be doubted, and that man by 
nature, as Aristotie held, is a social animal. is perfect~ true. 
- .. 
1. Sir James Mackintosh. 'Dissertation on the Progress of 
Ethica2 Philosophy', London, 18.51, p. 31. 
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The inherently social character of man and the existence 
of natural social feelings, like parental care, genuine love 
and sympathy, and natural good-\..rill in one man to\orards another 
cannot be denied. Han's everyday experience is a \..ri tness to 
this fact. l~ien do sometimes sacr±fice their interest for 
their fellow creatures and thus that they do sometimes engage 
themselves in disinterested activities cannot be doubted. 
it is undeniably true that there is something like genuine 
attachment to !'amily, to friends, to country and to mankind 
in every man. The entire history of mankind is a proof to 
this undeniable fact. 
Mr. Ber~rand Russel in the very introduction of his ripest 
l'rork 'Human Society in Ethics and PO.li tics 1 admits the 
existence of social impulses in human nature. He says: "Nan 
is more complex in his impulses and desires than any other 
animal, . . . .. He is a semi-gregarious animal. Some of his 
impulses and desires are social, some are solitary. The 
social part of his nature appears in the fact that solitary 
confinement is a very severe form of punishment; the other 
part appears in love of privacy and unl'rillingness to speak to 
I 
strangers. 11 He again concluding his discussion remarks: 
11We must therefore admit t\tTO distinct elements in human excell-
ence, one social, the other solitary. An ethic which takes 
1. Bertrand Russel. 'Human Society in Ethics and Politics', 
London, 1954,- p. 16 (Introduction).. 
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account only of the one, or only of the other, will be 
incomplete and unsatisfying. 111_ 
· Agafn Professor Broad in a brilliant article2 on 
'Egoism as a 'rheory of Human f.iotives' has examined this 
question at great length and has given a very penetrating 
analysis of the different motives of human actions. He 
has therein given a number of examples to prove the existence 
of other-regarding impulses3 .in man's nature. <1ne such 
example is worth quoting here. "Let us next consider the 
case of a man who subscribes anonymously to a certain charity. 
His motive cannot possibly be that of self-display. Can vre 
say that his motive is to enjoy the pleasant experience of 
self-approval and of seeing an institution in which he is 
interested flourishing ? The ans111er is, again, that these 
motives may exist and may be strong, but they cannot be 
primary and therefore cannot be his only motives. Unless he 
1-rant s the institution to flourish, there 1-ri 11 be nothing to 
attract him in the experience of seeing it flourish. And, 
unless he subscribes from some other motive than the desire 
to enjoy a feeling of self-approval, he will not obtain a 
feeling_ of· self-appro_val. So here, again, it seems ~Q me 
1. Bertrand Russell 'Human Society in Ethics and Politics', 
London, 1954, p. 17, (Introduction). 
2. Hibbert ITournal, Vol. XLVIII, No. 2, January 1950. 
3. By other-regarding Jinnpulses, Professor Broad, means those 
impulses in which the primary emphasis is on the other 
person or thing and its states. p. 107. 
- 59-
that some of his motives must be other-regarding. 111 
These facts, I think, cleavly show the existence of 
other-regarding ~npulses in human nature. 
It may also be helpful to point out here that. the 
whole case for egoism is based on the following considerat.ions. 
It. is a view which provokes a favout'"able reaction in almos.t 
every one who makes his first attempt at speculation about 
.human motivation .. It ie a thaory \~ich appears plausible 
to almost every one at first sight when he is more or less 
uncritical. This is not t.o.say that all advocates of egoism 
are uncrit.ical. The fact is that, as we have already said, 
such philosop~e~ force the interpretations of social impulses 
into accord with their theory. But there seems no doubt that 
to any one, who thinks deeply and examines critically and impar-
tially the problem of human motivation,. who considers the 
different situations and circumstances in which men are 
p~aced and the various ways in which they react to them, the 
various relations in which. men stand to their family, relations 
etc. will undoubtedly see the inadequacy and the unplaus ib ili ty 
of the theory of universal selfishness. 
-- -
-· . . --- . 
Another reason for the apparant plausibility of the 
egoistic philosophy seems to be that the ell.ement of self-
interest is so strong in men. We are nearer to ourselves 
1. C.D. Broad. 'Egoism as a T.heory of Human Motives', 
Hibbert Journal, Vol. XLVii.i, No. 2, January 1950, p. 110. 
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than we are to others. Self-love is nearer to man than 
other passions. Butler also probably realises this when he · · 
points out that all possible concessions would be made to this 
favourite passion whose cause is universally pleaded.1 
There s·eems yet another reason for the seeming 
plausibility of the selfish theory. In most of our activities 
including those which are social and benevolent, the self-
referential touch is there. It is difficult to po.int out 
cases where a self-referential element is altogether_ absent. 
This seems to be a very potent reason for the plausibility of 
this theory. The fact is that human nature is a composite of 
self-regarding and other-regarding impulses. In almost all 
men both the kinds of elements are mixed up so much that they 
both determine his particular line of action. Thus in actual 
life a man is neither perfectly and exclusively selfish nor 
perfectly and exclusively benevolent. An individual is 
denominated as benevolent or selfish according as the unselfish 
or selfish elements predominate in him. Hobbes's theo~ of 
universal selfishness ignores these facts of life. 
It may also be usefUl to point out here that in 
criticising Hobbes's theory of universal selfishness Butler 
does not fall into the opposite er.ror of ignoring privA~e 
affe.ctions of human nature altogether. Without being eclectic 
1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Sermon XI, 
sect. 2, p. 186. 
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Butler gathers truth, which he had made the business of his life, 
from whatever source he finds it. He does not hesitate to agree 
with anyone when he is right. He recognises '\..rhatever elements 
of truth he finds even in Hobbes's theory but his originality and 
greatness lies in transforming them, and adapting them to his 
moral scheme. 
We have discussed Butler's criticism of egoistic theory. We 
have also seen his own analysis of the sentiment of pity. But to 
understand more fully Butler's position,. which entails a denial 
of psychological hedonism, it is useful, perhaps also necessary, 
to point out here a distinction upon which B~tler lays considera-
ble emphasis between particular passions and affections on the 
one hand and self-love on the other. Butler discusses this point 
in Sermon I and then again in Sermon XI, sections 3-7· Every man 
has a general desire of his m·m happiness, and self-love is that 
principle in human nature which aims at it. As we have already 
said it never seeks anything external for its own sake but only 
as a means to one's well-being and ~appiness. Particular passions 
and affections on the other hand aim at particular external 
objects. They rest in external things themselves. 
Butler points out that the distinction bet'\-reen self-love and 
rrarticular passions can be -clear only if we b-ear in- -mind the-
means of their gratification. "Everybody makes a distinction 
between self-lova, and the several particular passions, appetites 
and affections; and yet they are often confounded again. That 
they are totally different, will be seen by any one who "taTill 
distinguish between the passions and appetites themselves, and 
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endeavouring after the means of their gratification. Consider the 
appetite of hunger, and the desire of esteem: these being the 
occasion both of pleasure and pain, the coolest self-love, as well 
as the appetites and passions themselves, may put us upon making 
use of the proper methods of obtaining that pleasure and avoiding 
that pain; but the feelings themselves, the pain of hunger and 
shame, and the delight from esteem, are no more self-love than 
1 
they are any thing in the world 11 • 
Butler is not satisfied with this., He gives in the same 
chain a concrete illustration to exp~ain this point. 
11 0ne man rushes upon certain ruin for the gratification of a 
present desire: nobody will call the principle of' this action 
sel1'-love. Suppose another man to go through some laborious '\'Tork 
upon promise of a great re\o~ard, \o~ithout any distinct knowledge 
,.,hat the re\vard \J.Till be: this course of action cannot be ascribed 
to any particular passion. The former of these actions is plain-
ly to be imputed to some particular passion or affection, the 
latter as plainly to the general affection or principle o£ self-
love. 112 
But though the object of self-love is the general 
happiness of the individual as a whole, yet this happiness can be 
obtai-ned enly through the gratification of particular pass·ions 
and affections. In other words the general happiness which 
self-love aims at can be attained only through the enjoyment 
of those objects \'Thich are appropriate to our particular 
·-----------·--·------------·- -·--·-
1. •'rhe Works of Joseph Butler 1 , Vol. II, p. 39 (foot-note). 
2. do. do. do. 
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particular appetites, passions and affections. Thus self-love 
presupposes the existence of particular passions and affections. 
Butler says: "Happiness or satisfaction consists only in the 
enjoyment of those objects, which are by nature suited to our 
several particular appetites, passions and affections. So that 
if self-love wholly engrosses us, and leaves no room for any 
other principle, there can be absolutely no such thing at· all 
as happiness, or enjoyment of any kind '\-rhatever; since happiness 
consists in the gratification of particular passions, '\orhich 
supposes the having of them". 1 
We have said that self-love cannot be satisfied without 
satisfying the pa.rticular impulses. It presupposes their 
. 
existence and can find its expression only in and through 
them. But the converse is not always true. Particular 
impulses can be sati:Sfied without self-love. These often 
become predominant and prevail over men \-Tho sometimes perform 
acts which self-love would not ~pp~ove of. But though, as we 
have said, particular impulses can be satisfied \·ri thout any 
regard to self-love they ought not to be. In the absence of 
the rational principle of self-love particular impulses might 
be either too weak or too strong to achieve their real ends. 
In either -c-ase they destroy- the right relat·ion--among t-he 
different elements in human nature on which, according to 
Butler, virtue depends. In order therefore that the particular 
-------~--
1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Sermon XI, sect. 6, 
P• 190. 
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impulses should realise their real ends it is absolute~ 
necessary that these be subordinated to self-1ove, that 
they act undex· its guidance and control so as to maintain 
the balance and harmony in human nature upop which Butler 
always and everywhere insists. 
Thus though the distinction between self-love and 
particular passions is clear enough, yet it is ignored by 
Hobbes, who identifies particular passions with self-love. 
Hobbes tries to explain away all particular affections by 
representing the whole life as nothing but one continued 
exercise of self-love. He reduces the entire ~uman nature 
to the different forms and expressions of self-1ove. In 
opposition to Hobbes Butler maintains that the particular 
impulses are not different expressions of self-love. They 
are hot directed to the pleasure of-the self. Butler's 
thesis is contained in the significant proposition that 
"That all particular appetites and pass ions are towards 
external things themselves, distinct from pleasure arising 
1 from them". Moreover particular impulses may and often do 
conflict with self-love. We sometimes under the influence 
_ of __ a _p~rtic!l_J.!J.r i_mpu~e_ tal<:~ a cQura.~ of acti_Pn .wb.ich .. 
self-love would not approve. 
It may be a.sked, how does this mistaken reduction of 
L. 'The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Sermon XI, sect. 3, 
p. 187. 
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the particular impulses to different expressions of self-love 
come to be made ? Why does Hobbes, as dQ all egoists and 
hedonists, fall into this conun·on error ? Butler holds that 
this is due to tvio confusions. The first is the confusion 
between the ownership of an impulse and its object. Impul.ses 
no doubt· all beloAg to the self. They are all owned by the 
individual. But they do not all have as their object the 
individuc;tl self.. Some impul.ses are, of cours·e, self-regarding 
in the s·ense that they have as their object some change in 
the state of the a· elf". Hunger, for example, is an impulse 
which h~s for its object some change in the state of the 
self. But there are some impu1ses which are other-regarding 
in the sense tha;t. they have as their object some change in 
the state of others. Sympathy, for example, is an impulse 
which has for its object some change in the state of the person 
sympathized with. Thus it is a mistake to think that since 
all impulses are owned by the individual, therefore they all 
have as their object some change in the indivii.dua.1 self. 
The second confusion arises from the fact that the 
satisfaction of any of l'l\Y impulses gives pleasure and that 
the pleasure is my pleasure. It is true that the satisfaction 
of any impulse gives pleasure to the individual but it is not 
true that the object of any of these impulses ~s the general 
happiness of the individual. who o.wns them. For instance, 
the satisfaction of sympathy or even malice no doubt gives 
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pleasure to the individual but it is not true to say th~t 
their object is the general we11-being of the individual. 
The object of sympathy is the relief of another man's distress 
and that of ma.lice the production of another's misery. 
Thus though the gratification of the ~rticular impulses is 
very ess·ential for the general well-being of the man's J!.ife 
as a whole, it is wrong to hold, as is commonly done, that 
the gratification of any impulse means· the general happiness 
of the individual. The pleasure which the satisfaction of 
particular impulses entails is only a factor in the total or 
general happiness which sel.f-love aims at, but surely it is 
not the objec.t which particular impulses aim at. Thus the 
relation of particular impulses to self-love is as Professor 
o,r . 
Broad says; "that of means to end,; of raw materials to. 
finished produc.t"·.1 
Before closing this chapter we would like to raise just 
one more point. Some moral philosophers have questioned the 
propel .. use of the words 'object' and 'external' in Butler. 
Professor Duncan-Jones s~ys: "If we took Butler to imply that 
the object.·ive of a passion is always external, it woul.d hardly 
be pos~i'~~e_ to agre~ ~. •I! __ We may conc~de to Butler th.at the 
objectives of self-love are intei"'l~l in the sens·e explained, 
1. C.D. Broad. tFive '!ypes of Ethical Theory', London, 1951., 
p. 66. 
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but we cannot deny that the objectives of p@rticu~r passions 
1 
may be interna.l als·o''• . Again as regards the word 'object' 
he says: "Butler seems here to be accepting uncritically 
the colloo~uial use of the word tobjecti, when it is combined 
with words standing for desires or purpos·ive actions. It 
will not alv~ys be possible to follow his usage, and when 
something 1es·s elliptical. is needed the word 'objective' 
will be used. 2 Professor Broad also remarks: "In fact 
the object of an impulse is never, strictly speaking,. a thing 
or person; it is always to change or to preserve some state 
. 3 
o£ a thing or person11·• 
We shall firs·t consider the use of the word 'external'. 
.. ~ 
It appears to us that the very distinction between external 
and internal as made by Butler is ill-advised. We quite 
realise his anxiety to distinguish self-love from particular 
passions on which distinction his refUtation of psychological 
hedonism depended. Butler perhaps feared wrongly that if 
the object or objective of any impulse be taken as internal, 
in that cas·e it might be identified with individual's 
general happiness, in which case he might not be able to 
1. Austin Duncan-Jones. 'Butler's Mora1 Philosophy1 1 (A. 
. volume of the Pelican Philosophy series), le52, p. 50. 
2. do do do p. 49. 
3. c·.D. Broad. 'Five Types of E:thical. Theory', London, 1952, 
p. 67 
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distinguish self-love from particular passions. In his 
anxiety to maintain this distinction Butler forgot the vezy 
obvious fact that the objectives of particular passions 
could be internal without being that general happiness which 
self-love aims at. The very fact that an objective is 
intet~al does not necessarily mean that it is the same as the 
individual's general happiness. Thus· it appears that BuUer 
-probably misunderstood the thing. He should not have raised 
any dis·tinction like external and internal which also seems 
uncal~ed for from the fact that he has already given one 
criterion to distinguish self-love from particul.iitr passions by 
characterising the former as 'general' and the latter 
1 part icu1ar 1 • Thus it appears, as we have already said, that 
the distinction between external and internal is ill-advised 
and uncalled for. 
As regards the use of the word 1object 1 or objects which 
particula.r p~ssions and affections aim at, we have to point 
out onl.y one thing, that the modifications suggested in this 
connection may be perfec:tl.y justified in some s·ense but .the 
question is 1do they affect Butler's main ethical teaching' ? 
-
It appears that the answer must obvi_~sly be ~~o_1 ~- ~ey do· 
- -
not make any important improvement on But.ler 1s ethical theory • 
.. 
His main thesis· in this context has been to show and to prove 
that the end or object which s·eJ:.f-love pursues is not the 
same as that which particular passions and affections pursue. 
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Now whether we call the ends which particular impulses 
pursue as 'objects' as Butler does, or as 'objectives' as 
. . 
Professor Duncan-Jones does or say that they are 'always 
to change or to preserve the states of things or persons' 
as Professor Broad suggests makes no material difference 
to Butler's main ethical stand. Thus the modifications 
suggested here should not be taken in the sense that they 
correct Butler's ethical theory. They are simply another 
wa:y and pel"haps better way of expl ... essing and putting the 
facts. 
Chapter III. 
Virtue and Self-interest in Butler. 
The relation between virtue and self-interest is a 
very complicated problem in Butler. Self-love is one of 
the principles about whi9h there is a good deal of confusion 
among the writers on Butler's moral philosophy and thus 
their opinions on the issue of virtue ~d self-interest are 
very sharply divided. Professor Sidgwick, for instanee, 
holds that in Butler self-love and conscience are co-ordinate 
principles. They boith thus carry_ the same authority -~d 
self-1ove is not subordinate to conscience. He says: "There 
remain, then, Con~cience and Self-love as the two authorities 
in the polity of the soul. With regard to these it is by 
no means Butier's view (@s is very commonly supposed) that 
Self-love is natural~y subordinate to conscience - at least 
if we consider the theoretical rather than the practical rel-
ation between the two.· He treats them as independent 
principl.es, and so far .· ·', co- ordinate in authority that 1 t 
is not 1 accordi~g to. nature t that either shoul.d be overruled" •1 
There are others again, for instance Professor Seth, who hold 
that in Butler virtue is synonymous with self-love. Ke says 
1. Henry Sidgwick. tQJ.tlines of the History of Ethics 1 , 
London, 1886, p. 192. 
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'~i1~ue is not synonymous with benevolence, but in the 
last analysis it is synonymous with self-love. The latter 
is a reflective and reasonable principle of life; prudence 
and virtue are co-ordinate, if not coincident. In spite 
of the authority or· conscience, and the intrinsic quality 
of that rightness which it approves, Butler's morality is 
not disinterested; its raison d'etre is the individual 
1 .. 
happiness to which it leads". These interpretations are, 
as we shall try to show in this chapter, erroneous and 
ill-founded, because they are based on statements abstracted 
altogether from the context and background in which these 
statements are made. However, to assess Butler's final 
view on the problem of the relation between virtue and 
self-interest and thus to ar.rive at the correct estimate 
of his general ethical teaching, it is essential, especially 
in view of the very wide divergences among his critics, to 
examine this question in great detail.. 
But before proceeding further let us also see what some 
of the more recent Wl"i ters on Butler, who either co- ordinate 
self-lave with conscience or regard self-love as the highest 
virtue_, __ say _ab.out. it. Pr-of'es.sor Pr.ichar-d- holds- that -Bu-tler-
considet•ed condUciveness to happiness to be the condition of 
1. James Seth. 'A stuey of Ethical Principles', Edinburgh, 
- 1899, p. 176. -
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the performance of a duty. According to him it is a 
condition of our being bound to do some action that doing 
it wou~d make for our happiness. Professor Prichard sums 
up Butler's view thus: "There seems to be no doubt then but 
that Butler cons ide red that no act can possibly be really a 
. 1 duty unless it will be for our happiness". 
. 2 
Mr. McPherson also holds that Butler in his Sermons 
(including their preface)is an 1Ethical Eudaemonist•. By 
. . 
tEthical Eud&amonism' he means the view: that one '"s Oiim 
happiness or self-interest is the ultimate criterion of the 
rightness of an action. His own words are thus: 11Butler's 
refutation of Hobbes in the earlier part of the Sermons has 
not prevented Hobbism from reappearing in a more respectable 
form as But1er develops his own doctrine. Butler has refined 
1. H.A. Prichard. •·Moral Obligation', (Essays and Lectures), 
Oxford, 1949,~ p. 97. 
Mr. Thomas H. McPherson in his article 'The Develop~ent of 
Bishop But1er's Ethics' Part I, published in Philosophy, 
Vol. }QCIII, No. 87, October 1948, and Part 2, Vol. XXIV, 
No. 90, July 1949, holds that there are two different 
theories of ethics in Butler's work. In the Sermons, 
including the preface, Butler's theor.y is Ethical Eudaemonism 
and ib the Analogy and Dissertation on virtue he develops 
the theory of •·Intuit-ionism', by which he means· the view 
that we are inunediately aware: of the obligatoriness of 
__ particular. .act.ions_ in. pact..icular .s-ituations-.--
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Hobbes's crude egoism, but he h~s not made it any the less 
egoism. Butler is a rational egoist, while Hobbes had 
tended to be~ irrational egoist ••••••• If the ethical 
theory of the Sermons must be given a label, it had better 
be call.ed Ethical Egoistic Eudaemonism. • • • • Butler is an 
Egoistic Eudaemonist in that he believes that we ought to 
1 
seek our own happiness". 
Now, all who hold that B~tler considered self-interest 
as the so~e criterion for virt~~~~~ir view by quoting a few 
stray passages from Butler where he apparently seems to 
identify virtue with self-interest. The most important of 
these is the famous. 1 cool-hour 1 passage which occurs in 
. . -
Sermon XI 'Upon the Love of our Neighbour•. We quote here 
some of these as instanc.es · 
1. 
2 .• 
(1) "Let it be allowed, though virtue or moral rectitude 
does indeed consist in affection to and pursuit of 
what is right and good, as such; yet, that when we 
sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to 
ourselves this or any other pursuit, till we are 
convinced that it will be for our happiness, or 
at least not contrary to itn.a 
- - - -
I 
Philo&:9Phy, Vol. XX:IIl, No. 87, October 1948-, p. 330. 
'The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol. 1!1 Sermon XI, 
sect. .• ZL, p. 206. 
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(2) "Reasonable self-love and conscience are the 
chief or superior principles in the nature of man: 
because an action may be suitable to this nature, 
though all other principles be violated; but 
. 1 
becomes unsuitable, if either of those are't. 
(3) "Conscience and self•love, if we understand our 
true happiness, always lead us· the same w~. Du.ty 
and interest are perfectly coincident; for the 
most part in this w.orld, but entirely and in every 
instance if we take in the future, and the whole; 
this being implied in the notion of a good and 
perfect administration of things"·. 2 
We have po.inted out above some of those interpreters of 
Butler who hold that self-love exhausts the entire c:ontents 
of morality in him and we have also quoted those passages 
which they usu@lly use to support their view. 
We shall now come to those interpreters who. hold that 
Butler does not mean to regard self-love as the sole determinant 
of virtue. Those who hold this view of Butler have al~ tried 
in their own way to explain thos·e passages especially the 
coo1-hour pa-ssage wherein Butler seems to -identi~y v1rtu-e- vri-th 
self-interest.. Before starting our own discussions in this 
1. •·The Works of' Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Sermon III, 
sect. 13, p. 76. 
2. do do do 
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connection, it may be useful in the interests of 
clarification to point out here how others have tried 
to interpret and explain the famous 'cool-hourt passage 
which is the ~oat important of them and Which has created 
so nru.ch confusion among the writers· on Butler. 
Interpreting this passage Professor Broad says-: "I think 
it is clear from the context that he is not here asserting 
his ovvn view, but is simply making a hypothetical concession 
to an imaginary opponent"·. 1 Professor Taylor remarks: "We 
must therefore conclude either that Butler h~s by a mere 
oversight al~owed himself to make an incidental remark which 
is not really consistent with his considered position. and 
forgotten to correct it, or, more probably, that the remark 
was not intended as more than a temporary concession to the 
2 prejudices of an audience"·. 
Mr. Mossner observes: ~The passage does not fair~ 
3 
represent his true position". 
Mr. Spocm.er quo.ting the passage remarks that it "apparently 
makes the obligation of listening to conscience depend on its 
~conduciveness to happiness; ye~ there is no doubt tha~, in the 
· ---- 1.- c-.n~ Broad. 
·rFiv·e Types of Ethical TheorY--' , -London,- -1951, 
p. so. 
2. A.E. Taylor. 'Some Features of Butler's Ethics', Mind, 
Vol. XXXV, New Series, No. 139, July 1926. 
p. 297 
3. E:.c. Mossner. 'Bishop Butl.er and the Age of Reason', 1936,_ 
p •. ll9. 
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main, Butler's position is just the opposite of this". 1 
Profes-sor Barnes referring to the passage says: "This has some-
times been interpreted to mean that we cannot convince 
ourselves that an action is a duty except by calculating that 
it will be for out• interest to do it, and this because what 
~kes an action a duty is· its being to our interest. If 
this were the correct interpretation it would mean that this 
passage is not only inconsistent with the whol~ tenor of" 
Butlerts philosophy but is also self-inconsistent. • •• • I do 
-
not thirut Butler can have been guilty of such a gross 
. 2 
contradiction". Gladstone ref"erring to the tcool-hour' 
passage observes: "Doubtless this is true, vlhen once we have 
been challenged and put upon our defence. But it need not 
be held to imply that. the pursuit of 'right and goodt, of 
-
the noble and the true, requires to be waited upon, and as it 
were certified, by the continual presence and active 
consciousness of the idea that it will conduce to our personal 
happiness: which would indeed tend to bring down the pursuit 
3 1 tself from a higher to a lower plane"·. 
1. W.A. Spooner. '·Bishop Butler•, London, 1901., p. lll. 
-
. W-.H-.-F-.- Ba-~es-. -'Joseph Butler: ·1\IIoral.ist·•-_t--The· ·Durham- -
Univers1ty Jo~l, New Series, Vol •. XII, No. 2, 
March 1951, pp. 43~. 
W.E. Gladstone. •·The Works of Joseph Butler', Oxford 1896, 
Vol. II, p. 206, (foot-note). . 
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We have pointed out the.views of others ro1d in this 
respect perhaps we have gone further than what is absolutely 
necessary for our purpose here. However our own view with 
regard to Butler's account. of the relation between virtue and 
self-interest is that he did not mean to co-ordinate self-love 
with conscience. He did not consider self-love as the 
highest or the sole principle or· virtue. He regarded it 
as one of the general rational principles of human nature, 
superior not only in degree but in kind and nature to 
particular prop.ensions, but ultimately subordinate to 
conscience. Our reasons for holding this view are the 
following: 
We think that in inter·preting any controversial 
expression, or a passage or even a book we must first lay 
down some general standards or tests. For instance when we 
want. to interpret a book about which th~re has been some 
controversy, we mus·t take into consideration how the problem 
whi.ch the book at tempts to solve ~rose, and ;_under What 
circumstances the book came to be written. This test or 
criterion must be applied in interpreting all those passages 
in Butler wherein he apparently seems to resolve all virtue 
into self-love. In this connection we shoul.d remember that 
the problem which confronted But1er was handed down to him by 
his predecessors of the seventeenth century. We have seen 
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that Thomas Hobbes had enunciated the principle of 
universal selfishness which was brought to its logical 
conclusion by Mandeville. From his freQ.uent references 
to Hobbes, it appears that Butler's one main purpose in 
his Sermons at the Rolls Chapel was to demolish and overt,hrow 
Hobbism. Dum ~hroughou.t his Sermons Butler had Hobbes 
always before his mind's eye. Now if it is a fact, as we 
have tried to show that it is, that Butler 1s main purpose 
in his Se11nons was 'i:,o defeat and .overthrow Hobbism, then 
bearing in mind the criterion which we have set up, any 
interpretation which goes to show that Butler identified 
virtue completely with self-love cannot be accepted, as it 
goes contrary to the main spirit in which the 8er.mons came to 
be delivered. It might be pointed out here and perhaps 
rightly that this argument does not carry us very far. 
Butler no doubt demolishes Hobbes·• s theory o~ universal 
-
egoism and vindicates the eKistence of social elements in 
human natUl'e, but he admits self-love ~s pe~nissible motive 
for action. This is perfectly true. Butler re-evaluates 
self-love. In fact an important purpose in his refutation 
of universal egoism is also to reinterpret self-love. 
Acc:ording to Butler to act on the principle of self-love is 
virtuous. But the question with which we are concerned in 
this Chapter is whether even in his own sense Butler reduced 
all virtue to self-love, and to this our own answer, as already 
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given, is no. 
It seems to us that the best way to interpret any 
cont.roversial. point is to judge it in its proper context. 
In interpreting these passages where Butler seems to hold 
self-love as the highest virtue, two factors should always 
be kept in view. They are (1) the temper of the age and 
(2) his own situation and practical purpose. It appears to 
!'I!L'S that in these pa.ssages Bu.tler is reflecting the tendencies 
of the age. It has already bee:n said that Butlercs age was 
the age of reason. It was the age of individualism, and the 
majority·of people would recognise ho virtue higher than 
regard for their own self. Butler seems to realise this when 
he says: ~•rt may be allowed, withou-t. any prejudice to the 
cause of virtue and religion, that our ideas of happiness and 
misery are of all our ideas· the nearest and most important 
to us ".1 It is immediately after this that the famous 
'cool-hour' passage occurs. It appears that in accordance 
with the tendency of the age Butl.er is ·trying to allow as many 
concessions as possible to this principle which is so 
universally strong in every ~.n. Butler himself says that 
"for there shall be all po·ssible concessions made to the favouritE 
passion, which hath so much allowed to it, and whose cause is 
so universally pleaded: it shall be treated with the utmost 
1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Sermon XI, 
sect. 21, p. 206. 
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tender"ness and con cern for its interests". 1 Butler 
probably, consistently with the temper of the age, very 
strongly believed that happiness-laving men would not, 
under the circumstances in which they are placed in the 
world, act virtuously unless they also somehow believed 
that it would be to their interest. The word 1 justify1 
which occurs in the 1cool-hour' passage does not in this 
context 1nean anything more than that reasonable and 
happiness-loving people would not justify to t.hemselves 
any course of action unless tlley knew that it would be 
to their interest. This seems to be supported from the 
assurance he is giving to his audience, a promise as it were, 
that whatever inconsistency there is between duty and 
interest, shall be set right. at the final distribution of 
things. 2 Thus it se~ns that Butler is here trying to 
provide an additional motive for the practice of virtue. 
Interest of the agent is an additional reason for doing an 
act which is duty. This is not to say that the interest of 
the agent is the reason, far less the only reason, why duty 
should be perfo~ed. It is only to reinforce the perfor~ 
ance of virtue. That is all. Mr. Harrison rightly remarks: 
"More than enough food and drink may be bad for one, but. more 
than enough reason for a statement does not make it false or 
invalid, nor does more than enough reason for an action m@ke 
1. 1The Works of Joseph Butler', v·ol. II, Sermon XI, 
sect. 2, p. 186. 
2. do Vol. II, Sermon III, 
sect. 12, p. 75. 
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it wrong or irrational. If one person has a duty to do 
something Which is in his interest, and another has a duty 
to do something which is not, the first. has better reason for 
doing the action he has a duty to do (though no better reason 
foz· doing his duty) than the second, ·though the reasons of 
bot}?. are sufficient 11 • 1 
Another passage already quoted above in which Butler 
very much exalts self-love and thus seems to identify it with 
virtue occurs in the last section of Sermon III. In his 
emphasis on self-love Butler seems no less emphatic here ·than 
he is in the tcool-hour 1 passage. But then what his real 
purpose here is may be seen clearly from his statement which 
follows ~runediately after this passage. He is here trying 
to prove that there is coincidence between virtue and interest. 
Butler is at pains to show that reasonable self-love and 
conscience always lead us the same way. It is only to 
emppasise this point that Butler exalts self-love. It is 
his peculiar· technique, a point which we have explained 
elsewhere, that whenever he explains any theory he exaggerates 
it so much that he apparently seems inconsistent. But there 
is_abs~lute~y no_reas~n for thi~king that he ~reat~ sel~-lov~ 
and conscience as co-ordinate principles. 
Moreover it seems that probably Butler also strongly 
1. J. Ha~·ison. ~"Self-interest and Duty', The Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXXI, No. 1, A~y 1953, 
pP. 25-26. 
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believed that no moral theory which ignores self-love can meet 
with general acceptance. This seems to be an important reason 
why he considers prudence also as virtue. Thus in his 
emphasis on self-love Butler is merely reflecting the spirit 
of the age. After all, the speculative beliefs of an age 
very largely detennine its moral character. He is thus 
trying to win over his sophisticated audience by impressing 
upon them that reasonable self-love (not mere selfishness) 
is not opposed to virtue. But from all this it is wrong 
to infer that Butler held self-love to be the sole criterion 
of virtue. 
The second factor which has to be considered here is 
Butler's own practical pu1~ose and the circumstances in which 
he worked. He was a practical preacher of righteousness and 
his aim was to make people virtuous and religious·. Like the 
sagacious mru1 he was, he did not neglect to appeal to the 
motives of Inen, and men are moved by prudential considerations. 
It would have been quite out of place for Butler to preach 
and talk all the time on 'disinterestedness and benevolence' 
when he knew 'lr'iell that his audience were more or less self-
centered. He therefore touches their sentiment gently but 
effectively. He takes them by surprise, as it were, by 
telling them that he is one with them as far as regard to 
self-love is concerned, and thus t1•ies to walk with them on 
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the same track. Butler, consistently with his general 
ethical teaching, in his heart of hearts believed that 
if people acted from reasonable cool self-love, which, he 
held, necessarily involved the good of others, mp:ch ground 
would be gained. It would ultimately lead people to virtue 
and religion. 
Connected with these two factors, there is also a third 
factor which is very important in the sense that it goes a 
long w~ towards explaining Butlerts appeal to self-love. 
He reinforces his theory of virtue by the hope of reward in 
this life and in the next. He also holds that God is the 
moral governor of this universe and that He has annexed 
rewards and punishments to right and wrong acts respectively. 
Not only this; while creating men God endowed th~n with a 
moral nature and also placed them in a situation which provides 
their nature enough scope to operate. Butler says: "Now 
from this general observation, obvious to ever,y one, that 
God has given us to understand, he has· appointed satisfaction 
and delight to be the consequence of our acting in one manner, 
and pain and uneasiness of our acting in another, and of our 
not acting at all; and that we find the c-onsequenc-e-s, Whi-ch we 
were beforehand informed of, uniformly to follow; we may learn, 
that we are at present actually under his government in the 
strictest and most proper sense; in such a sense, as that he 
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1 
rewards and punishes us for our actions". The fact that 
virtuous actions are rewarded and vicious punished should not 
be understood to mean that re~rd and punishment are the 
criterion for virtue in Butler. In him there is the emphasis 
on virtue and not on reward. According to Butler an action 
is virtuous and therefore ~awarded, it is not true that it is 
rewarded and therefore virtuous. Butler nowhere makes virtue 
dependent on reward though the latter accompan~es the former. 
The point is that he held that things are so arranged that we 
were "so constituted as that virtue and vice are thus naturally 
2 favoured and discountenanced, rewarded and punished as such". 
Consistently with his belief in the divine government of the 
world Butler infers that God will reward virtue. A man 
can take it more or less on faith that a virtuous life will 
be rewarded by God somehow but he must work 1 without any 
distinct knowledge of wh~t the reward will be'. This faith 
cannot be said to be a matter of calculation for the inter·est 
of the agent. It is, as we have already said, just to 
reinforce the performance of conscientious actions. 
Again, were Butler an egoist, his answer to the questions -
Why must I do what is right 1 Vfuat obligations are we under 
to attend to and follow conscience 1 would have been 'because 
it is to your interest'. But Butler instead answers, 'because 
it is the law of your nature'. Though it must be remembered 
1. 'The Works of ~oseph Butler', Vol. I, Part I, Chap. II, 
sect. 6, p. 52. 
2 
• 
do. Vol. I, Part I, Chap. III, 
sect.20, p. 79. 
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here that according to Butler to act according to nature 
al::}. 
is also to one's interest. From/this it appears that 
Butler never held that self-love is the sole dete~ninant of 
virtue. 
Furthermore if it is held that Butler was a rational 
egoist and in h~n self-love arid conscience are merely two 
names of the same principle, then not only does this go 
against the general trend of his moral philosophy, but 
his whole emphasis and insistence on the authority of conscience, 
which is rightly regarded as the key-stone of his whole 
moi•al philosophy, becomes superfluous or meaningless. 
We should bear in mind here a point which we shall explain 
at its appropriate place that while self-love approves an 
ac·t.ion because it is prudent conscience approves it because 
it is right. 
It appears that Butler's frequent use of the expressions 
like 'duty and interest•, 'virtue and happiness• have 
given some of his readers the impression that Butler 
considered all virtue to be identical with the agent's 
interest. This is a mistake. There are three points to 
t:le borne i-n- -mind in this -connect ion. The first is that 
Butler, as is clear from his tone in Sermon III, believed 
that the situation in which men are placed in this world 
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and the circumstances in which they work are such that 
their own real interest ·is always best served by virtuous 
conduct. In other words it is through virtue that man's 
real interest can be best served. Thus it appears that 
by his insistence and frequent use of the expression 
'virtue and happiness' Butler is trying to convince his 
audience and 1nake them pursue virtue, as that way lies 
their real interest. This does not mean that Butler 
reduced all virtue to self-love. 
The second reason why Butler often speaks about the 
coincidence between duty and interest is ~hat according to 
him virtue consists in following nature, which means the 
whole of hUJUan nature. Now self-love being one principle, 
though a very important principle in human nature, action 
done in consequence of it cannot be wholly virtuous 
but nonetheless it is partly so. An action done in 
consequence of self-love is thus a species of virtue. 
The sphere of self-love is a necessary part of t~e total 
sphere of virtue which is the empire of conscience. 
In this sense there no longer remains a ~uestion of 
consci~nce and self-love, but it becomes a question of 
virtue and a part of virtue, and betvteen virtue and a part 
of viz•tue there c·an be no conflict. This explains the 
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coincidence between virtue and interest and this also shows 
that self-love is a part of virtue but by no 1neans the whole of 
virtue as is wrongly thought by many. 
The third point to be remembered in this connection is 
that Butler very genuinely desired that virtuous people 
should also be happy. In fact he believed that they are so 
even in this world;1 at least the tendency in virtue to make 
people happy even in this world is manifest and 1 the 
.1-·a·lHc:iples and beginnings of a moral government ovet" the 
world may be discerned, notwithstanding and amidst all the 
confusion and disorder of itt. 2 But despite this tendency 
of virtue to make poeple hapPy Butler seems to I"ealise that 
virtuous 1nen in this world are not as happy as they deserve. 
Pleasures and pains in this world seem to be distributed 
without mu.ch regard to merit and demerit. He says: "Good 
3 
men shrely are hot treated in this world as they deserve". 
Dut then Butler also strongly believed that there was 
some sort of unalterable correspondence b~tween virtue and 
happiness which, though partial in this world, points to 
1. 
2. 
'The Works of· Joseph Butler•, Vol. II, Sermon III 
sect. 10, p. ?3. 
do Vol. I, Part I, Chap. III, 
sect. 4, p. 66. 
3. Fragment No. 9. r~s. 9815 ~ritish Museum, p. 28. Also 
printed in Bernardts Edition of 'The Works of Bishop 
Butlert. London, 1900, Vol. I, p. 30?. 
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their complete correspondence in the next. Ifay, the 
unalterable relation between virtue and happiness is a 
postulate, it is necessarily implied in the· very moral 
order of the universe. Indeed it cannot be denied under 
the perfect a&ninistration of God because the very denial 
will me~n the denial of the perfect a&ninistra~ion. 
says: "It is a manifest absurdity to suppose evil 
prevailing finally over good, under the conduct and 
1 
Butler 
administration of a perfect Mind". Thus it apPears to 
us that Butler, for the final reconciliation between virtue 
and happiness, passes from the. :field of ethics to that of 
religion. 11A righteous government may plainly appear to 
be carried on to some degree.: enough to give us the 
apprehension that it shall be completed, or carried on 
to that degree of perfection which religion teaches us it 
shall; but which cannot appear, till much more of the divine 
administration be seen, than can in the pi•esent life". 2 
Thus it seems to us that the statements, where Butler 
seems to identify virtue with self-interest, if taken in 
their proper and appropriate context mean simply that the 
individual happiness is the natural or we should say, the 
1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Sermon III, 
sect. a, p. 75. 
2. 1The \1orks of Joseph Butler', Vol. I, Part I, Chap. III, 
sect. 4, p • 66. 
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inevitable accompan~ent of virtuous conduct. This is 
all that Butler in his repeated use of the expression 
'virtue and happiness 1 seems to suggest. The statements 
do not entitle us to draw the conclusion that personal 
happiness is, according to Butler, the sole ground of virtue. 
We shall now pass on to conside1 .. a few other important 
points which are nec.essary in this connection. Butler no 
doubt has said that there is coincidence between self-love 
and conscience, partial in this world and perfect in the 
next world. But this does not prove that self-love is 
identical with conscience. They coincide because they are 
both reas enable principles, they are both reflective and 
calculative. They ntn in the same direction - they 
prescribe the same course of action, there is no wonder in 
it, because they both act on reason. So far they are in 
the same plane. Butler seems perfectly right. He is 
only emphasising here the rational aspect of self-love ru1d 
thus showing that reasonable self-love is not opposed or 
contrary to the dictate of conscience. This is all that 
Butler suggests here. He never means to say that self-love 
.a~1d conscience are identical :in the sense that they carry 
the same authority. Coincidence does not mean identity. 
If for instance the Archbishop of Canterbury and a village 
curate both acting reasonably go the same way it will never 
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mean that the latter cawies the same authority as the 
former. Professor Moore seems to agree with this view of 
Butler when he remarks: "Hence the fact that an action is really 
to my interest, can never be a sufficient reason for doing it: 
by shewing that it is not a means to the best possible, we 
do not shew it is not· to my interest., as we do shew that it 
is not expedient. Nevertheless there is no necessary 
conflic:t between duty and interest: what is to my interest 
1· 
may also be a means to the best possible". Thus in his 
insistence on the coincidence between virtue and interest 
Butler is only emphasising the t•ational aspect of self-love. 
He aid not mean to treat self-love and conscience as 
co-ordinate principles. 
Again t.he crucial test of whether self-love and. 
conscience are identical or ca1Ty the same authority is to 
be found in those passages where Butler anticipates and 
suggests the course to be adopted in case there be conflict 
between the two. It may be pointed out here that Butler 
first of all sincerely believed that there can be no conflict 
between reasonable cool self-love and conscience but if there 
be, then what to do in that case ? His answer is very clear 
and definite. We shall let Butler speak himself here also 
as we have very often done. 
1. G.E. Moore. 'Principia Ethica', Cambridge, 1954, p. 170. 
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"Whereas in reality the very constitution of ouzo 
nature requires, that we bring our v1hole conduct before 
this superior faculty; wait its detet•mination; enforce 
upon ourselves its authority, and mru{e it the business of 
our lives, as it is absolutely the whole business of a 
moral agent, to conform ourselves to it".1 
"Thus that principle, by which we survey, and either 
approve or disapprove our o~m heart, temper, and actions, 
is not only to be considered as what is in its turn to have 
some influence; which may be said of every passion, of the 
lowest appetites: but likewise as being superior; as from 
its very nature matnifestly claiming superiority over all 
others: insomuch that you cannot form a notion of this 
faculty, conscience, without taking in judgment, direction, 
superintendency. This is a constituent part of the idea, 
that is, of faculty itself: and, to preside and govern, from 
2 
the very economy and constitution of man, belongs to it". 
From the passages quoted above two things are very clear. 
The first is that Butler interprets virtue wholly by 
reference to authority which according to him conscience 
carries in the highest degree. The second thing is that 
Butler here gives a very clear-cut indication that if there 
1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler•, Vol. II, Pref. to Sermons, 
sect. 19, p. 14. 
2. do Vol. II, Sermon II, 
sect. 19, p. 64. 
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by any collision between self-love and conscience, the 
lattez· is to be taken as the paramount authority and self-
love will always have to bow down before its supreme 
authority. 
Again the view that Butler considered priva.te happiness 
as the sole ground of virtue is contradicted by the fact that 
by virtue of the position self-love occupies in the human 
nature, it cannot finally determine our duty. We sha11 
explain this point in two ways. F"irstly, like other 
particular passions and affections self-love also has to 
act within. its due degree. It has also its limit and bound. 
Butler himself very clearly says: "Ever-y one of our passions 
and affections hath it.s natural stint and bound, which may 
easily be exceeded; •••• This holds as much with regard 
to self-love as to all. other affec.tions".1 This statement 
clear~ suggests that self-love cannot determine our ultimate 
duty. It may also be noted here that in this context Butler 
treats self-1ove as no better than particular affections. 
An action done in consequence of self-love may become un-
natural·if, like particular affections, it goes beyond its 
limit and bound. Over-indulgence of self-love is as blame-
worthy as the over-indulgence of any particular passion since 
in either case the harmony, among the different elements of 
1. 'The Worlcs of Joseph Butler•·, Vol. n, Sermon XI, 
sect. 7, p. 191. 
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human nature, which is the foundation of virtue, is 
destroyed. "Over-fondness for a child is not generally 
1 
thought to be for its own advantage", Butler cites as an 
example. Thus it is obvious that self-love, which has to 
work as much within it&r due limit as any other particular passion 
cannot be regarded as the sole determinant of virtue. But 
this is never the case with conscience. There is no occasion 
for its going beyond its limit and falling into error like 
other principles of action. Conscience is the over-riding 
principle and its principal tasl{ is to regulate and keep all 
other principles within their due limit and thus maintain the 
harmony and the right relation among the different elements 
in man's nature • Self-love, being also a reasonable 
principle, can act ~s guide, no doubt, but only as provisional 
or rough guide. Butler says: "For the natural authority 
of the principle of reflection is an obligation the most 
near and int~ate, the 1nost certain and knovm: whereas the 
contrary obligation can at the utmost appear no mox-e than 
2 probable; •••• without the former". It is thus manifest 
that the final arbiter of our ultimate duty is conscience. 
Secondly it appears to n1e as w.e have already said that 
Butler treats self-love as no more than a general principle, 
1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Sermon XI, 
sect. 7, p. 191. 
2. do Vol. II, Pref. to Sermons, 
sect. 2l,pp. 15~16. 
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superior to particular passions and affections. 
Consistently with this view he holds that of the two 
principles of actions, (1) particular passions and 
affections and (2) self-love, the latter is a much better 
guide than the former and also that if men acted on the 
principle of self-love rather than on particular passions, 
it would prevent numbe1•1ess follies and vices in the world. 
All this Butler himself very clearly says in his preface 
to the Sermons, which is worth quoting here for the 
clarification of the point we are at the moment considering. 
Butler says: "Upon the whole, if the generality of mankind 
were to cultivate within themselves the principle of 
self-love; ••••• and if self-love were so strong and 
prevalent, as that they would uniformly pursue this their 
supposed chief temporal good, without being diverted from 
it by any particular passion; it would manifestly prevent 
numberless follies and vices. ••••• It is indeed by no means 
the religious or even moral institution of life. Yet, with 
all the mistakes men would fall into about interest, it would 
be less mischievous than the extravagances of mere appetite, 
will, and pleasure: for certainly self-love, though confined 
to the interest of this life, is, of the two, a much better 
guide than passion, which has absolute~ no bound nor measure, 
but what is set to it by this self-love, or moral consideN. 
1 
ations". 
1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol.. II, Pref. to §ermons, 
sect. 36, p. 27. 
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This passage, (quoted above) in which Butler regardS 
self-love only as less mischievous than particulaz· passions 
and by no means the moral institution ®f life, removes very 
clearly all illusions about the position of self-love in the 
hierarchy of human nature. It proves conclusively that he 
did not mean to regard it as the highest principle of morality. 
Again Butler in his Dissertation on Virtue very 
explicitly says "that the faculty within us, which is the 
judge of actions, approves of prudent actions, and disapproves 
imprudent ones; I say pr-udent and imprudent actions as such, 
and considered distinctly from the happiness or misery which 
they occasion" •1 If this be so, as it is, then self-love 
cannot be regarded as a principle co-ordinate with conscience. 
The superiority of self-love lies only in this that cons·cience 
approves of those actions which are directed towards its 
gratification. This is aJ.l. Butler nowhere says that 
self-love has the sole supremacy over the passions and 
affections. Thus the superiority which self-love possesses 
is only in a limited sense. This, to our mind, clearly shows 
that in Butler self-love and conscience are not co-ordinate 
principles. 
Then again the view that Butler reduced all virtue to 
self-love presents a practical difficulty. There are 
passages in Butler especially in Sermon XII 'Upon the Love 
of our Neighbour' where he seems to reduce all virtue to 
1. ''The Works of Jo~eph Butler', Vol. I, Dissertation on 
Virtue, sect. 11, pp. 406-407. 
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benevolence and which therefore cannot be explained 
consistently with the view suggested here. How can we 
resolve this difficulty ? Can we say that Butler is 
contt•adicting himself here? We do not think that Butler 
can be guilty of such a gross contradiction. The po~nt 
is, as we have been trying to establish, that Butler did 
not mean to identify virtue completely with self-love, nor 
did he mean, as we shall try to show in our next chapter, 
to identif·y it with benevo::Lence. He is only tr-ying to 
emphasise that actions done in consequence of self-love are 
also virtuous actions and he was thus encouraging his 
audience to work at least on the principle of reasonable 
cool self-love. 
There. is one more point to be noticed here. Mr. 
McPherson in his article referred to above makes a distinction 
between supposed self-love and real self-love and suggests 
that Butler's conscience, though opposed to and in conflict 
with supposed self-love, is identical with real self-love. 
It seems that even this distinction, which Mr. McPherson 
points out, does not help him very much to establish the case 
that Butler identified virtue with self-love. There are 
two things to be remembered in this connection. The first 
is that Butler always uses self-love in the sense of reasonable 
cool self-love. The second is that the whole point, in our 
opinion, hinges on this question: Is it that an action, done 
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in consequence of self-love, is considered virtuous even 
when it violates the authority of conscience ? The 
answ·er to this question must be in the negative and with 
this all attempts to prove that self-love is identical with 
virtue in Butler break down. The important point to 
establish is whether an action is or is not in line with 
the dictate of conscience. An action is virtuous or 
vicious according as to whether it is or it is not in line 
·with conscien~e. 
~hen again there are clear passages in Butler wherein 
he has shown very clearly that private happiness is not 
the criterion of virtue. 
"In truth, the taking in this consicleration totally 
changes the whole state of the case; and shows, what this 
author does not seem to have been aware of, that the 
greatest degree of scepticism which he thot~ht possible 
will still leave men. under the strictest moral obligations, 
whatever their opinion be concerning the happiness of virtue."1 
Numerous other such passages from Butler can be cited 
and we quote ~ in the foot-note a few which I think will 
be enough for our present pt~pose. 
1. 'The Worlcs of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Pref. to Sermons, 
sect. 22, p. 16. 
Note (1) we may judge and determine, that an action ~s 
morally good or evil, before we so much as consider, 
whether it be interested or disinterested". - \ 
, · · .-:. Vol. ilii, pref. to ·.se':rmont:1 ..sEfct:.34, p.25. 
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For all these reasons it seems obvious that it will be 
all wrong to characterise Butler as an Ethical Eudaemonist as 
Mr. McPherson does or as one who considered that no act can 
possibly be a duty unless it will be for our happiness as 
Pnofessor Prichard believes. Butler no doubt held that 
private happiness was near and dear to every rational being, 
yet he never meant that it could be considered as the criterion 
of virtue. He nowhere states that it is the happiness 
producing chRracte:r of A.CtA that ma.Jces them right. On the 
contrary he believes as we have already said that the whole 
universe - the whole natUl~e including human nattwe - i~ so 
constituted by God that if' man acts according to his nature 
(2) "In all 'Q:ommon ordinary cases we see intuitively at 
first view what is our duty, what is the honest part". 
·:. Vol. II, Sermon VII, sect.l4, p.l32. 
(3) 11 that this faculty was placed within to be our proper 
governor; to direct and regulate all under principles, 
passions, and motives of action. This is its right 
and mf'fice: thus sacred is its authority. And how 
often soever men violate and l"'ebel1iously refuse to 
submit to it, fo1~ supposed interest which they cannot 
otherwise obtain, or for the salce of passion which 
they cannot otherwise gratify; this makes no altera-
tion as to the natural right and office of conscience." 
· -- ·!. Vol. II, Sermon II, sect. 19, pp.6L~-65. 
(4) "That your co:mscience approves of and attests to such 
a course of action, is itt:.self alone an obligation. 
Conscience does not only offer itself to show us the 
way we should walk in, but it likewise carl~ies its 
own authority with it, that it is our natural guide; 
the guide assigned us by the Author of our nature: it 
therefore bekongs to our condition of being, it is 
our duty to wallc in that path, and to follow this 
guicle, without looking about to see whether we may 
not possibly forsake th~m with impunity. 11 -- ·•· 
_,, Vol. II, Sermmn III, sect. 6, p. 71. 
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it will automatically and necessarily lead to his happiness. 
Therefore all that a man need do, according to him, is to do 
his duty, which consists in acting according to the dictate of 
conscience which is the final and ultimate arbiter in morals. 
It thus appears clear that despite all the concessions 
that Butler makes to the favourite passion - self-love, his 
ethical teaching that virtue does not lie merely in self-love 
but in the human nature as a whole remains unaffected. 
We thus conclude that though, according to Butler, virtue 
always makes for the personal happiness of the agentJ and 
vir•tue and interest in the end always coincide, yet virtue is 
to be pursued not for the sake of the happiness lJut because 
it is virtue. 
Chapter IV.· 
Virtue and General Happiness in Butler. 
We have already seen in our last chapter that virtue 
cannot, according to Butler, be equated '\vi th self-interest. 
If there is a clash bet'\<teen conscience and interest, the 
former al'\·TaYS overrides. In the present chapter we shall try 
to see '\orhether virtue can be equated '\vith the promotion of 
general happiness. In other '\orords we shall try to determine 
whether Butler considered producing the general happiness as 
the only virtue. As '\<te have already said that there are a fe\or 
passages in him '\>rhich give the impression that he resolves 
virtue into benevolence, that he considers the promotion of 
general happiness as the sum of morals. Ho'\'rever, before He 
begin our examination of this vie'\v let us quote here some of 
those passages on '\vhich it takes its stand. They are these: 
11It is manifest that nothing can be of consequence to 
mankind or any creature, but happiness." 1 
11From hence it is manifest that the common virtues, 
and the common vices of mankind, may be traced up to 
benevolence, or the '\>rant of it. 11 2 
11It might be added, that in a higher and more general 
way of consideration, leaving out the particular nature of 
creatures, and the particular circumstances in 'IIThich they 
---·--------·---·--
1. 1The \~orks of J"oseph Butler•, Vol. II, Sermon XII, sect. 
20' p. 224. 
2. do. Vol. II, Sermon XII, sect. 
22, P• 226. 
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are placed, benevolence seems in the strictest sense to 
include in it all that is good and vTOrthy; all that is 
good, \ofhich vre have any distinct particular notion of. 11 1 
"That mankind is a conununi ty,. that \•Te all stand in a 
relation to each other, that there is a public end and 
interest of society vrhich each particular is obliged to 
promote, is the sum of morals." 2 
No\'r it seems to us as Professor Broad3 also rightly 
points out that if these statements be accepted at their face 
value, Butler was a utilitarian; i.e., he thought that happi-
ness is the only intrinsic good and that virtue consists in 
promoting it. But the question is, should vre tal{e these 
statements at their face value ? Are we to hold that Butler 
preached that the utili tarii.an rule - that \Ire should so act in 
any situation as to lead to the greatest happiness or least 
misery of everybody including the agent himself - should be 
taken as the rule of life ? Butler, no doubt, refers to this 
rule a number of times, as \ve have just shO\m., but it must be 
observed that even here he is not very clear and distinct. 
His statements are not without reservation and quali~ication. 
1. 'The 'vorks of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Sermon XII, sect. 22, 
P• 227 • 
2. 
3· 
do. do. Sermon IX, sect. 7, 
p. 155. 
C.D. Broad. 'Five Types of Ethical Theory', London, 1951. 
P• 81. 
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In one of his statements quoted above he says 11 common virtues 
and the common vice_s of rnanldnd, may be traced up to benevo-
lence or the "\•rant of it. 11 Then again he qualifies his next 
statement by saying "leaving out the particular nature of 
creatures and the particular circuntstances in which they are 
placed. 11 We notice also "whatever cautions and restrictions 
there are, which might require to be considered, if we were to 
state particularly and at length, what is virtue and right 
., 
behaviour in mankind." .J. 
Butler again in an explanatory note to the same 5ermon in 
which he seems to reduce virtue to benevolence makes his view 
abundantly clear that the pursuit of general good is not the 
only virtue. He first utters important cautions: "As ''~e are 
not competent judges, what is upon the whole for the good of 
the "\-Torld, there may be other immediate ends appointed us to 
pursue, besides that one of doing good, or producing happiness." 
He continues to say: "Though the good of the creation be the 
only end of the Author of it, yet he may have laid us under 
particular obligations, which "'e may discern and feel our-
selves under, quite distinct from a perception, that the 
observance or violation of them is for the happiness or misery 
of our fellow-creatures." 2 
··------------- -------
1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Sermon XII, sect. 22, 
p • p. 226- 227 • 
2. do. do. p. 226 (foot-note). 
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After having given these important cautions Butler next 
proceeds to ex;plain his own ethical theory. Nothing could be 
clearer than Butler's o'\>m words about it. 11 F'or there are 
certain dispositions of mind, and certain actions, '\>Thich are 
in themselves approved or disapproved by mankind, abstracted 
from the consideration of their tendency to the happaness or 
misery of the \..rorld; approved or disapproved by reflection, 
by that principle within, which is the guideof life, the judge 
of right and wrong .••.•••. .tt'ideli ty, honour, strict justice, 
ar.e themselves approved in the highest degree, abstracted from 
consideration of' their tendency ..••• thus much however is 
certain, that the things nm·r instanced in, and numberless 
others,are approved or disapproved by mankind in general, in 
quite another vie\..r than as conducive to the happiness or 
misery of the world. 11 1 
These unambiguous and categorical assertions of Butler 
are, to our mind, quite sufficient to dispel any illusion tha.t 
he advocated the utilitarian rule as the guide of life. 
It is not only in the foot-notes but also in the body of 
the Sermons and also in the Dissertation on the Nature of 
Virtue that Butler suggests that benevolence may be God's sole 
virtue but clearly it is not man's sole virtue. He says: "We 
have no clear conception of any positive moral attribute in the 
----·--· -------·-·-- -----·-·---------
1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, pp. 226-227 (foot-
note). 
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supreme Being, but what may be resolved up into goodness. 11 
Having said so much vrith. regard to God he proceeds to say: 
11And, if we consider a reasonable creature or moral agent, 
vri thout regard to the particular relations and the circum-
stances in which he is placed; 'liTe cannot conceive any thing 
else to come in towards determining whether he is to be raru{ed 
in an higher or lower class of virtuous beings, but the higher 
or lower degree in which that principle, and what is manifest-
ly connected with it, prevail in him. 11 1 
This passage is significant in the sense that it makes 
it clear that even in regard to God; not to speak of men, 
Butler does not explicitly say that benevolence is His sole 
virtue. He only says that we have no clear conception of any 
other attribute, though it must be admitted that he seems 
inclined to hold that benevolence may be God's sole virtue but 
not of course man's. 
Again Butler makes this vie\•T all the more clear and 
exp.+icit in his Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue \oThich is 
considered to be an indispensable document for the study of 
his ethical and moral teaching. The passage in vrhich he 
emphatically asserts his vie'" and thus removes any ambiguity 
or misunderstanding about it is thus: 11Without enquiring how 
far, and in \'lhat sense, virtue is resolwaAf,into benevolence, 
1. 'The Works of J"oseph Butler', Vol. II, Sermon XII, sect. 22, 
p. 227. 
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and vice into the '\·rant of it; it may be proper to observe, 
that benevolence, and the want of it, singly considered, are 
in no sort the whole of virtue and vice. For if this were 
the case, in the review of one's o~m character, or that of 
others, our moral understanding and moral sense would be 
indifferent to everything, but the degrees in which benevo-
lence prevailed, and the degrees in '\oJ"hich it was wanting. That 
is, we should neither approve of benevolence to some persons 
rather than to others, nor disapprove injustice and falsehood 
upon any other account, than merely as an overbalance of 
happiness was foreseen likely to be produced by the first, and 
of misery by the second." He then gives an example to explain 
this point. "Again, suppose one man should, by fraud or 
violence, take from another the fruit of his labour, with 
intent to give it to a third, who he thought would have as 
much plea~ure from it as would balance the pleasure which the 
first possessor would have had in the enjoyment, and his 
vexation in the loss of it; suppose also that no bad conse-
quences \oJ'OUld follm-r: yet such an action would surely be 
vicious". He then proceeds to say: "The fact then appears to 
be, that we are constituted so as to condemn falsehood, un-
provoked violence, injustice, and to approve of benevolence to 
some preferably to others, abstracted from all consideration, 
which conduct is likeliest to produce an overbalance of 
happiness or misery. And therefore, '·Tere the Author of nature 
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to propose nothing to himself as an end but the production of 
happiness, were his moral character merely that of benevolence; 
yet ours is not so. . . . The happiness of the \'lorld is the 
concern of him, vrl1o is the Lord and the Proprietor of it: nor 
do \ve know \vhat \ve are about, \-then \ole endeavour to promote the 
good of mankind in any \vays, but those ¥Thich he has directed; 
that is indeed in all \vays not contrary to veracity and 
justice. 11 1 Six David Ross while quoting with approval the 
above passage from Butler's Dissertation on Virtue remarks: 
11 1 may be alloHed to reinforce these criticisms of Utilitarian-
ism by quoting some words from the most sagacious, if not the 
most consistent or systematic, of the British Horalists •. In 
.his ripest \>TOrk on ethics, the Dissertation on the Nature of 
• 
Virtue, Butler indicates more clearly than in the Sermons his 
distrust of the vie\of \·rhich treats zeal for the general good as 
the only virtue. Theseweighty words of Butler's answer better 
to \-That we really think on moral questions, than a theory 
\vhich makes the production of good at all costs the only duty. u2 
Butler is not satisfied even vri th those observations 
\vhich \ve have quoted above. He goes even so far as to assert 
that 11im-agining the whole of virtue to consist in- singly aim-
1. 'The \4orks of Joseph Butler', Vol. I, Dissertation on 
Virtue, sects. 12, 13, 16, pp. 407,408,410. 
2. Sir David Ross. 'Foundations of Ethics', Oxford, 1939, 
PP· 77-79· 
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ing at promoting the happiness of mankind in the present state" 
is a mistake, "than \vhich none can be conceived more terrible". 1 
In the face of such emphatic assertations especially that 
in the Dissertation on Virtue, the vlew that Butler advocated 
a utilitarian rule of life cannot be maintained. 
We shall not stop here. We shall proceed further to 
examine this question in some detail in the light of Butler's 
general ethical and moral teaching. The first thing which 
strikes us here is that the vie'\·T that Butler considers bene-
valence as the only virtue and thus advocates a utilitarian 
rule of life involves a logical difficulty. Butler's main 
thesis is, as has already been pointed out, that vlrtue lies 
in acting according to the law of human nature. This la\v of 
human nature means again the la'\-r of the whole nature and not 
any one element of' it. No\aT if it is held that Butler resolved 
~11 virtue into benevolence, it would mean identifying virtue 
with a part of human nature. Benevolence is only one element, 
though an important element of human nature, and obviously 
caru1ot be taken as the \·Thole of nature. Thus the view that 
Butler reduced the entire contents of.morality to benevolence 
must be rejected. It goes counter to his fundamental teaching -
virtue lies in follmving human nature as a \vhole. 
1. 1The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol. I, Dissertation on 
Virtue, sect. 15, pp. 409-410. 
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It may be pointed out against this argument that Butler 
al\·rays argues that \ore must always act according to conscience. 
But conscience is also one principle, though superior even to 
benevolence but none-the-less only one principle. This is 
undoubtedly true. But in reply it may be said, as we have 
already pointed out elsewhere, that conscience is the highest 
principle. It is in kind and in nature supreme over all others. 
Unlike the voice of benevolence, the voice of conscience is 
the voice of the whole nature of man. It is the voice of the 
total nature of man, not in the sense of the sum of the 
different principles but in the sense of a system or constitu-
tion. Thus the voice of conscience, unlike the voice of bene-
volence, is the voice of the whole character of man. 
Again we can explain the same point in a slightly differ-
ent way. The view that Butler advocates utilitarianism as the 
only rule of conduct ignores a fundamental point in his ethical 
teaching. Butler has repeatedly said that virtue lies in the 
harmony of the different principles of action, especially of 
self-love and benevolence. If it is so, as it is, then virtue 
cannot consistently and logically be identified \'lith either of 
them alone. A character is not denominated virtuous or vicious 
from the predominance or lack of either benevolence or self-
love tru{en singly, but from the harmony or disharmony of both. 
Butler says: 110f the dgree in \'rhich affections and the 
principles of action, considered in themselves, prevail, we 
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have no measure." Immediately before that in the same passage 
he also says: "Love of our neighbour then must bear some pro-
portion to self-love, and virtue to be sure consists in the 
due proportion. 111 Consistently with this view of virtue 
which Butler always and everywhere propounds any interpreta-
tion that he consj.dered benevolence as the only virtue must 
be \'lrong. Slllch an interpretation cannot be maintained \>Ti thout 
causing violence to his fundamental ethical theory, namely that 
virtue consists in the harmony of human nature. F'urthermore, 
in deciding whether or not Butler reduced virtue to benevo-
lence we must always bear in mind one very important point, 
namely the method \ll'hich Butler follo\'IS in his '\oTOrks. We have 
already seen in our last chapter on JVirtue and Self-interest• 
hm·r Butler exalts the principle of self-love so much as to 
seem to make it co-ordinate with conscience and exclude 
benevolence altogether from the dual sovereignty. Not only 
that, as we have already shmm, he in his 'cool-hour• passage, 
already quoted, seems to go even so far as to subordinate 
conscience itself to self-love. Nm.,. '\-Then he returns to the 
discussions of benevolence in the Sermons 'Upon the Love of 
our Neighbour• he exaggerates benevolence and in his exaggera-
tion of this principle he goes so far especially in Sermon XII, 
that he seems to identify it completely with virtue. But from 
--~-,---------
1. 1The Works of Joseph Butler•, Vol. II, Sermon XII, sect. 9, 
P• 217 • 
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this emphasis we should not jump to the conclusion that Butler 
considers promotion of general happiness as the only virtue, as 
\·re have shmm in our last chapter that from his considerable 
emphasis on self-love \-le should not come td the conclusion 
that he reduced virtue to self-interest. It was Butler's 
typical method or vre can say his teclmi.que to exalt very 
highly the principle which vras in hand and to our mind this 
accounts for a good deal of confusion in regard to his ethical 
_:teaching. 'l•hus it seems quite obvious that it is just a 
matter of special emphasis which Butler is laying here on the 
agreement bet\veen virtue and happiness. He ils only demon-
strating to his audience the correspondence bet\..reen virtue and 
altruism as he does elsewhere bet\sreen virtue and self-love. 
In short Butler is only exalting benevolence here and is not 
equating it with the general happiness. 
Again, as \'Te have always been trying to suggest that to 
arrive at truth on any controversial point in Butler, or any 
other philosopher, we should not take his statements piece-
meal or at their face value. l.fuch confusion about him arises 
also from our taking his statements in isolation from their 
proper and appropriate contexts. It is interesting to observe 
·here that almost all the statements of Butler, wherein he 
apparently seems to preach that the promotion of happiness is 
the only end of virtue, are to be found in his second Sermon 
'Upon the Love of our Neighbour' where he is recommending to 
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his audience the practice of benevolence, in which, as 
1 Professor Broad says, people of his time \oTere sadly lacking. 
The only other place \·There \·re come•·across one such statement 
is his Sermon 'Upon forgiveness of Injuries• where also he 
is practically advocating the same principle. Butler does not 
repeat this idea anywhere else, which suggests that he did not 
seem to equate virtue \·rith benevolence, because an al,lthor is 
apt to repeat and thus emphasise a point if he \vants to treat 
it as fundamental, and '"ants his readers to pay attention to 
it. Thus, if Butler's method of explaining any princip~e, and 
the proper contexts in which he makes his statements, be borne 
in mind there is no doubt that it should be obvious to anybody 
who cares to ynderstand him that he never meant to r.~gard 
benevolence as the only virtue. 
It may also be useful to point out here that Professor 
Sidg\..rick in a foot-note seems to sug.gest that Butler does not 
notice any possible want of' harmony between benevolence and 
conscience in his first Sermon and then later changes his view 
in the 'Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue•. He says: "It 
may be interesting to notice a gradual change in Butler's view 
on this impGrtant point. In the first of his Sermons on Human 
Nature, published some years before the Analogy, he does not 
notice, any more than Shaftesbur~ and Hutcheson, any·•.possible 
1. C.D. Broad~ 'Five Types of Ethical Theory', London, 1951. 
p. 81. 
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want of harmony bet"\.,reen Conscience and Benevolence. A note 
to Sermon XII, however, seems to indicate a stage of transition 
bet"\oJeen the view of tho first Sermon and the vie\·1 of the 
Dissertation. ul i·1r. hossner also seems inclined to agree 
, .. d th Professor Sidg\oTiclc \•Then he remarks: 11Butler 1 s closing 
admission in the Dissertation of the actual divergence in prac-
tice bet\oTeen the supreme faculty of conscience and the lesser 
faculty of benevolence marks the beginning of that distinction 
bet,freen 'intuitional' and utili tnrian ethical theory, later of 
great importance in Paley and Bentham. Both sides of the 
debate appear inconsistently in Butler's \•rorks. In the Sermons 
he had held that the idea of benevolence included the utmost 
that man can do for man, the giving of happiness, a passage, 
that strictly interpreted, is very nearly as 'utilitarian' 
as Paley's famous definition of virtue .•.•• But Butler's con-
trary statement, (in the later Dissertation) indicates that he 
really regarded himself as an 'intuitionist' though he might be 
\villing to grant that God is utilitarian. 112 
But a little reflection makes it clear that no such change 
seems to have taken place in Butler's ethical theory. The 
reasons for this are the following: 
It has already been said above that Butler, in his anxiety 
to emphasise benevolence, no doubt, made a few such statements 
-·--~·---- -- ---------- --------------------------
1. Henry Sidgirick. 'The l'Lethods of Ethics'} London, 1901, 
p. 8o (foot-note). 
2. E.G. l•1ossner. 'Bishop Butler and the Age of Reason•, Nevr 
York, 1936, p. 120. 
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as give the impression that he identified virtue \'Tith altruism. 
He probably himself apprehended some ambiguity about it and 
lest his emphasis on benevolence be misunderstood by his more 
careless readers, he appended a foot-note, already quoted above, 
to the same Sermon Xli and in '\oJ"hich he makes his viB'\17 suffici-
ently clear that benevalence does not exhaust the entire con-
tents of morality. It might be argued that the foot-note re-
presents Butler's second thought. But we see no good evidence 
to suppose that the foot-note represents his second thought or 
that it is an improvement upon the theory \oJ"hich he advocates in 
the body of the Sermons. As '\ve have already pointed out in 
Chapter I the preface and the foot-notes \•Thich Butler adds to 
the second edition of his Sermons should not be understood to 
mean that Butler's ethical theory underwent any change. These 
additions are only by \·ray of explanation and clarification. 
Their sole purpose is to dispel obscurities and ambiguities 
about which there \'Tas much complaint by his readers '\·rhen his 
first edition came out in 1726. The foot-note is thus just 
explanatory and nothing more. Butler himself refers to this 
fact when he says: "l'hus much hm·rever \'Till be allowed, that 
general criticisms concerning obscurity considered as a distinct 
thing from confusion and perplexity of thought, as in some cases 
there may be ground for them; so in others, they may be nothing 
more at the bottom than complaints, that everything is not to 
be understood with the same ease that some things are." 1 
------- --- ·------ --· ------------ -··--------------
1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, pref. to Sermons, 
sect. 4, p. 4. 
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Again we do not find sufficient evidence to suppose that even 
in the Dissertation on Virtue Butler's ethical view underwent 
any change. Simply because there is a long interval bet'\'reen 
the publj.cation of the Sermons (1726) and that of' the Analogy 
(1736) to \·Thich the Dissertation on Virtue is an appendix, is 
no proof of the fact that Butler changed his view in his later 
\vork. There is, hm..rever, no doubt, that Butler is more 
emphatic in arguing against the utilitarian vie'\'r in his 
Dissertation than in his Sermons • But the i~~ediate reason of 
. this emphasis, as it seems to us, was Hutcheson 1 s 1 Inquiry 
into Beauty and Virtue• the first edition of '\'Thich came out 
just one year before the first appearance of Butler's Sermons 
and in which he had identified virtue Hith benevolence. It 
should be remembered here that Shaftesbury had also identified 
the t\vo and it is needless to say that Butler \vas.··~ry ,.rell 
acquainted "ri th this, but it seems he was then too much occu-
pied with demolishing the Hobbsian theory of universal selfish-
ness, which was then uppermost in his mind, to pay any attention 
to correcting the ethical theory of identifying virtue vri th 
benevolence. But when Hutcheson's 'Inquiry' came out in 1725 
Butler's attention became dra\>m to it. But then it was too 
late for him to make any special reference to this point in 
his Sermons ,.,hich had already been preached. But somehm..r, 
despite his foot-notes which he added to the second edition of 
his Sermons, the fear that careless readers might be misled 
into identifying virtue \oJ'i th benevolence lingered in his mind. 
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It is probably this fear which finds expression when Butler 
says that "But some of great and distinguished merit have, 
expressed themselves in a manner, which may oe:casion some 
danger, to careless readers, •.•. more terrible. 111 Butler 
probably out of courtesy avoids mentioning the names of the 
authors but we may safely assume that the authors here referred 
to are Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. Butler therefore in order 
to Bmove any co!lf'usion and misunderstanding on the part of his 
readers on the problem of the relation bet\-reen virtue and 
benevolence makes some very clear and emphatic arguments in 
his Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue against identifying 
virtue with benevolence. This e~plains why Butler is more 
emphatic in arguing against the utilitarian princ±ple in 
his Dissertation than he is in his Sermons. But from this 
emphasis it \atould be unjustifiable to draw the conclusii:on, as 
Professor Sidgwick and Mr. t1ossner seem to do, that Butler 
changed his view in his Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue. 
Again to hold that Butler reduces all virtue to benevo-
lence is to overlook a very important point in him, namely the 
relation between self-love and benevolence, the coincidence 
between the private and the public end. In the very first 
Sermon where Butler is trying to enunciate the different prin-
ciples of human nature, he points out very clearly that "I 
--------------- --------··-- -··-
1. 'The Works of J'oseph Butler 1 , Vol. I, Dissertation on Virtue, 
sect. 15, pp. 409..-L~lO. 
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must_ holtrev·er remind you that though benevolence and self-love 
are different; though the former tends most directly to pubiic 
good, and the latter to private: yet they are so perfectly 
coincident, that the greatest satisfactions to ourselves 
depend upon our having benevolence in. a due degree; and that 
self-love is one chief security of our right behaviour tmrards 
society". He goes further and says that their relation is 
such "that \Ire can scarce promote one without the other, is 
equally a proof that \'Te were made for both. 111 'l'hi_s clearly 
shma1s that according to Butler self-love and. benevolence 
involve each other and conscience very naturally accepts both 
the principles as virtuous. Thus consistently vTith this 
doctrine, ,.,hich Butler advocates every\-rhere, he cannot identify 
vlrtue with benevolence alone \'lithout becoming contradictory 
and inconsistent. 
Again 1trhen we come to Butler 1 s •Dissertation on the Nature 
of Virtue• we find the same.principle being .f}ollowed. Here 
also in his discussion on self-love he admits prudence as a 
virtue. He first defines prudence: "It should seem, that a due 
concern aboyt our own interest or happiness, and a reasonable 
endeavour to secure and promote it, ,.,hich is, I think 1 very much 
the me·aning of the 'mrd •prudence• in our language; it should 
seem, that this is virtue, and the contrary behaviour faulty 
and blamable: since, in the calmest way of reflection, we approve 
-------.. -------···-- --·---
1. 1 'l'he \'lorks of Joseph Butler • , Vol. II, Sermon I, sect. 5, 
P• 38. 
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of the first, and condemn the other conduct, both in ourselves 
and others." Having thus defined and discussed prudence at 
some length Butler concludes: "li'rom these things it appears, 
that prudence is a species of virtue, and folly of vice 11 • 1 
Then·when he turns to his discussion of benevolence he regards 
it as a virtue though not the: only virtue. In fact Butler's 
main emphasis in the Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue has 
been to show that benevolence is not the only virtue, it is 
not the only end to be pursued. This clearly shows that Butler 
follows the same method, the same trend, throughout his work. 
He accepts both self-love and benevolence as virtuous in his 
Dissertation as he does in his Sermons but he does not identify 
virtue with either of these two principles completely. For 
all these reasons \oJ"e .hold that the fundamental· ethical teaching 
of Butler is the same throughout his worlc, and there is 
absolutely no reason for thinking that he changed the ethical 
view which he had sketched in his Sermons, even at the mor0 
mature age at \vhich he \•Trote his Dissertation on Virtue. 
In the interests of further clarification it may be useful 
to distinguish here Butler's moral philosophy from that of 
·Paley•·s moral philosophy. Paley defines virtue as "the doing 
good to mankind, in obedience to the vTill of God, and for the 
sake of everlasting happiness. According to this definition, 
1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol. I, 'Dissertation on 
Virtue•, sects. 8 & 10, pp. 404, 406. 
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'the good of mankind' is the subject, 'the will of God' the 
1 
rule and •everlasting happiness• the motive of human virtue." 
According to Butler virtue consists in follol'ring human nature 
as a '\oThole. Consistently with this theory he regards the 
pursuit of general happiness as vlrtuous. Nay, he strongly 
advocates the cultivation of the principle of benevolence. 
But unlike Paley, Butler does not consider the promotion of 
general good as the only virtue, the only end to be pursued 
by man. Again, though according to both Butler and Paley 
re\vards and punishments are annexed to right and vn"ong acts 
respectively, Paley as opposed to Butler holds that the motive 
for obedience to the rule of right is derived from the consider-
ation of rewards and punishments to be bestowed in future. 
Paley himself makes this point very clear in Chapter III, Book 
2. He says: "Let it be remembered, that to be obliged, 1 is 
to be urged by a violent motive, resulting from the command of 
another 1 • And then .let it be asked, 1r1hy am I obliged to keep 
my word ? And the answer vrill be, because I am •urged to do so 
by a violent motive•, (namely, the expectation of being after 
this life rewarded, if I do, or punished for it, if I do not) 
•resulting from the command of another•, (namely, of God). . . . 
'fherefore, private happiness is our noti ve and the \dll of God 
our rule. 112 According to Butler, on the other hand, hope of 
1. William Paley. 'Principles of Noral and Political Philosophy', 
11th edition, corrected, Vol. I, Book I, Chap. VII, p.41. 
2
• do. do. do. Book II, Chap.III, 
PP• 5'9-60. 
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reward and fear of punislwent are no criterions for virtue. 
According to him actions are re,.,arded. because they are virtu-
ous, not vice versa. 
It seems that Paley defines right in the sense of egoism. 
The promotion of private happiness, the hope of reward and fear 
of punishment in the next life is the motive for virtue 
according to him. But he subsequently turns out to be a 
utilitarian. He begins to enqui:re into the tendency of an 
action to promote or to diminish the general happiness. 
In Book II, Chapter V Paley says, 11 that the method of 
coming at the will of God concerning any action, by the light 
of nature, is to inquire into the tendency of that action to 
promote or to diminish the general happiness. 111 As opposed 
to this view Butler holds that actions are in themselves 
approved or disapproved by mankind apart from an~ consideration 
of their tendency to the happiness or misery of the world. 
From the above it is clear that Paley is manifestly a 
utilitarian and as opposed to him Butler is obviously an 
intuitionist. According to Paley the value of an action 
depends on the ad vantages which it brings '\oli th it. He says: 
11Actions are to be estimated by their tendency. Whatever is 
expedient is right. It is the utility of any moral rule alone 
1. William Paley. •Principles of Moral and Political Philoso-
phy', 11th edition corrected, Vol. I, Book II, 
Chapter :·:v~, p.:. 70·~.-· 
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which constitu~es the obligation of it 11 • 1 According to Butler 
on the other hand virtue does not consist in the mere calcula-
tion of actions with regard to their external advantages. 
These are notth:e sole consideration in judging the merit of an 
action. According to him, 11v"irtue consists in a regard to 
,.,hat is right and reasonable, as being so; in regard to vera-
city, justice, charity, in themselves; 112 In short Paley 
makes virtue depend on the external consequences of actions. 
Butler, on the other hand, makes it depend upon the due opera-
tion of the human constitution. Paley is thus a utilitarian 
moralist, Butler, on the other hand, is a moralist of conscience. 
It may further be pointed out here that the difference 
between Butler and Paley in regard to their attitude towards 
virtue depends very largely on the difference in their concep-
tion of human nature. Paley does not attach any great import-
ance and dignity to human nature. He does not seem to recog-
nise any distinction between the higher and the lower, between 
the superior and the inferior principles of human mind. On 
the contrary he assumes that men's passions and affections are 
the same in kind, though they differ in continuance and inten-
sity. Bu-tler on the other hand attaches so much dignity to 
human nature that he bases his entire conception of virtue on 
1. William Paley. 'Principles of Noral and Political Philoso-
phy', 11th edition corrected, Vol. I, Chap. VI, P· 70. 
2. 'The Worl{s of Joseph Butler', Vol. I, Part I, Chap. III, 
sect. 19, PP· 77-78• 
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it. According to him, as already explained else,oJ"here, there 
is a hierarchy of higher and lovrer principles and there is a 
difference of kind among them, quite apart from their differ-
ence in strength. 
Dr. Rashdall in his article 'Bishop Butler' makes an 
observation vrhich supports our vie'oJ" that he 'vas not a utilit-
arian. He says: 11When I taught Noral Philosophy in Oxford, I 
al\-iays recommended men t;o begin uy reading Butler is Sermons, 
or some of them, and l'iill 1 s Utilitarianism as the typical 
representation of the two classical schools of Horal Phj.losophy. 
Butler is the typical champion of the Authority of conscience -
the typical intuitionist. 111 We may sum up our discussion of 
this chapter by saying that from what we have said above it 
seems clear that though Butler recognises the duty of benevo-
lence, he recognises that the pursuit of the happiness of man-
kind is virtuous, yet certainly he never means to regard the 
promotj.on of general good as the only virtue. It appears quite 
obvious from the general trend of his Sermons that he holds 
that there are certain obligations which are not comprised in 
benevolence. 
Besides, Butler holds that the situations and the 
circumstances in which men are placed in the \ororld are so 
·----·---··-------·----
1. Rashdall Hastings. 'Bishop Butler', 'The Modern Churctunan', 
Vol. XVI, No. 12, i•larch 1927, p. 689. 
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various, and kno\'rledg e is so limited, that it is extremely 
difficult to determine vrhat actions \oJ"ill lead to the promo-
tion of general happiness. Butler himself clearly says: 11the 
whole end, for \thich God made, and thus governs the \mrld, may 
be utterly beyond the reach of our faculties: there may be 
some\-rhat in it as impossible for us to haye any conception of, 
as for a blind man to have a conception of colours. Ill Thus 
our data is so insufficient that ,.,e cannot reckon and tell in 
a particular situation \·That actions would result in most 
happiness. 'rhe notion of duty therefore cannot according to 
Butler arise from the mere contemplation of actions vri th 
regard to their external result (proqtotion of the general 
happiness of manl{ind) but must arise from the very constitution 
of man's nature. The requirements of the promotion of the 
happiness of manl{ind cannot all be understood and fulfilled 
by us in the circumstances in which vie are placed, but \ole can 
all understand and also obey the voice of our conscience, which 
is the voice of our entire constitution. 
It may be asked: lt/hat, then, in Butler 1 s vievrJ is the 
ultimate relation bet\veen virtue and the happiness of others ? 
Butler does not seem to give any clear ansrrer to this question. 
But it seems to us that this is not a question separate from 
1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol. I, Part I, Chap. II, 
sect. 3, p. 50. 
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and independent of the question: What is the ultimate connec-
tion bet'\·reen virtue and private happiness ? T'\.oJ'O points should 
be remembered in this connection. First, according to Butler, 
vrho believed in the organic nature of society, private good 
and public good are not opposed to each other. They involve 
each other and we cannot promote the one ''~i thout the other. 
Secondly, according to him, .a due concern about our own 
happiness and a reasonable endeavour to secure and promote it 
is as virtuous as is the promotion of the happiness of man-
kind. If \·re bear in mind these t'\oro points, we can see that 
in Butler the two problems - (~) vlrtue and private good (2) 
virtue and public good - virtually and ultimately resolve 
themselves into one, namely virtue and happiness, and in order 
to point out the ultimate co11nection between these two Butler 
leaves the field of morality and passes on to that of religion. 
Perhaps he \vould say, as we have already pointed out, that God 
has so made the universe and all things in it are so constitu-
ted and adapted to one another that if men simply act suitably 
to that nature \<Jhich God has given them, there would be much 
happiness in the world and it would be an ideal place to live 
in. Bu.tler strongly believed that in the divine moral govern-
ment of the '\•rorld virtuous actions invariably make for the 
happiness of men. 11 virtue as such, naturally procures 
considerable advantages to the virtuous, and vice as such, 
naturally occasions great inconvenience and even misery to the 
-1~3-
vicious in very many instances. 111 If virtuous actions are 
sometime~ follo\lred by misery or vicious actions by happiness 
this is not because they are virtuous or vicious but because 
2 of accidental causes, Because whether or not benevolence is 
the sole virtue of God, though Butler seems inclined to hold 
that it is, 3 he certainly haJi a "disposition to make the good, 
4 the faithful, the honest man happy." 
We thus conclude that in spite of all the emphasis \•Thich 
Butler lays on the promotion of general human happiness, virtue, 
according to him, does not '"holly consist in 'benevolence and 
is not to be pursued merely f'or that purpose but because it is 
virtue and consists in follm-Ting human nature as a \ofhole. 
Butler•s ethics is thus intuitional and not utilitarian: 
like Paley•s. 
------- -------·--------
1. •The Works of Joseph Butler•, Vol. I, Part I, Chap. III, 
sect. 13, p. 72. 
2. do. do. Part I, Cl~p. III, 
sect. 38, P• 93· 
3· do. Vol. II, Sermon XII, sect. 22, 
P· 227-
4. do. Vol. I, Part I .f Chap. . II, 
sec • 3, P• 50. 
Chapter v. 
Virtue as an End in itself in Butler. 
We have already seen that according to Butler virtue 
consists neither wholly in self-love nor whol~ in benevolence. 
Conscience, when approving or disapproving an action, considers 
both but is not identified with either. In this Chapter we 
shall first t~ to determdne the nature of conscience. This 
is necessary for two reasons. (1) It is the most important 
principle, the very core of Butler's ethical doctrine. (2) 
There is a good deal of controversy among the writers on moral 
philosphy about its nature. For a correct interpretation 
of Butler's moral teaching therefore it is essential to 
discuss this ... i.uestion in some detail. SeconcUy after having 
determined the nature of conscience we shall try to explain 
Butler's doctrine of virtue which is its own end and is to be 
pursued for its own sake. 
Butler defines conscience thus: "There is a principle 
of reflection in men, by which they dis·tinguish between, 
approve and disapprove their own actions. We are plainly 
constituted such sort of creatures as to reflect upon our 
own nature. The mind can take a view of what passes within 
itself, its propensions, aversions, passions, affections, 
as respec·t.ing such objects, and in such degrees; and of the 
several act ions consequent thereupon. In this survey it 
approves of one, disapproves of another, and towards a third 
is affected in neither of these ways, but is ·-:~.uite indifferent. 
- 125-
This principle in ·man, by which he approves or disapproves 
his heart, temper, and actions, is conscience; •••••• so 
as to take in more 11 • 1 Again he says: "But there is a 
superiOl" principle of reflect.ion or conscience in every 
man, which distinguishes between the internal principles of 
his heart, as well as his external actions: which passes 
judgment upon himself and them; Pl'Onounces determinately 
some actions to be in themselves just, right, good; others 
to be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust: which, without 
being consulted, without being advised with, magisterially 
exerts itself, and approves or condemns him, the doer of 
them accordingly". 2 
From the passages just quoted it is clear that in 
Butlert_s treatment of conscience, two aspects are very 
conspicuous. They are (1) cognitive and (2) authoritative. 
To these two Professor Broad adds a third aspect also. 
According to him conscience is also an active principle.3 
VIe shal1, hawever, explain briefiy these two important 
aspects of conscience one by one. We shall first deal 
with the cognitive aspect. Conscience as reflection is 
1. 'The Works of Joseph Butlex·', Vol. II, Sennon I, sects. 7,8. 
pp.41-42. 
2. 'The \'larks of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Sermon II, sect. 10, 
p.59. 
3. C .D. Broad. 'Five Types of Ethical Th.eory', London, 1951, 
p. 76. 
- 126-
that faculty Which judges the actions, characters and 
intentions of men from the point of view of their rightness 
and wrongness, goodness and badness. It distinguishes a 
deliberate act from an unintentional act. It makes allow-
ances and taltes the circumstances of men into, account. 
When passing judgment upon actions conscience also considers 
and takes into account the Character and disposition of the 
agent. After all no one can expect the same standard of 
behaviour from a child and from a grown up man, from a 
savage and from a civilized man, and from a lunatic and from 
a sane man. Butler's conscience considers all these and is 
thus a highly reasonable and reflective faculty. Professor 
Rashdal.l probably ignores this aspect of conscience in Butler 
when ·he observes: '~e (Butler) assumes that our first intuitive, 
half-instinctive judgment upon the most complicated problem 
of conduct - prior to any reflection upon probable consequen-
c~s, -· will be infallibly true. He is disposed to look 
upon conscience as a sort of penny-in-the-slot machine. 
Not a moment's thought is nec:essary, put in your qp.estion: 
out jumps the answer read;y-made, complete, cut and dried. 
Here be is obviously wrong;' •1 Professor Rashdall overlooks 
the fact that conscience in Butler does a good deal of 
rat.iocination and reflection before it passes any judgment 
about the rightness or wrongness of an act. It takes into 
1. Rashdal.l Hastings. 'Bishop Butler', The Modern Churchman, 
Vol. XVI, No. 12, March, 1927, p. 691. 
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account the calculations of all inferior principles before 
giving its final verdict in regard to any particular course 
of action. 
It may be pointed out here that although it would seem 
that an action to be judged as right must have the approval 
of conscience, in actual life it is not always appealed to. 
It is not the case that in practical life every action is 
brought before conscience for its determination as right or 
1 
wrong. Butler's conscience is, as Dr. Joad points out, 
like a good headmaster or business manager who can absent 
himself from his school or business in the reasonable assur-
ance that eve~hing will go on in just the same way as it 
would have done had he been present. The fact is that Butler 
recommends and argues for the formation of habits or virtue. 2 
\'/hen virtue becomes habitual and when the proper temper of it 
is acquired, then virtuous actions become easy, they become 
more or less automatic and instinctive. In such cases even 
action done in consequence of particular passions, not to 
speak of self-love and benevolence, are considered and take.n 
as right because when habits o~ virtue are formed these do 
not violate the authority of conscience. Professor Broad 
puts this case mathematically when he says: n·1n a well-bred 
1. C.E.M. Joad. 'Guide to the Philosophy of Morals and 
Politics', London, 1938, p. 200. 
2. 'The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol. I, Part I 2_Chapter_.V, 
especially sects. 24 & 25, pp. :L2l-122. 
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and well-·trained man a great deal of this organisation has 
become habitual, and in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred 
he does the right things without having to think whether or 
why they are right. It is only in the hundredth specially 
perplexing or specially alluring situation that an explicit 
. 1 
appeal. to conscience has to be made". 
We now come to the authoritative aspect or conscience in 
Butler. In discussing this aspect he points out that cons-
cience being the highest principle in the constitution of man 
it carries supreme authority along with it. By attributing 
supreme authority to conscience Butler means that its verdicts 
or pronouncements in matters of conduct are rinal. The very 
fact that conscience approves or disapproves a particular 
course of conduct constitutes a sufficient reason or as 
2 Professor Duncan-Jones s~s 'a prepotent reason' for taking 
or not taking that course of conduct. Briefly Butler 
regarded co1wcience as the highest court of appeal. Then 
again it is also clear from this that conscience also carries 
obligation along with its authority. ~ its approbation or 
disapprobation of an action conscience puts us under an 
obligation to do oi• not to do it. The authority and oblig-
ation constitute part of the notion of conscience in Butler. 
1. C.D. Broad. 'Five Types of Ethical Theory', London, 1951, 
p. 79. 
2. By 'prepotent reason' Professor Duncan-Jones means not merely 
a reason, not even a decisive reason merely but a reason of 
such a nature that it outweighs all contrary reasons. Vide 
Butler's MO~l Philosophy, a volwne of the Pelican Philosophy 
series, p. 77. 
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He himself very clearly says: "Take in then that authority 
and obligation, which is a constituent part of this reflex 
approbation, and it will undeniably follow, though a man 
should doubt of ever~thing else, yet, that he would still 
remain under the nearest and most ce1~ain obligation to the 
practice of virtue; an obligation ~nplied in the ve~ idea 
of virtue, in the very idea of reflex'·approbation 11 • 1 
It may be pointed out here that though conscience carries 
the natural authority with it, nay though it carries the 
supr~ne authority, it does not always carry the necessa~ 
power to enforce its authority, with the result that in 
actual life it is often overpowered either by self-love or 
by benevolence or by the particular passions just as self-love 
and benevolence are somet~nes over-powered for the same 
reason by the particular passions and affections. This 
is what Butler seems to suggest when he says 'had it strength 
as it has right etc.• This, however, does not affect the 
moral right of conscience. Its authority is de jure but not 
de facto. The fac.t that conscience does not always have its 
full say, is often over-powered, does not mean that it forfeits 
ita rig~~ to make pronouncements in matters of-conduct. 
It may be interesting to compare here Butler's conscience 
with that of reason in P.lato 1 s Republic. Plato assigns the 
same sovereignty to reason in the soul of man as Butler does 
1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler•, Vol. II, Pref. to Sermons, 
sect;. 22, p. 16. 
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to conscience in the hierarchy of the human constitution. 
Like conscience in Butler, reason in PJl.ato is that "which 
rules and issues these pi•ecepts, that which posseoses in 
itself knowledge of What is advantageous to each and all o:r 
those three principles 11 • 1 Again just as according to 
Butler conscience, being the supr~ne principle in human 
nature, should rule, we find the same idea very clearly 
stated in Plato where it is asl~ed, ''Then is it not befitting 
that the rational part should rule, inasmuch as it is wise 
and has foresight for the whole soul, and that the spirited 
part should be its subject and ally ? 11 and the answer is, 
"Certainly-11 • 2 Thus we see that except for the difference 
in tenninology Butler is in complete agreement with Pl~to 
in ~ttributing sovereignty to the highest principle of 
human nature. 
There is also another very important point about 
conscience which we should like to consider here. Butler 
more than once has referred to conscience as 1the viceroy 
of God within us'. He holdS that it is our natural guide 
and has been assigned to us by the Author of our nature, 
i.e. ·God. Again Butler presses this point strongly and 
emphatically in his Analogy when he says: "And thus, God 
having given mankind a moral faculty, the object of which is 
1. Plato. 'The· Republic', Eng. Trans .• by A.D. Lindsay, 1954, 
· p. 131. (Everyman's Library, No. 64). 
2. do do do p. 131. 
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actions, and which naturally approves some actions as right, 
and of good desert, and condemns others as wrong, and of ill 
cleser.t; that he will, finally and upon the \Vhole, reward the 
former and punioh the latter, is not an assertion of an 
abstract truth, but of what is as mere a :fact, as his doing 
1 
so at present would be". It seems that by attributing 
divine origin to conscience Butler probably means to suggest 
that the voice of conscience is not an arbitrary voice of an 
arbitrary principle, but it is the voice of' a principle of 
eternal righteousness. In other vtords it is the voice of an 
etet~al righteous Being. By attributing divine origin to 
conscience Butler is contemplating the Deity through the 
moral nature of man and by emphasising our obedience to 
conscience he is vindicating the truth that God who possesses 
the highest moral virtues is the only proper object of human 
affections. We shall. further develop this point vrhen we 
compare Butler with ~~dhusudana. However from what we have 
said it is clear that Butler's ethics, through his doctrine 
of conscience, reaches its climax and final completion in 
religion. Spooner obsez-ves in this connection: "Butler 
assumes that the God whom conscience reveals to us is the 
perfect expression or impersonation o:f that moral law which 
we find written in our hearts; the absolute embodiment of all 
those tlualities which we feel ought to prevail in ourselves, 
----------------------------------------------·------------··------
1. tThe Works o:f Joseph Butler', Vol. I, Part II, Chapter. VI~I, 
sect. 26, p. 369. 
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and which call forth our enthusiastic admiration as we con-
1 
template them when exemplified in our fellovr--men". 
\"Je have considered Butler's view about conscience in its 
different aspects. We shall now consider it in some detail 
in the light of the various criticisms that have been made of 
it. 
fle shall first consider Professor 'l'lb.ewell 1 s view of 
Butler's treatment of conscience. He points out t.he.t Butler 
did not mean to treat conscience as a faculty, separate and 
independent of the rational faculty. He holds that this is 
an erroneous view prevalent among many and is due mainly to 
Butler's own use of the 'Supreme' or 1Suprerracy 1 to describe 
conscience. We shall let Professor 1\rhewell himself speak 
about it. He says: 11But it will be evident to an attentive 
reader, that such a supremacy of conscience was not intended 
by Butler. He did not hold an original and independent 
faculty of conscience, whose decisions were to be accepted as 
rules of right action. ~7ith him, conscience was a faculty, 
if you choose, but a faculty, as reason is a faculty; a powe_r 
by exercising vmich we may come to discern truths, not a 
repos ito·ry of truth already collected in a visible shape. 
Conscience, indeed, is the reason, employed about q_uestions of 
right and wrong, and accompanied with the sentiments of 
aPProbation and disapprobation which by the natui·e of man, cling 
1. lfl.A. Spooner. 'Bishop Butler', London, 1901, p. 118. 
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1 inextricably to his appr·ehens ion of right and wrong 11 • He 
further says: 11'If conscience be the supreme judge of right 
2 
and wrong, whose conscience j_s to be taken ? 11 He also 
questions the appropriateness of the use of the word 'Supreme' 
for conscience which he considers, as has already been said, 
as the root cause of the erroneous view that conscience is an 
independent faculty. 
Mr. Townsend seems inclined to hold the same view when he 
says: "tonscienc.e' is used by Butler as a synonym of 'the 
principle of reflection"'. A little later he again says: 
"The reader of the Sermons, however, need be in no doubt that 
the author means to point to an internal principle of organiz.-
ation, whether he calls it conscience or a principle of 
reflection". 3 
4 Professor Raphae~ also in an article seems inclined to 
maintain a. similar view of Butl·er's conscience. 
It does not seem true that Butler held conscience to be 
mere reason or reflection. It is no doubt true that he does 
not clearly explain the nature of conscience or the moral 
faculty. He leaves it very vague and remains indefinite on 
1. Vi. flh ewell. 'Butler's Three Sermons on Hwnan Nature and 
Disser~ation on Virtue', Cambridge, 1848t 
p. 9, Introduct1on. 
2. do do do p. a, Introduction. 
3. H.G. Tovmsend. 'The Synthetic Principle in Butler's Ethics', 
Irr~er"'lational Jour'Ilal of Ethics, Vol. xxxvii, No. 1, 
October 1926, p. 83. 
4. D.D. Raphael. 'Bishop Butler's view of conscience', 
Philosophy, Vol. XXIV, No. 90, July 1949. 
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this important problem, even in his later work 'The Analogy' • 
Call it moral reason, moral sense or divine reason, though 
he himself calls it 'conscience'. It is also true that Butler 
often calls it 'the principle of reflection' which gives the 
impress ion that conscience is mere teflection and not an 
original and independent faculty. But then it must not be 
forgotten that he also at many places calls it 'the approving 
or disapproving faculty' which shows that he recognises an 
element of emotion as included in the idea of it, as is the 
element of reason. The fact appears to be that Butler took 
the existence of conscience as an established fact and he felt 
certain that everyboey would understand what he means by 
conscience or moral faculty. In the very first Sermon he says: 
"It cannot possibly be denied, that there is this principle 
1" 
of renection or conscience in hunan nature". Again in his 
Dissertation on Virtue he says: "It is manifest great part of 
common language, and of common behaviour over the world, is . 
2 formed upon supposition of such a moral faculty-". A13 Butler 
assumed the existence of conscience and believed that this 
could not be denied by anybody he thought it probably unnecess-
ary to go into the detailed analysis of it, to show what 
processes were involved in it. Moreover the controversy 
between feeli~g and reason.had not arisen when Butler delivered 
1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler•·, Vol. II, Sermon I, sect. 8, 
p. 42. 
do do Vol. I, Dissertation on Virtue' 
sect. 2, p. 399. 
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his Sermons. However, it appears obvious from Butler's 
various statements that conscience combined in it both reason 
and feeling. Conscience, according to Butler, also reflects 
in dif'ficul t cases. It does a good deal of ratiocination. 
It takes into account the circwnstances and the capacities 
of men and then detennines whether or not an action is in 
conformity with nature. After all these are over it accords 
its approval or disapproval in regard to a particular act. 
It m~ also be pointed out here that while bestowing approval 
or· disapproval conscience is not guided by any end as self-love 
or benevol.ence are, for God alone knows the end if there is 
any which it is its function to promote. Thus the element of 
the feeling of approval or disapproval is, as it appears to us, 
more.important; at least it is not less important than the 
element of reason or reflection in regard to the rightness or 
wrongness of a particular ~ction. Thus it appears quite 
obvious that Butler did not mean that conscience is just a 
synonym of reason. Reason is, no doubt, a very important 
aspect of conscience, or, we should say, an essential aspect 
of it, but as we have already seen it is also an essential 
aspect_ of both the inferior principles - self-love and benevo-
lence. Thus reason cannot be identified with conscience any 
more than it can with self-love and benevolence. 
There seems to be another reason why Butler puts so much 
emphasis on reason. He was acquainted with the moral sense 
theo~ of Shaftesbury, though he does not appear to be very 
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happy about it. Anyway, the influence seems to be there on 
Butler when he says: "Now obligations of vir-tue shown, and 
motives to the practice of it enfm·rced, f1 .. om a review of the 
nature of man, are to be considered as an appeal to each 
particular person's heart and natural conscience: as the 
external senses are appealed to for the proof of things cogniz-
able by them. Since then our inward feelings, and the per-
captions we receive from our external senses, are equally real; 
to argue from the former to l.ife and conduc.t is as iittle liable 
to exception, as to argue from the latter to absolute specu-
lative truth".1 As it appears to us Butler by his emphasis 
on reason and by calling conscience 'the principle of reflec-
tion' is trying to avoid the naiTovmess of the mol .. al sens·e 
theory. He is trying to show that the judgments of conscience 
are not subjective. They are not based on emotional qualities 
- pleasure and pain only. He rather wants to show that the 
pronounc.ements of conscience are objective and that way he 
also gives them a touch of universality. 
Moreover, that Butler considered conscience as an inde-
pendent faculty, and not a mere synonym of reason, is also 
supPort.ed b¥- the fact that he be~ieves that reason alone and 
by itself cannot provide the sole and adequate ru1e for the 
gui.dance of life. H.e rather apJ:>rehends that too much specu-
lation is apt to lead men away from the path of virtue. He 
1. 'The Works of Joseph: Butl.er', Vol. II, Sermon II, 
sect. 3, p. 53. 
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feels that there is a 1noral danger in entering into elaborate 
speculation. He says: "That which is called considering what is 
our duty in a particular case, is very often nothing but endea-
vouring to explain it away. Thus those courses, which, if men 
would fairly attend to the dictates of their O\nl consciences, 
they would see to be corruption, excess, oppression, uncharita-
bleness; these are refined upon - things were so and so circum-
stantiated - great difficulties are raised about fixing bounds 
and degrees: and thus every moral obligation whatever ma.y be 
evaded. Here is scope, I say, for an unfair mind to explain 
away every moral obligation to itself 11 • 1 Butler makes this 
point all the more when he says: "Reason alone·, whatever any one 
may wish, is not in reality a sufficient motive of virtue in 
such a creature as man, ••• upon his heart". 2 These passages 
clearly show that Butler does not regard reason as the sufficient 
motive for virtue. On the other hand he regards conscience as 
the sole determinant of virtue. Thus conscience cannot be treat-
ed as mere reason. 
Then again a statement which Butter himself makes in Sei'lRon 
VI 'Upon Compa~sion' makes it clear that he means to regard 
conscience as a separate and independent faculty. He says: 11[n 
such a compliant state of mind, reason and consci-enc·e-will have 
a fair hearing; ••• at this season 11 .3 
1. 'The Worlts of Joseph Butler', Vol. ii, 
2. do. 
3· do. 
do. 
do. 
do. 
do. 
Sermon VII, sect. 14, 
PP• 132-133· 
Sermon v, sect. 4, 
p. 98. 
Sermon VI, sect. 13, 
jl. 119. 
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Lastly we shall refer to the elastic statement which 
Butler makes in the Dissertation upon Virtue "Vlhether call.ed 
conscience, moral reason, mor•al sense, or divine reason; 
whether considered as a sentiment of the understanding, or 
as a perception of' the heart; or, which seems the truth, as 
including both 11 • 1 The ambiguity and the elasticity of the 
sentence leaves the door open for various interpretations 
and i"n :ract it has been interpreted differently by different 
people. It seems that Butler's idea probably is that so long 
as we act accot"'ding to conscience, which to him was an unden-
iable fact of experience, it does not matter 1nuch what termin-
ology we use for it. But then as it appears to us that the 
truth also comes out of his lipe towards the end of the 
sentence when he says tas including both'. As we have pointed 
out above, conscience according to him includes both reason 
and feeling. It thus cannot be said to consist in mere 
reason. It is a moral faculty, a separ·ate and independent 
faculty. 
Thus though in Butler's treatment of moral actions these 
two words 'reflection•: and 'conscience' are usually combined, 
they unite in order to make moral. pronouncement, which, as we 
said above, is probably the main reason for confusion, but 
there seems absolute~y no reason to think that they are synony-
mou.s. Butler feels convinced that reason alone cannot carry 
1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol. I, Dissertation on 
Virtue, sect. 2, p. 399. 
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us through whereas conscience, when habitually exercised, 
acts instinctively without any reflective operation. It 
must be borne in mind here that Butler always emphasises· 
the cultivation of virtue so that it may gradually become 
habitual. Mr. Rogers also malces an observation in this 
connection which throws some light on the problem we are 
discussing. Re says: " 'Conscience', which since Bishop 
Butler has shown a tendency to displace 'reason' in their 
terminology, is for its more enlightened advocates a foxm 
of reason; but under the influence of the moral sense 
conception it becomes a special form, or 'faculty'. And 
on the vthole the change perhaps is aTl improvement. At 
least the term 'conscience' calls attention to the fact 
that moral reason has a peculiar subject matter which sets 
it apart from other rational pronouncements; and until this 
is clearly recognized no advance in analysis is possible" •1 
Professor Vlhewell as we have already indicated above 
also questions the appropriateness of the use of the word 
'supreme' to describe conscience. Bu.t there seems absolutely 
nothing inappropriate about it. The fact is that in Butler's 
analysis_ of the human nature the different elements and 
principles stand in a hierarchical order and conscience being 
on top of them all, Butlet' calls it the supreme principle. 
Being at the head conscience in Butler also has the highest 
1. A.K. Rogers. 'Morals in Review' J London, 1927, p. 272. 
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or supreme authority. This is the sense in which, we think, 
Butler usee the word •supreme' and in his own way he seems 
perfectly justified. 
Professor Whewell again while pointing out the inapprop-
riateness of the word 1 supreme 1 argues that since conscience 
itself is subject to the supr•eme rule which enjoins all virtue 
and duty and which is the law of God, it cannot thus have the 
supreme authority. 
This az•gwnent loses aJ.l its force when we beat .. in mind the 
divine origin of conscience. Butler holds that conscience 
is the mouth-piece of' God. God Himself speaks to men through 
conscience. It was put into man by God to point out to him 
his duty and to make him do it. Conscience is thus the 
divine in. man. Its law is the same as the law of God. 
Conscience does not derive its credentials from any higher 
authority. On the contrary it carries with it its own 
credentials. Thus there seems nothing v~rong in conscience 
having the supreme authority. 
Moreover by using the word 'supreme'Butler probably also 
means to vindicate and demonstrate the separate and independent 
existence of the moral. faculty or conscience. 
We have tried to show that Butler considered conscience 
as an independent moral faculty, and also that it is the 
supreme judge in morals as it carries along with it the 
highest authority. We shall. now consider one important 
question that is generally raised in this connection. It is 
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often asked, in fact the question is, as we have seen, also 
raised by Professor Whewell, if all of us have a conscience 
or moral faculty which tells us what is right or what is 
wrong in a particular situation, then why are there diversities 
in moral judgments 1 V1hy is it that our moral judgments differ 
from individual to individual, from country to country and 
from age to age ? In such divergences whose conscience is to 
be taken as supreme 1 
It seems that the objection overlooks a very important 
point that at least potentially the fUndamental character-
istics of conscience are the same in all individuals. It is 
not that the conscience of X tells him that Y should do such 
and such, or that the conscience of Y tells him that X should 
do such and such. The fact is that when a manta conscience 
determines an action as right, that action is considered 
right generally. In other words when the conscience of an 
individual determines an action as right, that action would be 
right for everybody in the same situation. This also shous 
that the distinction between rightness and wrongness v1hich 
conscience makes is not based upon individual feelings and 
beliefs. It is on the other hand based on an objeetive 
criterion. But since this argument does not get over the 
difficulty that people's consciences do not agree. we shall 
pursue this discussion further. 
Butler, as it appears to us, was himself well aware of 
this difficulty and he also seems to have anticipated this 
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objection when he says, "the apPearance there is of some 
small diversity amongst mankind with respect to this faculty, 
with respect to their natural sense of moral good and evil; 
and the attention necessary to survey with any exactness what 
passes within, have occasioned that it is not so much agreed 
what is the standard of the internal nature of man, as of his 
1 
external form. Neither is this last exactly settled". 
Perhaps because of such objections which, Butler probably 
anticipated, he avoids using the word 'infallibility'. He 
never ascribes it to conscience, although it is general~ 
thought that his doctrine implies it. ~ doing so Butler 
leaves the door of conscience open for its further education 
and development. In fact Butler, as it appears, never held 
that the conscience in al.l individuals is equally developed. 
He never means to hold that a child has as developed a 
conscience as a grown up or that a lunatic: has a conscience 
as developed as that of a sane man, or even that a savage has 
conscience as fully educated and developed as that of a 
c ivi~ized man. He was 'l..Uite aware that the internal nature 
of all men is never quite settled, never equally educated and 
develop-ed. Thus it-seems that so long as the differences 
are there in the internal nature of man, the diversities in 
moral judgment will be there. 
But Butler held that these differences in the internal 
1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Sermon II, 
sect. 2, p. 52. 
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nature of 1nan do not matter very much. Men are in general 
very much alike. He says·: "Yet we undex•stand one another 
when we speak of the shape of a human body: so likewise we 
do when we speak of the heart and inward principles, how far 
1 
soever the standard is from being exact or precisely fixed". 
Collins remarks in this connection: "Butler was prepared 
to meet the real difficulty which lies upon the threshold of 
his doctrine, - that conscience is a shifting rule, varying 
vlith the various stages of civilisation - with age, with 
countr-.t and even wit,h climate. The standard of the internal 
nature of man is not 1exactly settled', he admits~ neither is 
that of his external shape and stature. Yet practically we 
all understand what is meant v1hen we speak of' the one or the 
other. He is even prepared to allow with Woilast.on that 
conscience has its rudimentary stage, and that morality has 
therefore been progressive. But he is scarcely so bold or 
1 th i · t · ht · h h llll" to be " • 2 so c ear on s po1n as we m~g w1s 
Then again the diversity in our moral judgments is due 
very largely to circumstances, situations and matters of tact 
and not so much due to differences in the internal nature of' 
man. Conscience or moral faculty according to Butle1a does 
take into account the circumstances, and when these and other 
matters of fact vary, its moral pronouncements also vary 
1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Sermon II, sect. 2. 
p. 52. 
2. W. Lucas Collins. 'Butler', Edinburgh and London, 1890, 
p. 85. (Blackwood's Philosophical Classics). 
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accordingly. For instance, we may adopt some criterion in 
regard to a particulur field of mor•al experience. Subsequently 
we may have to change the criterion when the scope of the field 
increases. Thio does n~t disprove the tact that conscience 
is the judge in matters of conduct. This'".only proves that 
conscience does not make moral judgments blindl.y irrespective 
of any consideration of the situation and the circumstances. 
Sir David Ross observes: ''Yet on examination the diver-
sity of opinion on moral questions is found to rest not on 
disagreement about fundamental moral principles, but partly 
on differences in the circumstances of different societies, 
and partly on different views which people hold, not on moral 
1 questions but on questions of fact". 
Professor Taylor also remarks: "There are ultimate mo1•a1 
disagreements, but they only cover a minority of the cases, 
and even they are, in the main, disagr·eements about axiomata 
media, not about principles". 2 
From all these it is clear that the diversity of opinion 
on moral questions does not contradict Butler's main ethical 
theocy that conscience does provide guidance to men in matters 
of conduct. It does tell them with regard to a particular 
course of conduct whether it is right or wrong. It seems 
true and probably Butler also would have agreed that if the 
situations and circumstances and other matters of fact be the 
same, if 1nen be free from bias, prejudices and partialities 
1. Sir W. David Ross. 'Founda·::.ions of Ethics', O.Aford, 1939,p.l8 
2. A. E. Taylor. 'Some Features of Butler's Ethics•, Mind, 
Vol. XXXV, New series No. 139, July 1926, p. 288. 
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which influence and pervert moral judgments, there is no 
doubt that the pronouncements of a reasonably developed moral 
faculty or conscience will be the same in almost all cases. 
Butler says: "·For, as much as it has been disputed wherein 
virtue consists, or whatever ground for doubt there may be 
about particulars; yet, in general, there is in reality an 
universally acknowledged standard of it" •1 
We have considered in detail Professor Whewell's view 
of Butler's tt•eatment of conscience. We shall now consider 
an important criticism which Sir James Mackintosh 1nakes. He 
remar•ks: ''The most palpable defect of Butler's scheme is, that 
it affords no answer to the question, 'What is the dieting-
uishing quality common to all right actions?'~ If it were 
answered, •Their criterion is, that they are approved and 
. 
commanded by Oonscience •·, the answer would find that he was 
involved in a vicious circle; for Conscience itself could be 
no otherwise defined tha.n as the faculty which approves and 
conmands right actions.". 2 This criticism is again repeated 
by Sir Leslie Stephen.3 It is necessary to notice a few 
points in this connection. The first is that Butler considers 
conscience as the final arbiter on moral quest-ions. It has 
1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol. I,'Disser-tation on Virtue; 
sect. 3, P. 399. 
2. Sir James ~&lckintosh. 'Dissertation on the Progress of 
~hical.Philosophy1 , London 1851 7 p. 58. 
3. Sir Leslie Stephen. 1 Histo~ of English Thought in the 
Eighteenth Century', Vol. II, London 1876, p. 50. 
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the supreme authority. Its pronouncements are ultimate. 
The very fact that conscience approves an action constitutes 
sufficient and conclusive reason for doing it. No further 
reason is to be sought for it. After all we cannot ask the 
why of everything. Vle cannot ask the why about the judgments 
of conscience which are final and ultimate. 
Again, it appears that the criticism overlooks a very 
important point in that it does not consider that ultimately 
the verdict about the rightness or wrongness of an action 
depends upon its approval or disapProval of the moral faculty. 
It is true that Bu.Uer d<i:l•es not give any definite criterion of 
right. actions, he does not point to any common quality of right 
actions. But even if there was one, the question of approval 
or disapproval. remains there. It is not enough that oux· 
speculative reason discovers and perceives the common ~uality 
of right actions, it is also essential that our mot .. al faculty 
should apProve of them. Thus it seems fairly clear that 
whatever the criterion for right actions be taken to be, they 
must finally be approved by conscience - they must bear the 
seal of approval of the office of conscience. Thus it does not 
seem to us t-hat Butler's doctrine involves an argument in a 
circle. 
Moreover it must also be borne in mind here that the 
tact that conscience approves an action should not be taken 
to mean that it creates moral.ity. Conscience only makes 
moral actions possible by trying to bring harmony among the 
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different elements of human nature. But it does not create 
morality just as the "vatch does not cr·eate the time it 
measures. Conscience only creates p::t"'per environment and 
atmosphere for ·vil'·tuous actions. Butler himself says: "That 
which renders beings capable of moral government, is their 
having a moral nature, and moral faculties of perception and 
of act ion n·. 1 
VIe have discussed the nature of conscience in some detail 
and in this connection we have also examined certain criticisms 
and objections. "fle are now in a posit ion to ascertain in 
fAa .co 
what virtue consist according to Butler. Vfuat constitutes 
,.. . 
morality according to him ? In the light of what has been 
said above and also in the previous Chaptei•s we can see clearly 
that according to Butler virtue does not lie in any external 
end, it does not lie in the attainment of this or that partie-
ular thing or even a set of things. Nor does it lie in the 
realisation of any one internal principle of human nature. 
VIe have seen that virtue consists neither wholly in self-love 
nor in benevolence. If there is a conflict between these, 
there is nothing in the nature of either which gives it 
authority to resolve it. In what does virtue lie then 1 
What is its end 1 Butler's answer is that virtue lies in 
acting according to the dictates of conscience. It is only 
by an ·appeal to conscience, which is endowed with an ovex-· 
riding authority that the conflict between self-love and 
1. ''.rhe Works of Joseph BUtler', Vol. Ii Dissertation on Virtue, 
sect. , p. 39?. 
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benevolence can be resolved. But it may be asked: is not 
conscience only one principle of human nature ? Have we not 
just said that virtue does not lie in the realisation of any 
one internal principle ? Are we not contradicting ourselves 1 
In reply it may be said that the contradiction is only apparent. 
rle forget Butler's ~ccount of human nature. It is not a mere 
sum of the different principles of action. It is a system, 
constitution or hierarchy. Conscience, being the head of the 
constitution, represents the whole being. Butler's human 
nat.ur-e is a polity in which conscience is supreme. 
is the voice of the whole character and personality. 
Its voice 
Consid-
ered thus conscience is not merely only one principle of hwnan 
nature. Life according to it means life according to the 
whole nature. \~hen Butler says that virtue lies in following 
conscience he means conscience in this sense. Butler's reply 
to the question as to the end of virtue is that it is its own 
end and should therefore be pursued for its own sake. 
We thus conclude that according to Butler virtue is an 
end in itself. It is to be pursued not for the sal{e of any 
ulterior end but because it is virtue. \'lhile self-love 
approv~a an action because it is prudent, benevo~ance apProves 
it because it is conducive to the happiness of others, but 
conscience approves it because it is right. 
\"!e have concluded the main discussion of the Chapter but 
before we finally close it we should like, in the interests of 
fuz•ther clarification, to bi•ing out one or two more points. 
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The first is that a conscient-ious life which Butler 
advocates is an integrated life, and harmonious because in it 
all the elements of human nature are well-balanced, well-
adjusted and well-unified. In this l.ife an individual is 
not at the mercy of his desires and inclinations. He is 
not like a shuttle-cock driven to and fro by them. It is 
a highly reasonable life. With the further grov~h and 
development of conscience a man's life also becomes richer. 
As his conscience becomes more and more educated, as it learns 
more and more from past and the present experience, his life 
also becomes fuller and richer. It becomes more and more 
illwninated. Besides, in a conscientious life all the 
elements are so regulated and directed as to realise the end 
or purpose for which they have been implanted in man by God. 
The second point which we want to bring out briefly here 
is Butlerts view on the I'elation between ethics and religion. 
We have seen that Butler sometimes leaves the field of morality 
and passes on to religion. We think it therefore necessary 
to elucidate this problem a little further. 
Butler's conscious purpose seems to be t6 derive morality 
from. ·t.he psychological nature of man, to dist-inguish th-e 
spheres of morality and religion and thus to give the former 
an independent basis as well as a separate field of speculation. 
But it appears that despite all his conscious· purpose to 
establish Jnorality on a basis of its own apart from the support 
of religion Butler himself does not seem to be fully satisfied 
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with this empirical account of morality, and probably feels 
that it should have some supernatural bas is and support. 
This view is SUPPOrted from the whole tenor of Butler's moral 
philosophy. To understand this position fully it will be 
useful to remember a few things here. The first is that 
Butler's whole metaphysical outlook was religious, which in 
this context means Biblical. As we have seen, he believed 
in a personal God, endowed with perfect moral virtues. This 
point by itself does not help us very much because a man may 
believe in a personal God and yet propound an ethical system 
independent of religion. But Butler also held that the world 
is morally ordered and that God is its Moral Governor. He 
rules the world morally, rewarding virtue but punishing vice 
in exact proportion. Furthermore, Butler also believed in a 
future life and held the general doctrine of religion, that our 
present life is a state of probation for a future one; that we 
have scope and opportunities for that good and bad behaviour, 
which God will reward and punish hereafter. In Sermon II 
Butler clearly refers to this when he says that if man violates 
the law of nature and does not listen to his conscience (the 
voice of God within us) he w_ill be suitably dealt with in the 
life hereafter. Then again towards the end in Sermon In he 
refers to a future life when he says that all shall be set 
right at the final distribution of things. All these have 
not only great ethical significance, but constitute the very 
postulates of Butler's ethical thought, and to understand fully 
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his moral philosophy the consideration of these general 
postulates and assumptions of his thought is very essential. 
The fact appears to be that Butler by empihasis ing 
religion in matters of conduct is probably trying to give, as 
he always does, a double support to virtue. He is trying 
to plant morality on a securer ground, on a more stable found-
ation. If we divorce morality from God's authority and His 
commands as embodied in the Scriptures, we are apt to ignore 
its demands, especially when we are not rationally able to 
explain them, which we finite beings cannot always do as 
"the works of God, and his scheme of' government, are above our 
1 
capacities thor·oughly to comprehend". Again, "there may be 
infinite reasons for things, with which we are not acquainted". 2 
On the other hand if the demands of morality be based on God's 
authority, if we believe that they reflect God 1 s will, we shall 
submit to them even when we cannot fully comprehend their 
implications, feeling assured that these must be good as they 
have emanated from God. 
But perhaps the relation between morality and religion 
goes deeper in Butler. Probably morality can only be satis-
fac~or_i+Y explained and fully vindicated from the standpoint of 
revelation, of Christianity. This should not be understood 
to mean that, according to Butler, a man cannot be moral unless 
1. 1The Works of' Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Sermon ~, sect. 6, 
p. 263. 
2. do do Vol. I, Part II, Chapter I, 
sect. 3, p. 188. 
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he is religious, or that statements about duties can only be 
deduced from theolo.gical statements about God. \Vha t we want 
to say is that according to him one cannot be •completely good1 
and 'fully moral 1 without performing certain religious duties. 
Butler's vo~hole course of Sermons at the Rolls and more particu-
larly Chapter I, Part II of his Analogy confirms this view. 
In addition to moral duties, which arise out of nature of the 
case and which can be knovm independently of Scripture, there 
are certain positive duties also which are enjoined upon us 
and which can be knovm from Scripture only. Butler says : 
"Positive duties do not arise out of the nature of the case, 
but from external command; nor ~uld they be duties at all, 
were it not for such couunand, received from him whose creatures 
and subjects we are 11 • 1 He does not stop here. According to 
him to obey these positive percepts is a moral obligation and 
these therefore should be fulfilled. Butler says: "it is 
highly necessary that we remind ourselves, how great pr-esump-
tion it is, to make light of any instit1i!ltions of divine appoint-
ment; that our obligations to obey all God's commands whatever 
are all absolute and indispensable; and that conunands merely 
po~itive, a&nitted to be from him, lay us under a moral_oblig-
ation to obey them: an obligation moral in the strictest and 
-2 
most proper sense". · Besides there are certain religious 
1. 'The Vlorks of Joseph Butler' , Vol. I, Part II, Chapter I, 
sect. 26, pp. 202-203. 
~­
c.. do do Vol. I, Part II, Chapter I, 
sect. 34, pp. 208-209. 
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duties v1hich arise from the vel~ relation with the Lord Jesus, 
the Saviour, and the Holy Spirit - the Sanctifier. Religious 
duties may be either positive duties or moral duties. These 
are the obligations which we owe to them and which must be 
fulfilled. Butler says: "In Scripture are revealed the rela-
tions, which the Son and Holy Spirit stand in to us. Hence 
1 
arisa the obligations of duty, which we are under to them". 
From all this it seems clear that to be completely good and 
moral. the performance of certain religious duties is absolutely 
necessary. 
1. ''rhe Vlorks of Joseph Butler' Vol. I, Part II, Chapter I, 
sect. 17, p. 197. 
Chapter VI. -
Virtue and Human Nature in hadhusudana. 
In keeping \ofi th the ancient Hindu tradition 1-:adhusudana 
Sarasvati does not 1nention the time and the period when he lived. 
This ha.s naturally given rise to some controversy among the 
vrri ters on i\iadhusudana with regard to the period \vhen he flour-
ished. Hr. Telang concludes: 111 think we may safely lay dmm 
the proposition that I-~ladhusudana Sarasvat'i probably, flourished 
about the end of the fifteenth or the beginning of the sixteenth 
century of' the Christian era 11 • 1 Professor Nodi believes that 
"I·;1adhusudana lived between 1495 and 15i5 A.D. 112 hr. Divanji 
holds that 15!+0 to 161.~7 is probably the life-time (lf Nadhusudana 
Sarasvati. 3 vii thout going into this controversy \vhich is not so 
much to our purpose \•Te may point out here that Nr. Di vanj i seems 
nearer the truth as he bases his conclusion on the most recent 
researches. 
Iviadhusudana '"as born at Kotalipada, a suburb of the Farl.dpur 
district in eastern Bengal. His original name \oTas Kamalnayana. 
He \•Tas one of' the fiour sons of Purandracharya, the others being 
Srinath, Yada~anda, and Yagischandra. Shortly after the com-
1. l<.T. Telan-g-; 'A_ note on the Age of Nadhusuda-na Sara-svati 1 , 
Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 
Vol. X, No. XXX, P• 375. 
2. P.i,j. l·:iodi. Eng. Trans. of 'Siddhanta Bindu'. Baroda (India), 
1929, p. 27 (Introduction). 
3· P.C. Divanji. Eng. Trans. of 'Siddhanta Bindu of l•iadhusudana', 
Baroda (India), 1933, p. XXV, (Introduction). 
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pletion of his studies Kamalmayana came in contact vrith VisveS.vara 
Sarasvati at Benares and \oTas initiated into the fourth order 
( aannyasa·) and received the name of r~ladhusudana Sarasvati. 
Thus Visve.svara Sarasvati wa·s ,.,hat is teclmically called the 
_, 1 - -· 
'Asrama Guru' of Nadhusudana Sarasvati. 
The follO\ving \vorks of l!Iadhusudana are ,.,ell known: Vedanta· .... 
Kalpa - latika, Advaita-Siddhi, Advaita--ratna-rakf?ana, Advaita-
manjari' Atma-b9dha~~ika, Inanda--mandaxini", K~f?lJ.a-Kutuhala na~aka, 
Prastnana--bheda', Bhaki-samanya--nirupana, GudhaTtha·-dipika, Bha,kti-
- - , -- -
rasayana, Bhagavata--Purana-Prathama-Sloka-Vyakhya•, Veda-Stuti-
- - ,__ - -·- 1.... - - -~ikru, Sandilya-Sutr.a--~ika~, Sa·stra--Siddhanta-lesa-~ika·, Srupk~epa-
,__ - . . - - - - -· Sar:i.raka--Sara•Sal!lgraha, Siddhanta-Bindu and Hari-lila~ Vyakhya. 
But the most important of these 1tTOrks., in many of which 1-ladhusudana: 
propounds hhakti creed, are (1) Advaita'· Siddhi and (2). Gudhartha-
dipika. Advaita Siddhi is a metaphysical treatise and is mainly 
devoted to the objections ra"ised against the monistic theory of 
I 
Sarpkara Ve"danta1. We are hm-rever concerned ·mainly \·Ti th Gudhartha-
dipika in which he expounds his ethical and moral philosophy. 
It may be stated here that Gudhartha-dipika is a commentaTy on 
the. Bhagavadgita ,.,hich is one of the earliest ethico-religious 
works of the Hindus·. Regarding this conunenta:ry Mr. Telen_g remaTks: 
110ne of the most famous- commentaries on the Bha:ga:vadgiti is the 
Gi.tagudha"Tthadi"Piki: of Nadhusudana· Sarasvati. It is a most 
learned and elaborate work, and is in extent very neaDly double: 
1. By A~rama Guru is meant the spiritual preceptor. ·.who. initiates 
a man in the fourth order of life namely :·sannyasa\. 
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th 11 k G-=-t- Bh 1 f s' - - '' 1 e \ole - .nown 1 a a:s 1ya- o ankara·chaxya- ·• Professor 
I-·iodi also observes: "His critical powers were considerably developed 
as his literary activities increased in later life and by the time 
he wrote his Advaitasiddhi and Gudharthadipika he had reached the 
2 
zenith of his pmoJ"ers and become. a great independent thinker". 
With this brief sketch of l.fadhusudana' s life and v1orks \ole 
now proceed to discuss his philosophy of action. But before·· 
starting a: detailed study of it, we \oJ'OUld like to mention by wa-y 
of background a few points here which we think necessary to ena=ble 
the readers to follol:r 'bhe general trend of his ethical teaching. 
The first point is that the ethics of Nadhusudana· is taught 
against the background of the Supreme end of life namely mok~a 
or liberation.· Madhusudana at the very beginning of his commen-
tary3 makes this point sufficiently clear. There are four ends· 
of life recognised in Hindu philosophy: (1) Dharma (2). Artha: 
These can be rendered by duty (dharma).., 
economic activity: and material \oJ"ell-being (artha), enjoY!Ilent (kama)., 
and emancipation or spiritual freedom (mok~a-)... Broadly, speaking 
these are the fo_ur categories into \IThich all human objectives can 
be divided. But it should be borne in mind here that these ends 
or objectives of' human life are not separate and independent of 
L. K.T. Telang. 'A note on the Age of H~dhusudana• S.ara-svati.', 
Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 
Vol. X, No. XXX, p. 368. 
~l. P.l~. Hodi. Eng. Trans-,. of 1·Siddhl:mta· Bindu.•, Baroda~ (India} 
1927, p. 7: (Introduction) .• 
3· 'Gudharth@-dipi~a~ p. 4. 
------------------=--------------~--
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one another. The realisation of artha and kama should always 
be in accordance \'lith dharma \>lhich is the means of attaining 
mok~a. It may also be mentioned here that I~adhusudana holds 
that mok~a or bliss alone is the SUpreme goal of life to which 
the other three ends are only subsidiary. 
Dr. Mees explains the interrelatedness of the four ends of 
life thus: "The Scriptures propound a fourfold end: Artha, Kama', 
Dharma' and l'vloksa:. They are psychological tendencies which have 
to be purified and perfected, or in other words: socializ-ed. 
Artha is the trend to (perfection of), wealth and material well-
being: it is and has to be manifested. a-s subsidiary and subseiPv-
ient to the second: Kama- ,.rhich is the trend to (perfection of). 
feeling and desire, of sensuous and sensual experienc.e, this is 
and has to ·be manifested as subsidiary and subservient to Dharma·, 
the trend to menta-l (incl. morall perfection. All are subsidiary 
1 
and subservient to Nok~a', spiritual liberationu. 
It may be useful to point out here that in Hindu ethicaU. 
thought very ·great emphasis is laid on dharma and as \'le have 
already mentioned both artha and kama should be realised only in 
accordance with it. A. man should never overstep the limits of 
the moral lavr to realise these ends. It is only \-Then thus real-
ised that these ends' (artha· and kama). can act as progressive stages 
to the realisation of' mok~a, the Supreme goal of life. That· 
probably is why· in Hindu ethical thought dha!l'ma is mentioned first 
1. Gualtherus. H. Mees. 'Dharma and Society', The Hague, 
Holland, 1935.5, PP• 2:5-26. 
- 158 -
runong the four ends of life. 
The second point about Madhusudana' s moral philosophy, 1.vhich 
is in fact the general standpoint of the v1hole non- dualistic 
Vedant:a: philosophy, is that it is due to ignorance of the true 
natur-e of' self, Brahman and the vll'orld that all miseries and evils 
of life arise. It is our ignorance about the real nature of 
these (self, Brahman and the world) that canst itutes ou:c:· bondage 
to the world, that is, to the wheel of bjjrth and death. In 
short, ignorance of the nature of truth is the root cause of all 
ills and evils from \"Jhich man suffers in this world. 
Just as ignorance is the cause of all ills and evils in life, 
so knowledge about the true nature of :self', Brahman and the world 
is the only cure, the only way to get final release from the bond-
age to the wheel of birth and death. In other words knowledge 
of the true nature of Reality alone can bring mok~a or liberation 
v1hich results not only in the destruction of all ills and evils 
lin life but in the attainment of positive bliss. It should be 
borne in mind here that according to non-dualistic Vedanta bliss 
is the very nature of the self. The -self is Reality, Consc .ious-
ness and Bliss (Sat, Citt, Anru1da). It is because of our ignol-
ance that we do not realise it. It is covered by ignoranc-e and 
can be realised only through knowledge. 
This knowledge or wisdom (.j11ana), which is a means to perfec-
tion, does not mean intellectual knowledge. It means spiritual, 
intuitive knowledge and cannot be easily and cheaply attained. 
It cl:'an be achieved ohly through hard sacrifice and rigorous 
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discipl:ine. It can come only at the end of a long and arduous 
moral and spiritual discipline. This arduous moral and spirit-
ua.l discipline, necessary for wisdom, consists in the freeing of 
the mind of all distractions and the purging of the heart of all 
its impurities. 
It may be pointed out here that there are two kinds of know-
ledge - (1) The lower (apara) and the higher (para). The first 
or the lower knowledge (apara-vidya) consists of the knowledge of 
the Vedas, phonetics, ritual, grammar, etymology, astronomy etc. 
L-, short it consists of the knowledge of' all sciences and arts. 
The second or the higher la1owledge (para-vidya) is that knowledge 
,. 
by which the Supreme is realised. In the Cha.ndogya Upani!3ad-
Narad approaches Sanat-kllmara and confesses to him that in spite 
of the f~ct that he has mastered all the sciences and arts, he 
has not lmown the self and is thus still not free from sorrow. 
Sanat-:Kwnara having heard from him as to what he has read imparts 
to him the para-vidya which alone is the means to spiritual free-
dom. 
Madbusudana holds that there are three paths or disciplines 
by which moia?a can be realised. The first of these disciplines 
is called 1 t]1e discipline of action 1 or 1 Karma-yoga 1 • Acc;:ording 
to it the seeker must perform all his functions, domestic, social 
and religious, disinterestedly and without expecting the enjoyment 
of theil~ fruits. In other words he should perform his functions 
surrendering all their fruit to God. 
1. tChandogya Upani~ad 1', 7.1. 1-3. 
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The second is called 'the discipline of devotion' or 'Bhakti-
yoga 1 • According to it the seeker is required to be exclusively 
devoted to God, looking upon Him as his sole refuge. His whole 
mind is directed towards God alone. Not paying any attention to 
any object of desire, the devotee worships God who is endov:ed with 
all power, glory and lordship.1 Complete devotion and resignation 
is by itself sufficient for God to confer His grace on him, to 
purify his heart and kindle the light of. knowledge within him. 
The third discipline is called 1the discipline of knowledge' 
According to it, the seeker tries to realise 
the identity of' the individual self with the ultimate self, there 
being really no differance between them. He pt·actises the diffi-
cult processes of hearing (sravana), reasoning (manana) in order 
to remove any doubt that there may be regarding their truth. The 
last process meditation (nididhyasru1a) is prac-tised to put an end 
to the normal activity of the mind so that the direct realisation 
may be had. 
Of these three disciplines, the last is the hardest. Also 
everybody is not fit to take up that discipline. Because of this 
some are not prescribed this and for them only the other two are 
reconunended. 
It may be useful to point out here the distinction between 
lmowledge and the discipline or path of knowledge. The two are 
not the same thing. The discipline of ]{nowledge is only one of 
1. 'Gudhartha-dipika', Commenta1'Y on verse 1, Chapter VII, 
p. 239. 
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the three methods thi•ough which knowledge can be attained. But 
accoi·ding to Madhusudana even the successful pursuit of the disc-
ipline of action and that of devotion ultin~tely result in the 
dawning of "knowledge" (through the grace of God) which as we 
have said above, alone can bring mokf}a. 
Incidentally it may be EJentioned here that Madhusudana, by 
holding that there are three disciplines or methods for attaining 
mokt?a, seems to recognise a very important truth. He holds that 
all the three main aspects of human life - thinking, feeling and 
VJ illing -· are equally good. They are all equally important in the 
sense that any of these can lead to the attainment of the Supreme 
moral ideal, Dr. Radhakrishnan seems to hint at it when he 
remarks "Ma.dhusudana Sarasvati considers that the Gita adopts the 
three methods indicated in the Upani~ads, karma or work, upasana 
or worship, and. jnana or wisdom, and devotes six chapters to each 
in succession. Whatever be the truth of it, it emphasises the 
three great divisions of conscious life" •1 In regard to this 
l'emark we would like to say that the important point here is not 
that t~dhusudana. simply emphasises the three divisions of consc-
ious life but rather the fact that he considers all these aspects 
as equally important as leading on to the realisation of the 
Supreme goal of life, 
Then again there is another ~portant psychological t1~th 
which seems implied here. Madhusude.na not only attaches equal 
1. S. Radhakrishnan. 1 Indian Philosophy' , Vol. I, London, 1951, 
p. 554, 
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importance to each phase of conscious life but he also seems to 
emphasise their inter-relatedness. This inter-relatedness among 
the different phases of conscious life may be seen in his notioh 
of bhakt i or devotion. According to h~ bhakti is an independent 
1 
means to mol~ a, and also helps the approach to the other two dis-
ciplines, Karma-yoga and Jfiana-yoga. 2 Bhakti thus links together 
karma and jnana. Madhusudana. holds3 that that is the reason v1hy 
bhakti j_s described in the intermediate six chapters of the Bhag-
avadgita and the p:ath of action and that of knov1ledge in the first 
and last six chapters respectively. This point has been expr·essly 
- 4 
stated by him in his BhQ.kti-rasayana. 
It may also be pointed out here that Madhus·udana differs from 
the other great non-dualistic Vedantic conunentators on the Bhagav-
adgita on the point of emphasis and the place of devotion in 
5 
spiritual ethics. He also holds that the path of devotion is 
superior even to the path of knowledge and the superiority of the 
former lies in the fact that it leads to the realisation of truth 
more quickly than the latter, there being no difference in the 
conception of spiritual freedom achieved through either. We wish 
to make it clear here that devotion ~plies duality between the 
1. 'Gudh·artha-dipiJta', Conunentary on verse 16-, Chapter VII, p.250, 
also Commentary on verse 1, Chapter lX, p. 280. 
2. 'Gudhartha-dipika, Commentary on ver·se 66, Chapter XVIII, 
pp • 51Q- 512:. 
3. do do (Intr·oduction). 
4. 'Bhakti-rasayana', Calcutta, 1913, pp. 6-7. 
5. 'Advaite Siddhi', Bombay, 1917, Chapter IV, p. 897. 
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devotee and God to whom devotion is offered, while knowledge does 
away with all duality, which as we have seen is not real ultimat-
ely. Madhusudana propounds the view that liberation is difficult, 
almost impossible to achieve even for those who follow Jfiana-yoga 
except through the grace of God which can be received only by 
those who have attained the purification of their mind and heart 
and are devoted to God. Being devoted to God is, however, part 
of the process of the attainment of liberation. Madhusudana 
emphasises the purity of mind and heart because the impure mind 
is disturbed and restless and thus cannot reflect the light of 
pure consciou.sness which is the nature (Jf Reality. This reflec-
tion is possible only when the mind is cleansed and freed from 
all impurities. Probably this is why 1\hdhusud.ana holds that the 
main, rath~r the only, purpose of morality is the cleansing and 
the purification of the mind. 
The third point about Madhusudanats moral philosophy which 
in fact is implied in our second point but which we want to empha-
sise here again is that ethicar disciplines do not directly lead 
to knowledge. Morality is only a remote or mediating cause, it 
is only a means to spiritual life and pro.gress. l'.~orality is thus 
only a necessary condition for spiritual. knov1ledge which alone can 
bring moksa • 
. 
It is here that ~~dhusudana's philosophy of action 
is clearly seen. ~bral life is a preparato~ stage in a man's 
spiritual. life. 'When man has· reached the end of his life's jouz-
ney and has become spiritually perfect, morality as such ceases 
for him. Duty as such has no meaning for the liberated soul. He 
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is beyond all categorical imperatives. Vfuile morality consists 
in doing one's duty from a sense of duty, a free or liberated man 
cannot be said to have any v1ork to do from a sense of duty. This, 
however, does not mean that the liberated being gives up all works. 
This only means that he does not work under the constraint of' 
obligation but through spontaneous love for mankind. Unethical 
actions are impossible for him. He works for the maintenance of 
the world-ordet· because even God Himself who is its sustainer 
never ceases from action. In short the life of a free soul is a 
life of ser"Vice to others. He works for the welfar-e of others and 
his actions follow spontaneously from. the fullness of his heart 
without their· being any sense of obligation. 
'l'hu.s actions though they can pe interested, must be disinter-
ested in order to be ethical and moral but ultimately and eventual.J.\ 
they must become spontaneous and free out-pourings for the general 
good of hwnanity and of the world at large from the liberated man's 
nature. T.his is Madhusudana' s philosophy of action. 
\le have briefly indicated the general background of Madhusii-
dana 1 s philosophy of action. 
in detail • 
We shall now proceed to discuss it 
. Madhusuda.na holdS that morality lies in acting according to 
one's position in society. It consists in doing one's duty 
according to one's station in life. By the phrase 'station in 
life' Madhusudana means only the caste to which one belongs in 
life. He admits the division of men into four castes - brahmin, 
. , ,-k~attriya, va1sya and sudra. These four· castes constitute the 
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four principal parts of the Hindu societ,y. The precedence of 
these castes is in the order enumerated above. The earliest 
reference to the division of Hindu society into four classes is 
found in the Rg Veda • 
• 
It is described in the Puru~a sukta, a 
section of the ~g·Veda, as having come out of the different limbs 
of the body of the creator himself. F!anu says: "There is no fifth 
1 2 
caste". 1\pastrunba also holds that there are four castes only. 
The institution of caste has an important social bearing and 
occupies a most important place in the life o.f the Hindus. It 
has very l<:~rgely coloured their· outlook on life. But the history 
of the origin and development of the caste-system which is pecul-
iar to India is very comp~icated. Its origin is lost in &bscurit,y~ 
It is very difficult· to give any precise and scientific definition 
of caste. Dr. J. Muir observes: "'he sacred books of the Hindus 
contain no uniform or consistent account of the origin o.f cf'astes; 
but,on the contrary, present the greatest varieties of speculation 
on this ~~bject". 3 The popular belief however held among the 
Hindus with regar_d to the institution of caste is, as Sir Sivas-
wamy Aiyer says, "that the main divisions of castes are of inunern-
orial antiquity and in .fact coeval with creation11 • 4 
In regard to the origin of the institution of caste our 
1. 'Manusmrti 1 , Chapter X, verse 4 • 
• 
2 T" b 1 Dh - I ·• 1\pastama.. arma-sutra, 1.1.1.3. 
3. J. Muir. •sanskrit textsr, Vol. I, London, 1872, p. 159. 
4. Sir Sivaswarny Aiyer. 'Evolution of Hindu Moral Ideals', 
Madras, 1935, p. 71. 
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author, Madhusudana., relies upon the view expressed in the Bhaga-
vadgita that the division of men into four castes vJas made by God 
Himself in accor•dance with their characteristic qualities and 
specific duties.1 The division of' men into four castes is thus 
a natural division made in accordance with their intrinsic quali-
ties and function. Its underlying principle is probably the divi-
s ion of labour and is intended to keep the social fabric in a harm-
onious condition. 
The division of men into four castes is thus not an arbitrary 
division. This is based on the hard reality, the concrete facts 
of experience that the different individuals are not all alike in 
their natur·e (svabhava). Men differ in respect of their quality 
and capacity, charactel'· and conduct. The division of men into . 
four castes is in accordance with this difference in their quality, 
character and aptitude. It is thus clear that the caste-system 
is based on a principle. It is based on a&nitted inequalities 
in the physical, mental and spiritual make-up of people constitu-
ting the society. In short the classification depends on types 
of human nature. Each of' the four. ·classes has certain well-def-
ined characteristics though they should not be regarded as exclu-
sive~ Dr. K~tkar rightly remarks: "It is preponderance of various 
qualities that determines the birth of man as a Brahmana or a 
- 2 Shudra". 
We have said that the caste is determined by the intrinsic 
1. 'The 'BhagavadgTta', Chapter IV, verse 13. 
2. Shridhar V. Ketkar. 'History of caste in India' Vol. I, 
New York, 1909, p. 114. ' 
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qualities in human nature. . It is determia~JC. by the preponderance 
of warious qurali ties in m~n ,. s nature. Now what are these quali-
ties ? What is their nature ? How do they determine the birth of 
man in a particular caste ? These are some of the questions which 
naturally arise here and it is to a discussion of these that we 
shall now turn. 
There are three gul')as called sattva, rajas and tamas which 
are present in all individuals. These 1 gunas 1 , v1h ich are usually 
I 
rendered as 'qualities•·,. spring from prak;-ti. There is no being, 
indeed no object in which these gu:t;J.aS are· not present. In the 
Bhagavadgita it is clearly said: 11There is no entity either on 
earth or in heaven among the gods which is free from these gunas 
born of prak:rti 11 • 1 It may be pointed out here that the SaJ11kb.ya 
philosophy does not regard gu~as as qualities merely. According 
to it these are the ultimate subtle entities or substances. Vlhich 
constitute the whole cosmic nature or prakrti asat is called in 
• I 
Indian philosophy. The three gul')as are thus the constitutive 
elements of prakrti according to SanJkhya philosophy. 
But since we are mainly concerned with the ethical implication 
of the guQas, and probably this is the application of the gu~as in 
the Bhagavadg.ita _also,_ we shall use, for the purpose of our thesis, 
sattva for goodness, rajas for activity and passion,and trunas for 
darkness. We may also refer to Mr. Widgery's remarks here which 
he makes in regal~ to the application of the gul')as in ethics, He 
says: "No exact translation of the term gu~as seems possible, but 
1. I The Bhagavadg r tat ' c hapter XVIII, verse 40 • 
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as applicable within the realm of the moral life it may be inter-
preted in general as qualities, tendencies, or states of active 
consciousness".1 
~ · understand fully the nature of these gu~as or qualities 
we shall now try to explain briefly their main chai•acteristics. 
Of t.he three gul;1as, the first is sattva. It is laghu and praka-
saka. It is pure and produces goodness, happiness and knowledge. 
It also produces harmony, or4er and peace. The second is rajas. 
It is active (cala) and of the nature of passion. It is the 
·source of all crav;i.ng and attachment. It thus binds men by attach-
It is heavy (guru) and ment to action. 
produces visada. 
The third is ta~as. 
It arises out of ignorance and deludes all 
mor•tals. It leads to indolence, sloth, laziness and negl ieence. 
It binds men by developing these qu~lities in them. Mr. Bipin 
Chandra Pala explains the characteristics of the gul!as which may 
throw some more light. "The cht;lre.cteristics of the quality of 
light or sattva, are purity, illumination and freedom; those of 
heat or rajas, are passion, activity, cri.lving (for power and glory) 
and attachment to ranlc and position; while those of darkness or 
tamas, are ignor·ance, error, idleness ana inertia 11 • 2 
It may_ also be mentioned here that -these qualities cannot be 
directly perceived. Their existence can only be inferred fi•om 
1. Alban G. Widgery. 'The Principles of Hindu Ethics•, 
International Journal of Ethics, Vol. XL, No.2, 
January 1930, p. 233. 
2. Bipin Chandra Pala. 1The Ethics of the Bhagavadgita', The 
World, Vol. VIII, No. XXXI, September• 1899, p. 531. 
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their effects. Furthermore, these gu~as always go together and 
are intermingled with one another. They are closely related as 
the flame, the oil and the wick of a lamp. Thus all people 
possess all these gu~as. But it must be remembe1•ed that they 
do not possess them in the same degree. The proportion of these 
gui;las vary from individuals to individuals. It should always be 
borne in mind here that in the interrelation of the three gul)aS 
it is always the one or the other that predominates in each human 
being and the nature of the man is determined by the predominating 
gu:z:ta. Ivien are called sattvika, l .. ajasika, or tamasika accordine 
as the one or the other prevails in him. 
From the nature of the gu!)as and their characteristics we 
can see clearly that it is the prevalence of these gunas that 
determines the nature of man's. activities. It is the predom-
inance of one or the other of these gunas that makes all the 
difference to the spirit in which the possessor performs his 
work. The man in Whom sattva predominates, and is thUS Of satt-
vika nature, works without any attachment. He is free from all 
egotism, full of zeal and firmness. He is not disturbed from 
the effects of his passions and affections. He does not work 
for the sal<:e of any reward in this life or in the life hereafter. 
He does his work in the spirit of duty because it ought to be 
done. The man of rajasika nature is always swayed by passions. 
He is selfish and always desirous of the fruits of his actions. 
Unlike the man of sattvika nature he is moved by joy and sorrow. 
He is full of jo,r in success and M<i bitterly · d · 
J gr1eve 1n failure. 
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The man in whom tamas prevails is dlllll and inert. He acts mech-
anically a.nd followo the common routine blindl;)r. His activities 
are undertaken without any regar·d to capacity and consequences. 
He is dilatory, slow to act and gets very easily depressed. He 
acts in complete obedience to his pass ions and aft'ections. The 
mind of such a man is confused and deluded. 
From what has been said above there is one deduction which 
obviously follovfs and which we should always bear in mind. It. is 
that no human being can be either wholly or purely sattvika or 
rajasika or tamasika. These at•e ext1 .. eme cases and are rarely, if 
ever, found in practical life. Human conduct almost invariably 
partakes of the nature of rajas and is in varying degree nearer 
either to sattvika or trunasika. 
It may also be pointed out here that though all the gu~as or 
qualities are present in all individuals of all the four castes, 
yet a particular caste is characterised by the quality prevailing 
among all the individuals constituting that caste. Madhusudana 
in his commentary on verse 13 of'· Chapter n?- points out that the 
brahmins are sattva-pradhana, k~attriyas are sattva-upsarjana-
rajah-pradhana, vai;;yas are tamah-upsarjana-rajah-pradhana and 
~- . -~udras are tamah- pradhana. It is very difficult to give an 
exact english transla·t.ion of the word 1 upsarjana' :which Madhusudana 
uses here and which he uses again in his commentary on verse 44 
2 
of Chapter XVIII, but it may be rendered as subsidiary or subserv-
1.. 1 Gudhartha-dipika', - p. 136. 
2. do do p. 495. 
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ient for convenience. 
~'le have discussed in some detail the nature and characteristics 
of the three gu~as. We can now see clearly how caste is determined 
by the character of man, by his nature, by his characteristic qual-
ities, or to express it technically, by his predominant gul!as. A 
man is born in a particular caste according as he develops one or 
the other of the thr·ee gu:t:as. In the words of Dr. Radhakrishnan 
"The kind of birth depends on the character we have developed. ~'Je 
are born in celestial regions, or as men on earth, or in the animal 
world, according as we develop character in which sattva, rajas or 
tamas predominates 11 • 1 l!le can thus see how the birth of a man in 
a particular caste is determined by his nat.ure or by his predomin-
ant gu~a. 
In order to understand the full implication of the caste-system 
we have to pursue our discussion still further. It is necessary 
to point out here that it is one 1 s ovm karma that determines one 1 s 
predominant guna just as the latter determines one's birth in a 
. 
particular class. This brings us to the doctrine of karma. The 
fact is that the institution of caste is very closely connected 
with the doctrine of karma and the theory of the transmigration of 
soul or re-birth. All these three namely the gul).as, the doQtrine 
of karma and the theory of re-birth justify the caste-system. VIe 
have already considered in some detail the 'three gu!las 1 and their 
nature. We shall now proceed on to consider the other tw.o - the 
doctrine of karma and the theory of re-birth. 
The doctrine of karma is one of the most important ethical 
1. s. Radhaltr•ishnan. 'Indian Philosophy', Vol. I, London, 1951, 
p. 552. 
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theories in Indi~1 thought. It is accepted even by the Bauolla 
and the Jainas though they do not believe in the authority of the 
Veda. Since there is a good deal of confusion and misunderstand-
ing about this doctrine it is necessary to consider it in some 
detail. 
'Karma' means action and the phrase 'doctrine of karma' means 
that every action has its reaction, its result. According to this 
doctrine every action done whether good or bad produces its effect 
and the effect which it produces is not. ,only physical but also 
mental and moral. An action affects the tendencies, dispositions 
and character of the agent and according to the doctrine of karma 
these are all conserved in the organism. Nay, they are also 
cazTied over so that every individual gets his due here or here-
after. The doctrine has thus both retrospective and the prospec-
tive aspects. It is a principle of continuity. It is continuous 
with the past and goes on into the future. To borrow a metaphor, 
the individual's life, according to·the doctrine of karma, is not 
a term but a series. This process cannot stop unless the ultimate 
goal of life is realised, unless man reaches the end of life's 
journey which is spiritual realisation. 
But karma is often identified with fate and the doctrine of 
karma with fatalism. Even a great thinker like Professor Keith 
remarks: "The conception of Karman serves indeed in an excellent 
way to defend and protect the established order of things, but it 
is essentially fatalistic, and fatalism is not fot• a normal mind 
a good incentive to mor·al progress. If, on the other hand, the 
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doine of an evil deed is r·estrained by the thought that it will 
be punished in another life, it is equally true that reflection 
shows that the actor has really no option in his acts and is an 
absolutely predetermined person, whose former acts produce his 
present motives and reasonings without the possibility of inter-
1 
vention of any kind on his part". This confusion is perhaps due 
to misconception about the true nature of the doctrine. It is a 
travesty of the truth about the doctrine of karma. Far from 
meaning fatalism the doctrine stands for man's freedom. It is 
not imcompatible with free will. In fact it involves and implies 
it. The doctrine of kanna vindicates the essential righteousness 
of the universe. It is no other than the moi•al counterpart of 
the Scientific Law of Gausation. We can say it is the Law of 
~thical eausation. As you sow, so you reap is its main principle. 
It vindicates the truth that man himself is responsible fop his 
suffering and happiness, he is himself the architect of his dest:irw: 
the arbiter of' his fate. The doctrine of' karma thus explains all 
the inequalities in life. Instead of throwing the blame on others 
for what we are and have or have not, the doctrine teaches that 
we are ourselves responsible for our present state. It is a vind-
ica~ion of cosmic justice. The doctrine of karma thus illustrates 
the truth that moral life is not a chaos. Men are not the sport 
of' a cruel chance. There is no room for caprice here. The 
accidents of birth and fortune in this world are but the rewards 
1. A.B.Keith. 'The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and 
upanishads', Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. 32, 1925, P• 596. 
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and punishments of our own deeds in the past life. According to 
the doct1·ine of karma there is a spiritual continuity. The present 
life is the beginning of another into which "'"e carry with us what 
we dO her•e. The new life starts just where the old life ends. 
Academically speaking, the doctrine of karma thus vindicates the 
principle of the eternal law of cause and effect in the moral life 
of man. 
There is, however, a certain amount of determination involved 
in the doctrine of karma. But this do.es not mean exclusion of all 
freedom. The present life in its beginning is no doubt determined 
by the past but it can be changed for the better or worse by our 
efforts in course of our present life. In the words of Dr. Radhak-
rishnan, "Life is like a game of bridge. The cards in the game 
are given to us. Vle do not select them. They are traced to past 
karma but we are free to malce any call as we think fit and lead any 
suit. Only we are limited by the rules of the game. \"le are more 
free when we start the game than later on when the game has devel-
oped and our choices become restricted. But till the ver~ end 
there is always a choice 11 • 1 
In order to understand the full implication of the freedom of 
man's will involved in the doctrine of karma, it is necessary to 
pursue our discussion a little further. According to Hindu think-
ers there are three kinds of karma. (1) Sancita (2) Prarabdha and 
... (3) Agami or Kriyamana. S~c},Jita is all the altunumulated karma of 
the past, that is tlhose karmas which have not yet started producing 
1. S. Radhakrishnan. 'An Idealist view· of Life', London, 1951, 
p. 279. 
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thdir reactions. Prarabdha is that portion of the past lcarma 
v1hich has started producing its reaction. Agami is the coming 
karma which includes also tha karma that is being gathered at the 
present time. This is usually illustrated with a beautiful 
analogy. Let us imagine a bow man v1ith a q_uiver containing arrows 
and that he is taking n im at a target. Let us further• imagine 
that he has already shot an arrow and he is about to shoot another. 
In this analogy the bundle of arrows contained in the quiver stands 
for sancita karma, the arrow he has shot for prarabdha karma and 
the one he is about to shoot for agami karma. Just as the bow man 
has perfect freedom in regard to the arrows in the quiver and the 
ar•row he is about to shoot, so also man has perfect freedom in 
regard to the s.i':ci-ita and agami karmas. He can influence their 
reactions by good deeds in course of his present life. But he has 
no freedom as far as prarabclha lcarma is concerned. He cannot 
influence its reaction. Once the arrow has left the bow it must 
have its course. So also the past karma which has begun producing 
its effect must have its course. But man can control his future. 
In regar-d to prarabdha lcarrna our ovm. author :Madhusudana goes so far 
1 
as to say that even the grace of God cannot exhaust it. Prara-
bdha karmas are eKhausted by themselves after the individual concer-
ned has experienced their good or bad results. 
There is yet another misunderstanding about the doctrine of 
karma. It is said that, it is individualistic and there is no room 
1. 'Advaita Siddhi 1 , Bombay, 1917, Chapter IV, pp. 892-893. 
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for social service under its rigid law. This is perhaps a mis-
conception of the actual position. It is no doubt true that the 
ultimate value namely mok~a has to be attained by every individual 
himself. But the ~uestion is: how to reach the stage when moksa 
. 
can be attained 1 This stage can be Peached only j_n and through 
fulfilling ons 1 s appointed functions as one's contribution towards 
the common eood. It is only when all. works are done in a spirit 
of service to humanity that man can prepare himself and is able to 
travel on the spiritual path. Consistently vlith thiz spirit Hindu 
th :inkt,;;l·s comdemn selfishness and egotism and argue f'or the p~rform-
ance of selfless work. Thus social service is not only not incon-
sistent with the doctrine of karma but is enjoined as a means to 
spiritual freedom. 
The th~or:y of tr.:msmigration of' the soul or re-bil•th is a 
corollary to the doctrine of karma. As we have already shovm 
above, the differences in the tendencies, dispositionc and charac-
t.cl' of men at birth are due to differences in their past karmaA 
V!hich obviously implies past birth. Again since <::1.ll actions do 
not bee.r f1--uit in this life man has to take another birth in order 
to 'enjoy' the residual karmas. Every jiva thus has to pass 
thr·ough a s_eries of births and deaths. Thus the law of karma 
implies future birth. 
There is an objection often raised against the ethical signif-
icance of the theory of re-birth. It is pointed out that in the 
absence of memory between successive reincarnations or births, the 
different incarnations would be nothing short of different persons 
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and v1ith this the entire juridical motive of incar-nation stands 
obrogated. Without memor'Y the point of retrj.butive justice is 
nullified and the vmole penal purpose of re-inca~nation is defeated 
thereby. In r·eply it may be pointed out that the criticism is 
based on a misunderstanding of th~ theory. It ignores its real 
significance and purpose. The point j,s that re-·inca.rnation is 
an ethical postulate. It is the fabric of the v1hole moral struc-
ture, and its validity is in no way conditioned by empirical evid-
ences. It is a belief in the moral order of the universe and in 
this context the absence of memory does not rende1• it an <-~bsurdity. 
':111at is important in the theo.ry of re-birth is the conservation of 
the moral values. The juridical and penal aspects of the theory 
are only subsidiary and need not be pressed too far and given too 
high a premium. 
\7e shall conclude our discussion of the doct1•ine of karma by 
showing its implication to the institution of caste. l'Je have seen 
that the doctrine of karma suggests that the responsibility for the 
particular caste into which an individual is born rests with the 
individual himself since the nature of man on which caste depends 
is ultimately determined by the nature of his deeds. Those whose 
conduct has been good attain good births and those whose conduct 
has been evil attain evil births. It is one's own actions in the 
past life that have determined one's present existence and again 
one's actions in the present existence will determine one's future 
life. Caste is thus determined ultimately by the eternal and 
inexorable law of karma. Furthermore, the doctrine of karma not 
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only explains our inequalities in the social status but it also 
offers a message of hope and sounds a note of warning. It proclaim~ 
that an individual's rise and fall in the social scale in the next 
life depends entirely upon his performing good or bad deeds in the 
pr·esent life. A man may be promoted or relegated according to his 
good or bad deeds respectively. 
,_ 
Even a sudra may by good conduct 
attain to the highest spirituality. Manu admits the possibility 
of such a change and he gives elaborate rules in this connection.1 
In Chapter IX, he specifically says: "A 13udra who is pure, the 
servant of his betters, gentle in his speech and f'ree from pride 
and al\·iays seeks a refuge with Brahrnamu attains in his next life 
2 
a hieher caste". 
'IJJe have seen that the division of men into four castes is 
based on the differences in their nature (svabhaval. In this 
,. 
connection we have also considered. how man's nature is ultimately 
determined by his conduct, by the nature of his work. ':le shall 
now try to see that corresponding to these differences in their 
nature, their duties and responsibilities are also divided. Each 
caste has a particular set of duties called caste-duties. The 
brahmins have one set of duties, the k~attriyas another and so 
. , ,_ 
with the va1syas and sudras. Every man is required to dischar•ge 
his duties according as he belongs to one or the other of these 
four castes. These caste-duties have an important social bearing 
and are described in the Bhagavadg!ta in Chapter XVIII, verses 42-44, 
1. 1Manusmrti t, Chapter X, verses 57-65, especially 58 & 65. 
2. do Chapter JX, verse 335. 
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These have also been described by various other Hindu law givers. 
'rhe duties of the brahmins born of their nature are: control 
of the inner OrBan or anta~araQa Cfiama); control of the outer 
organs or senses (dama); austerity meaning worship of gods,teachers 
and those who know the Vedas (tapas); purity (sauca); forgiveness 
(k~ama·); sinc~rfuty (arjava); }{nowledge of the meaning of the Vedas 
(jnana); skilfulness in karma-~anda, that is knowledge of the Vedic 
rituals and realisation of ynity with Brahman (vijnana); and faith 
(astikya). The natural duties of the K~attriyas are: heroism 
(saurya); smartness (tejas); power of endurance (dh~ti); skill 
(dak~.y.a); not to flee in battle (yudhe capy apalay.ana); making 
Note: Dr. Ketkar n~rrates an incident from his personal 
experience w~ch we quote here because it goes a 
long way and throws considerable light on the relation 
of the doctrine of karma and the institution of 
caste. He says: 'I once met a mahara, '\vho, fearing 
that I '\vas going near him and that my purity might 
then be defiled in case I touched him, and that he 
might incur the sin of defiling mg. purity1 cried out 
at once and made his caste lcnown to me. l got into 
conversation \>Ti th him. I found that Iviahar, though 
illiterate, could repeat many verses of Tukaram, 
Namdeo and Chokhamela. He appeared to be '\vall 
acquainted with the theories of Karrna and Bhakti, 
and of the transmigration of soul~.: ··.Fie believed that 
though he '\oras a !"'ahar in that birth, by some mis-
doing in his past life, he '\-Tas going to become a 
Brabmana in. the next birth, as he· .felt the desire· 
for learning Sanskrit, and reading Gita and 
Puranas. He comceived that these- desires were clear 
indication of the better birth which he was going to 
get in his next lifel. · · 
A History of Caste in India. Vol. I, New York, 
1909, p. 115 (fDot&note). 
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gifts (dana); and power of controlling others ( is'vara bhava). 
The natural duties of the vais'yas are: agricul tu1•e, trade and 
rearing of cattle, and service of the three upper castes through 
,_ 
Elanual labour is the natural duty of audras. 
It may be stated here that Madhusudana after enumerating the 
1 dharmas or duties of brahmins says that these may be the duties 
of all people belonging to all the four castes when they are 
sattvika. It is true that these are the natural duties of brahmins 
because in them sattva predominates, but for those also who are 
not brahmins these may become duties when there is a preponderance 
of sattva in them and that is why they also come under the category 
of 'common duties'. He quotes a few authorities on this point. 
Most of them list forgiveness, purity, charity, self-control, truth-
fulness etc - all duties of the brahmins - as the comnon duties of 
all. 
The central idea that underlies this division of labour on 
the bas is of the natural quality and capacity of men is probably 
that since all men are not alike in their nature and capacity they 
are not all suited for th~ same type of work and it is no use 
employing a man in a task which is alien to his nature. The same 
individual cannot be equally_ successful as a ruler, warrior o.r 
tradesman. One who is eminently suited for one kind of work may 
be, in fact often is, quite unsuited for another kind of work. 
The present psychology of vocation is a witness to this fact. 
------·-------------------· 
1. 'Gudhartha-dipika', Comnentary on verse 42, Chapter XVIII, 
pp. 492-494. 
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Professor Hanumantha Ra.o has rightly r·emarked: "A system of ethics 
\'Jhich serves a moi·e serious purpose than that of a mere formal. 
textbook ought to take into consideration individual differences, 
social and psychological. The same duties that are enjoined 
upon the teacher cannot be e~joined upon the trader; the duties 
prescribed to one who serves in the army cannot be prescribed to 
one who serves in a factor-y or on a farm. It is this principle 
of relativity that is at the bas is of the Hindu class-morality" •1 
There seems much truth in these observations as far as we can see. 
Afte:r' all we cannot allot any task to a man irrespective of any 
consideration whether or not he is equipped for it, whether or not 
he is psychologically and otherwise suited for it. 
There seems another important ethical principle that underlies 
the division of labour on the basis of differences in nature. 
Society is one organic whole and in this society there are broadly 
speaking four types of nature and answering to them there are four 
broad kinds of functions and duties. Society can be held together 
and its progress can be maintained only when each unit contributes 
its share by properly performing the functions assigned to it. It 
is this principle of integration and co-ordination that probably 
lies at the back of the institution of caste. The society can be 
compared.to an organism. Just as the well-being of the organism 
depends on the proper functioning of its different parts, so also 
the maintenance and progress of the society depend on the proper 
-----------------------------------------------------------------·------
1. G. Hanumantha Rao. 'The Basis of Hindu Ethics', International 
Journal of Ethics, Vol. XXXVII, No. 1, October 1926, p. 31. 
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functioning of its different units. If the stomach quarrels with 
the head it is not the stomach or the head alone that suffers but 
the entire organism including these parts. So if one unit quarrels 
v1ith another it is not only this or that unit which suffers but the 
entire social structure is paralysed. There is no question of 
superiority of the one unit over the other. Just as all parts of 
the organism are equally necessary a.nd important fot· its well-being 
so also all the social units have their equal necessity and import-
ance for the well-being of the society. There is thus no emphasis 
on the differences in the nature of functions or· duties. The main 
emphasis is on the performance of one 1 s dharma born of one t s nature 
according to the position one occupies in society because it is then 
only that one can promote the stability and progress of the society. 
In addition to the institution of caste and the caste-duties 
there is another principle of division of life which it is necessary 
to point out here. Just as human beings are divided into four 
castes, so hwnan life is divided into four stages and like every 
caste, every stage has its corresponding duties and responsibilities. 
These stages are: brahmacarya, ga1•hasthya, vanaprastha and sannyasa. 
Manu also accepts these four stages or as they are also called 
'orders 1 of life. He says "The student, the householder, the 
1 hennit and the ascetic, these constitute four separate orders". 
The first stage of life is the life of a student. According to 
the Chandogya upani~ad a student lives in the house of his teacher 
1. t lVIanusmrt i 1 , Chapter VI, verse 87. 
v 
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for twelve years or for a series of years during which he 
studies the Vedas. This period is devoted to the building up 
of the body and. the training of the mind both intellectually and 
morally. One of the most important disciplines of this stage 
is continence. It is the stage when everyone is required to 
equip himself v~ell for the succeeding stages of life. The 
second stage is the stage of garhasthya (househtllder). This 
stage is the most :important and it is generally regarded as the 
foundation of. all the other stages. Just as air is essential to 
life, so is the householder essential to the life of all those who 
belong to the other three orders. This is the stage when man 
develops what we can call a social life which br•ings with it 
greater social. responsibilities and obligations. In this stage. 
man marries and begins to lead a family 1 if'e. He is thus not 
alone but has his wife and children too. In addition to his 
family obligations he has to fulfil certain social obligations 
also. The third stage, called vanaprastha is the stage when man 
relinquishes his family duties and obligations. In this stage 
he is absolved fr•om the responsibility of home and retires into 
the solitude of the forest to meditate on the higher problems of 
life. The main obj.ective of' this stage is to escape from the 
bustle of life. It is really a transitory stage of partial 
renunciation leading to the last stage called the stage of 
1. 1 Chandogya Upanisad', IV. X.I • 
• 
2:. do do rv. rv.s. 
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sanny-asa. It is the final stage of lif'e 1 s journey. In this 
stage man rises above the nar1,ow ct:reles of clan and country and 
vm.nders f'ar and wide. He works f'o1· the welfare of the entire 
humanity. It is the stage when he cultivates the knowledge of 
God to be united with Him which is the crown and glory of all life. 
_, . 
Viewed in one way the four asramas are success1ve stages for 
taking man to perfection. These are the steps to the attainment 
to the ideal of mok~a. As we have already said each of these 
stages has special duties and fore ach of these an ideal type of 
moral character is enjoined. The moral qualities attained in the 
earlier staees are carried over as a basis for the ·deve~opment of 
the q_ualities of' the succeeding stage of life. Though normally 
one has to pass through the four stages successively, it is not 
absolutely necessary. In special and extraordinary cases it is 
permissible to take up sannyasa even after the fir·st stage. For 
, 
instance Samkara renounced from the stage of brahmacarya. Buddha 
renounced from the stage of garhasthya. Our own author Madhusu-
dana took sannyasa from the stage of brahmacarya. 
It may also be pointed out here that besides the caste-duties 
or va~a--dharma and the duties of the different stages of life 
(asrarna-dha~a), there are also laid down the comnon duties of men 
Called the sadharana-dharma Or sarnanya-dharma. These have great 
ethical importance and may well said to be the foundation of the 
Hindu moral life. These conunon or ordinary duties are cardinal 
virtues and are obligatory equally for all individuals irrespective 
-, 
of distinctions of va1~a and asrama. These are to be cultivated 
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by all to the best of the·ir abilities. The idea being that 
morality is not incumbent on any one individual or class. The 
Hindu ~criptures give seve1•al lists of these cardinal virtues. 
1 The author of the Bhagavadgita calls these virtues as godly vir-
tues and according to him these are: "fearlessness, purity of 
thought, steadfastness in knowledge and action, alms-giving, self-
restraint, sacrifice, stuqy of the Scriptures, austerity, upright-
ness, non-violence, truth, f1•eedom from anger, the spirit of dedi-
cation, tranquility, aversion to slander, compassion to living 
beings, freedom from greed, gentleness, modesty, .steadiness, cour-
age, forgiveness, fortitude, purity, freedom from malice and arro-
1 gance". 
Manu enumerates these conunon virtues as "oteadiness (dhairya), 
forgiveness (k~anid, s elf--rest.ra int (da.ma), non- stealing (caucya 
. . 
bhava), sense--control (indriya-nigraha), wisdom (dh1), learning 
. 2 
vidya), truth, (satya), and freedom from anger (akrodha)". 
\1e have e:A"Plained ull the three kinds of dharma or duties -
Val1la-dharma, asrama-dharma and samanya-dharma - l'ecoenised by 
Hindu thinkers including our author. But it must be borne in 
mind that th~ mD in cm_,Jhusis of the author of the Bba~dgiiita .is 
on_varna-dharma or caste duties and it is with these--that we are 
. 
mainly concer'lled. 
Before we conclude our discussion of this topic and pass on 
to compare Madhusudana with Butler, it is useful to point out one 
1. 'The Bhagavadgita', Chapter XVI, verses 1-3. 
2. 'Manusm~ti', Chapter VI, verse 92. 
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thing here. We have said that according to Nadhusiidana one's 
dharma or duty is determined by one's nature or svabhava. 
Virtue according to him lies in fulfilling the functions of 
life that are in accordance with the capacities, turn, charac-
ter and the consequent position \·Thich a man occupies in the 
society. But llfadhusiidana says in his comment on verse 24 of 
Chapter Xlll1 and he refers to it again in verse 15 of Chapter 
2 
III that the injunctions and prohibitions of the Scriptures 
determine , .. rhat should be dono and ~;hat should not be done. In 
other \'lords our duties are determined by the Scriptures. 
Apparently it seems that this not only goes against our main 
contention that according to Madhusudana duty is determined by 
one's nature but also this may lead some to believe that he is 
setting up an external standard of duties which has nothing to 
d6 with human nature. But this is not the case. For in his 
cownentary on verse 13 of Chapter I~ Madhusudana accepts that 
the four castes have been created by God Himself. Tpis verse 
4 
should be read along with verses 41-44 of Chapter XVIII where 
the functions of the four castes are enumerated. The fact that 
the four classes are created by God in accordance with the 
predominating quality of nature and the consequent function 
shows that one 1 s duty is ultimately determined by one's nature. 
1. 'Gudhartha-dipika, PP•. 434-435· 
2. do . p • 10 5. 
3· do. P• 136. 
4. do. PP• 490-497· 
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It may be asked here that if it is nature which determines 
duty then why is it said that to obey the injunctions of the 
Scriptures con~titutes our duty. The reply to this is that the 
arrangement of God with regard to duty according to one•s 
nature is the very thing that the Scripture also teaches. In 
other \vords Bcriptures are only r.ecord~ of God 1 s arrangement 
\vi th regard to men• s duty according to nature. It may also be 
remembered here that according to the Hindu conception the 
Vedas are not ccmpositionz of any finite human being. They are 
eternal (nitya) and impersonal (apaurusheya). They are eternal 
truths revealed by God Himself. Thus what is taught in the 
Vedas does not in any way contradict what God says about His 
creation of the four castes. Indeed the Vedas, as we have just 
said, only record the same fact. Thu;s we can say that duty is 
determined by nature but is known from the Yedas. 
B. A comparison between Butler's and Maill1usUdana~s 
account of Virtue and Humru1 Nature. 
We shall now proceed to compare Madhus'\ld.ana with Butler. 
Apparently there is no similarity between the ethical and moral 
teaching o:r the two thinlcers. The phrases 'station and its 
duties', 'institution of caste' and 'caste~duties' etc. which 
are so frequent in Madhusudana are altogether alien to the 
~oral philosophy of Butler who has endeavoured to deduce 
morality d.irectly from the analysis of huma..YJ. nature. nut then 
we should remember that for Madhusudana also one's duty is 
ultimately based on one's nature, svadharma is based on svabhava. 
We have seen that in Madhusudana the division o:r duties is 
based on di:f:ferences in the qualities and character o:r men. 
The duties o:r brahrnins, k~attriyas, vais'yas and s'tldras have all 
been prescribed according to their innate qualifications and 
capacities. Those who are strongly endowed with purity of 
thought and powers of re:rlection are brahmins; those gif'ted with 
heroism and chivalry are k~attriyas; those strongly inclined 
. , ~owards the practical business of life are va1syas and those 
in whom none of these qualities are highly developed are 
'-d su ras. Corresponding to these differences in their qualities 
or nature their duties respectively are: cultivation of 
spiritual knowledge, guiding others on religious matters, the 
study and teaching of the Vedas; protection of people against 
oppression, maintenance of the law and order, supporting the 
righteous and suppressing the wiclced; tending -eattle, agricul-
ture and trade; service to the members of the other three 
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classes. 'rhus according·:.to Mad.husudana when a man is asked to 
perf'orm his class duty, he is asked to do something which is 
appropriate to him, which is in accordance with his nature. In 
other words, it is f'ollowing the law of his own being, his 
svadharma. 
Butler's fundamental ethical teaching is, as we have 
already shown, that virtue consists in f'ollowing nature and vice 
in deviation from it. He analysds human nature to derive moral-
ity from it and h.iA R.n.A.l.yf3j_f.l rF:lveals that there are in it 
particular impulses and above them there are the two superior 
general principles of self~love ancl l)enevolence. On top of all 
these there is the sovereign principle called conscience. 
Butler says: "Every bias, instinct, propension within, is a 
real part of OtU' nature, but not the whole: add to these the 
superior faculty, whose office it is to adjust, manage and 
preside over them, and take in this its nattU'al superiority, and 
1 you complete the idea of human n!=l-ture 11 • According to Butler 
to follow conscience is to follow the law of one's own being. 
It is to follow one's nature as a whole. To appreciate this 
point in Butler we must remember his conception of hmnan nature. 
It is not merely a collection of di~ferent faculties and 
impulses, nor is it a mere balance or harmony between sel:f'-
regarding and other-regarding impulses. He sees human nature 
as a system and points to ro1 order in it. There is in it a 
1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol. I~, Sermon III, sect. 1, 
pp. 67-68. 
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natural subordination o£ the lower to the higher. When Butler 
says that to £ollow conscience is to £ollow the law o£ one's 
own being, to £ollow nature as a whole, he means this system or 
hierarchy in which conscience occupies the highest place and 
to which all other elements o£ human nature are naturally 
subordinate. According to him an action becomes wrong when 
the order or system is violated, which in this context means 
when the authority o£ the higher 11rinciple in nature is 
clllj:r:egbli'ueu. Butler himself summarises this position in the 
last section o£ his last Sermon 'Upon Human Nature' thus: "The 
n~ture of man is adapted to some course o£ action or other. 
Upon comparing some actions with this nature, they appear 
suitable and corresponding to it: from comparison of other 
actions with the same nature, there arises to our' view some 
unsuitableness or disproportion. The correspondence of 
actions to the nature of the agent renders them natural: their 
disproportion to it, mu1£d:;ural • That an action is corr·es-
. pondent to the nature of the agant, does not arise from its 
being agreeable to the principle which happens to be the 
strongest: for.:.i t may be so, and yet be g_ui te disproportionate 
to. the nature of the agent .•.•• And the correspondence arises 
from the action bei1,1.g conformable to the higher principle; and 
the unsuitableness from :i:, ts being contrary to it. 111 
It may be pointed out here that when Madhusudana says that 
. _________ , ____________________ _ 
1. 'The WoPks of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Sermon III, sect. 13, 
pp. 75-i/;6. 
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vil'•tue lies in cloing one's duty or dha1•ma born of natu.re he 
also like Butler means lnunan nat·ure as a whole which according 
to him is determined by the PI'evailine gu.l}a or quality.· It is 
the predominance of one or other of the three g'UJ'}.aS which 
determines the fundamental character or nature of man. It 
should be remembei•ed here that according to the general Hindu 
ethical thought all h·uman nature has been broadly clivided into 
three classes, sattvil\:a: raja~:dka and tamasika. Every man 
·belongs to one OI' the other of these three c1.i visions accorcling 
as he develops predominantly one Ol"' the other of the three 
gunas - sattva, rajas or tamas - in his nature ancl hj_s furulfl-
~ 
mental character or natu1•e as a whole becomes accor•cl.ine;J.y. 
Every m<ID:'s moral conduct :L.s thus relative to his own funda-
mental nature. In the Bhaeav~deita there is a good deal of 
emphasis on the llerformance of one's own dharma which is :in 
1 
accordance Vli th one's fundamental nature. 
MadJ1usU.dana in his conunentary on this ve1•se is ve1-ay 
emphatic on the pu1 .. suance o:r one 1 s dharma which is in accord-
ance with one's natur·e. He insists that it must be pm .. sued 
however impertfect it may lJe. No man should try to imitate 
another man's dharma however perfect it might appear• to be. 
He goes so far as to say that death in one's own law of nature 
is better for a man than victory in an alien movement. It is 
dangerous to follow the law of another's nature. 
----------------------------------------·----------------
1. The Bhagavadgita_, Chapter III, verse 35. 
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The idea behind this emphasis on the performance of one's 
own dharma is probably that there is no use employing our-
selves in tasks which are alien to our nature, for which we ai"'e 
unsuited by our nature or svabhava. 
Thus we see that there is a ftmdamental similarity between 
Butler and Madhusiidana. They bo·tll agree as far· as their 
ftmdamental ethical teaching is concerned. Virtue according 
to both is ultimately determined by ht-unan nature. According 
to both r.re must act with nature. Riahtness of an act conaiata 
in following one's nature and wrongness in deviation from it. 
Thus 'follow nature' is the dictum of both Butler and MadJmsuCJ..;;.;_. ::· 
ana. 
There is another very important point of similarity 
between the ethical teaching of the two thinkers. It is not 
only that they preach the seme doctrine, ~lamely 'follow nature' , 
but ·they also agree in advocating :the control of the lower 
imlJttlses of human natm"'e. According to both desires, wishes 
and inclinations should be disciplined and not crushed. To 
develop this point it is necessary to go into some detail. 
Madhusudana holds (ancl in this he is supported by other Hindu 
thinkers) that man is a btmdle of instincts, desires and 
impulses and these constit\lDe the spring of all actions. They 
are at the root of all our activities. Mann says: "Not a 
single act here (below) appears ever to be done by a man free 
from desire; for whatever man does, it is the result of the 
impulse of desire." 1 But though desires seem to be universal 
, . 
. - ···--· -------
1. 'Manusmrti', Chapter II, verse 4 • 
• 
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and at the back of all our activities, yet to act solely from 
desires is never· laudable. Maahusudana like Butler holds that 
moral±ty consists in the control, regulation and organisation 
of the different elements of human nature. He seems in com-
plete agreement with Butler in holding that men are men not 
merely because of their tmpulses, inclinations and desires, 
some of whlch they share with brutes, but mainly because of 
reflection or conscience which is peculiar to us men only. If 
we act solely from impulses R.ncl a.f"H~j.-rP.f; w~ r.e~se to he men !:l.nct 
are brought dovm to the level of brutes. In other words if we 
do not govern OUl"' impulses, Vfe become victims of them, and our 
lives become as aimless as those of the animals. In order· to be 
man, therefore, one should exercise reasmn and re~lection, and 
through them harmonise the diverse elements ·of human nature by 
giving them due weight within their limlts. Madhusudana in his 
1 
commentary on verses 60, 62 and 63 of' Chapter II points out 
the evil effects of the senses when uncontrolled and conse-
quently emphasises the necessity for controlling them. He 
refers to this again in his commentary on verse 21 of 
2 Chapter :A'VI . The desires and attachments (kama), anger 
(krodha) and greed are said. to be the three gates of hell. 
Dr. Radhakrishnan also remarks: "Inclinations must be overcome 
----------- ______ , ____ , 
1. 'Gudhartha-dipika', pp. 86-88. 
2. do. p. 433. 
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or else they drag us on·without resistance. The mere push 
and pull or desire must yield place to.the calm and quiet or 
reason. The divine element or reason should leaven the whole 
nature or man. Rational life is, then, the life in which the 
senses are curbed ancl confinad within their proper limi ts11 • 1 
It may be interesting to point out here that the Pali 
work 'Dhammapada1 is also full of similar ideas. "There is no 
fire like passion, there is no shark like hatred, there is no 
~:maN~ like folly, and there .. ? is no torrent like. greed".-
In the interests of further clartfication it may be 
useful to rerer here to two other systems or Inclian philosophy 
which are practically at two extremes in respect of their 
ethical teaching. One of them is the Carvaka ijystem or 
]Yhilosophy. The Carvakas like the Epicureans are extreme 
hedonists. They lay emphasis on sensuousness even. to the 
neglect of reason and will. Their philosophy is more or less 
only an argument for giving full and rree expression to the 
passions and desires, a surx•ender to the impulses and desires 
of the moment. 3 Some of the well-lmown 0arvaka maxims are: 
1. s. Radhakrishnan. 'The Ethics of the Vedanta', International 
Journal of Ethics, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, January 1914, p.l?O. 
2. 'Dhammapada', Chap. XVIII, verse 251, Eng. 'trans. by F. Max 
Muller, Sacred books of the East, Vol.X, Oxford,l681, 
P• 62. 
3. Note. We are aware that there were among the Carvakas a few 
Susiksitas who, in spite of admitting that pleasure is 
the only good in life, believed in the quality of 
pleasures. They would rather see a dr~a or read poetry 
thw1 revel in mere feasting and drinking. But here also 
our main point remains valid because their maxim was 
still the same as that or the other less cultured , 
carvakas namely that pleasure is the summum bonum of life. 
- 195 -
"Eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow we may die". 
"A sure piece of cell is better than a doubtful coin of 
gold". 
Professor Hopkins Quotes a passage to explain the 6arvaka 
philosophy. "~'he old Sarvaka or materialist of' the sixth 
century B.C. said bhmtly: Be as licent:Lous as you please; lj.ve 
for pleasure; there is no punishment hereafter. Indulge your 
a:ppeti tes; this is your only chance to do so. God and soul are 
myths; the priest is a hypocrite; the body dies and then you 
end. Be happy while you live; to be virtuous is to be a 
1 fool",-· 
As ppposed to this Carvaka system, there is the Jaina 
system of philosophy. It is, as we have said, at the other 
pole. 'l'he Jainas do not allow any room for :passions and 
desires in the life of the ascetics who are bent on attaining 
perfection. They hold that these are at the root of all evils 
in life. They therefore advocate and argue for their annuJ.-
ment and eradication. It must be admitted, however, that in 
Jaina ethics certain allowances are made for the ordinary 
householders, that is, for those who have not renounced worldly 
life and become ascetic. But it may still be held that the 
tr·end of the Jaina ethics ultimately is towards asceticism. 
Dr. Radhakrishnan, explaining their moral philosophy, remarks: 
1. E. Washburn Hopkins. 'E:thics of India', Yale, 1927, p. 206. 
_, 
;. • • I _j ' 
II -· •. 
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"'J!he ethical system of the Jainas is more rigorous than that of 
the Budill1ists •••• True freedom consists in an independence of 
all outer things". 1 At another place he again remarlcs: "Both 
Buddl1ism and Jainism admit the ideal of negation of life and 
lJer·eonali ty. To both life is a calamity to be avoided at all 
costs. They req_uire us to free ourselves from all the ties 
that bind us to nature and bring us sorrow". 2 Our purpose is 
not to explain the ethics of the Cnrv'E!.l{a and Jaina systems of 
philosophy. Our main purpose here is to show that the ethical 
teaching of both Butler and Mac1husiidana avoids these extr.emes. 
Life acco1 ... ding tm them consists neither in extreme intellect-
ualism nor in extreme sensualism. In the former case it 
becomes too ascetic, practically a negation of life and in the 
latter case it becomes blind as it is devoid of intelligence. 
Both Butler·and Madhusudana therefore advocate a system of 
ethics which is opposed to both the ethics of pure sensibility 
as we find in the Carvakas and the ethics of pure l"'igorisrn as 
we find in the Jainas. They both admit and recognise the 
impol"'tance of feelings and desil"'es in the economy of the ht~an 
constitution, and they lJoth give them their due place in the 
moral scheme of life. The impulses are not bad in themselves. 
They al"'e bad when nncontrolled and when they disregard the 
authority of the hieher principle. Butler says: "Every bias, 
1. s. RacU1al<:ri shnan. 'Indian Philosophy', Vol. I, London, 1951, 
P• 326. 
2. do. do. Vol. I, London, 1951, 
P• 329. 
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/ inst;J.nct, propension vri thin us, is a real part of our nature 11 • 1 
Again in the preface to the Sermons he clearly points out that 
particular passions when uncontrolled have no bound, no measure. 
Butler goes so far as to say that mere appetites, by \vhich he 
probably means uncontrolled appetites, are extravagant. He 
says: "Yet , • .it (self-love) would be less mischievous than the 
extravagances of mere appetite, \dll and pleasure: for certain-
ly self-love, though confined to the interest of this life, is, 
of the two, a much better guide than passion, which has abso-
lutely no bound nor measure but what is set to it by this self-
love, or moral considerations 11 • 2 Butler says again: "And as 
in civil government the constitution is broken in upon, and 
violated by power and strength prevailing over authority; so 
the constitution of man is broken in upon and violated by the 
lower .:V·acul ties or .Principles \vi thin prevailing over that vThich 
is dm its nature supreme over them all 11 .3 
In Madhusudana this point is clear. from the fact that in 
. Indian philosophy kama (enjoyment) is recognised as one of the 
four ends (though a subsidiary end) of life. We have said 
before that kama, krodha (anger) and lobha (greed) are the three 
gates of hell. Madhusudana in his commentary on verse 37 of 
lt- -Chapter IIr- describes kama as the great ebemy of man and as 
that woich is the cause of all evils in life. But kama here, 
1. 1The works of Joseph Butler 1 , 
2. do. 
Vol. II, Sermon III, sect. 1, 
p.67. 
do. Pref. to Sermons, 
sect~ 36, P• 27. 
3· do. do. Sermon III, sect. 1, 
P• o8. 
~- •Gudhartha-dipika', PP· 120-121. 
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we think, means unregulated kama. It is enjoyment under unlair-
ful conditions. In other \orords it means the satisfaction of 
desires \-rithout any control and guidance of intellect or 
buddhi. It is the gratification of such unregulated desires 
'\trhich is the cause of all evils in life. But when kama is said 
to be one of the ends of life it means regulated kama. It is 
enjoyment under la\orful conditions, the satisfaction of desires 
under the guidance and control of reason. 
It is true that at one stage desires have to be given up. 
The preparation for mok~a demands that desires for worldly 
values must cease sometime, at some stage of man's moral pro-
eress. But then it does not mean that desires are to be killed 
or suppressed. What happens is that buddhi becomes so purified 
and so turned tm-rards God that there is no place for desires 
in man's life. They disappear automatically. At this stage 
man transcends the sphere of ethics. We have said all along 
that Madhusudana recognises a stage which is beyond ethics. 
But before that stage is reached, so long as man is \·rithin the 
sphere of ethics, there is no question of killing desires 
though the teaching is quite emphatic that they must be con-
trolled. We thus see that the ethical and moral teachings of 
both the thinkers are in essential agreement in this that they 
both insist that impulses are not to be destrqyed but they 
should be properly subordinated and kept within their limits. 
~le have explained the ethics of both Butler and Nadhusu-
dana against the background of the Jaina ethics. To avoid any 
misunderstanding and confusion about it we think it necessary 
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to explain it a little further. 
It is true that sannyasa as an asrama, that is to say, a 
stage of life is recognised in Hinduism. It may even be said 
that all life moves tow·ards this stage of life and also that 
in this one has to renounce vrorldly values. But even in the 
stage of sannyasa rigorism is not so emphasised as is in Jain-
ism. Renunciation is essentially an imner detachment and \·Tith-
drawal of consciousness from false identification with things 
of the world. This certainly prevents the sannyasi from seek-
ing what the ordinary man lives for. ·But in his actual vTay of 
life·the sannyasi does not revel in suppressing his physical 
needs and healthy life. Indeed when it is said in the 
Bhagavadg!ta1 that he renounces all activity it is also said 
that he still does \<Thatever is necessary for the maintenance 
of his physical life. What we have said in the thesis about 
the ethics for the general man is not inconsistent with the 
vie,., expressed here. For sannyasa is a stage \·Thich is not 
strictly speaking ethical yet for vrhich all ethics is a pre-
paration. Ethics and morality are to be practised by the 
people in the first three stages of life; this does not mean 
that the sannyasi can lead an unethical life but only that 
having gone through the processes of high ethical training 
he has no need of it any longer. 
There is yet another very important point of similarity 
betvreen Butler and Nadhusiidana. It is not only that they both 
insist on the control and regulation of the lovrer impulses but 
they both hold that there is a supreme principle in human 
1. 1Bha.gavadgita! Chapter IV, ve7.~es 20-21. 
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nature through '\oThich these impulses should be controlled and 
guided. V~rtue according to both thus consists in the regula-
tion of the impulses by the supreme principle. Butler calls 
this principle 'conscience•, in 11adhustidana it is enlightened 
intellect or buddhi. Buddhi plays the same role in Nadhusiidana 
as conscience does in Butler. We have already discussed the : -: 
role of conscience in Butler's moral philosophy in some detail. 
Let us therefore first point out here bi'.iefly ho"\oT buddhi plays 
an important role run t..hA psycholoeica.l e.cheme of the Bha.gavad-
gita which Nadhusudana accepts and prbpounds. 
Krsna says ii:n the third chapte!r of the Bhagavadgita that 
. . . . 
there is a path of knowledge (Jfiana-yoga) to the supreme good 
which path philosophers follm.,. But there is a.lso a path of 
action (Karma-yoga) which men of action follow. In this Karma-
yoga buddhi is the ultimate path-finder. According to the 
Sal!lkhya philosophy which the Bhagavadgita accepts so far as it 
goes, buddhi is the highest element in the subjective being of 
man. Therefo1•e the elements 1-rhich are lo\<rer than buddhi 
should be controlled and guided by it. Buddhi is also that 
principle in which, as sho\<m by the Sa~hya philosophy, the 
light of Puru~a is reflected. It is this reflection '\oThich is 
R:nown as spiritual illumination or knm.,ledge. It thus becomes 
essential for man to purify buddhi so that it can become proper-
ly ·capable of reflecting the light of Puru~a (spirit). From 
the ethical point of vie'\oT it is that principle lim man which 
decides in a given case what is to be done and what is not to 
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be done. It is buddhi that decides and sets its sanction on 
one or the other among the many suggestions of the lo'\-rer 
elements of hwnan nature. Buddhi decides '\-That is safe for the 
soul and 't'lhat is daneerous, \·That binds man and 't'lhat sets him 
free. It is thus this principle which decides in a particular 
situ~tion what is right and what is wrong, what should he and 
l.·That should not be done. The development of buddhi thus 
becomes an ethical task of man. 
In the Kat;ha Upani~ad1 buddhi or intellect has been com-
pared to the driver of a chariot. Just as the driver of the 
chariot controls its movements, activities, directions etc. so 
also buddhi is that principle \'lhich controls, guides and 
regulates the activities of the other elements in human nature. 
No\'1 since buddhi is that principle '\-rllose guidance is ultimately 
decisive it has to be properly developed. It is enlightened 
or sattvil{a buddhi alone that can see things in their right 
prospective, that can rightly distinguish between right and 
wrong and thus decide whether or not a thing is to be done. 
l•!uch emphasis is therefore laid on the steadiness of buddhi. 
If man is al\'lays disturbed by desires, his buddhi also continues 
to be unsteady and unsettled. This disturbed buddhi, not 
·cleared of all obscuring tendencies, cannot make a right dis-
tinction between what should or should not be done and as such 
cannot act as a proper guide to conduct. It is incapable of 
reflecting the light of ~ru~a (spirit) and we may say in the 
1. 1Katha Upanisad 1 , I. III. 3-9· 
. . 
( 
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context of the Bhagavadg!ta, of God. 
li'rom vThat '\>Te have said a·bove we can see the parallel 
between Butler's conscience and buddhi. This parellel is 
strikingly brought out by the fact that conscience is the 
highest principle in human nature just as bud~1i is in the 
Bhagavadgi ta' s scheme of psychology. Every man should there-
fore try to bring under the control of his buddhi all his 
lower impulses and inclinations and act according to it. He 
should thus bring order and harmony in his psychological life 
through the exercise of intellect or buddhi. Butler always and 
every-\vhere strongly argues that vre must act according to 
conscience \•Thich is the chief principle in human nature. 
According to him any action in which the authority of this 
highest principle is violated must be wrong. An action can 
be right only \>Then man acts according to the principle. 
Elurthermore1,. conscience is the voice of God according to 
Butler. It is that principle \•Thich apprehends God and His 
purpose in the.world. For a Karma-yogi also buddhi is the 
c.t).ief instrument of knmving God 1 s \vill and carrying it out. 
Again just as in Butler conscience can be over-po.wered by 
inferior principles so also in Hadhusudana buddhi can be, in 
fact, often is clouded and over-pGwered by other inferior 
elements of nature. vlhen thus over-powered, buddhi is unable 
to make a right discrimination between virtue and vice, right 
and \'Trong. In this state it often takes vice as virtue and 
out of ignorance perceives all things wrongly. Thus accord-
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ing to both Butler and ~iadhusudana an actiom is right if and 
vrhen it is in accordance \'lith the highest principle of nature 
and it is \·Trong \vhen that principle is disregarded. 
We have pointed out the fundamental points of similarity 
bet\oreen the t\vo thinl(el's. But there are also some points of 
difference which we shall try to bring out here. The first 
point of difference is that though both derive morality from 
human nature yet their conception of it (human nature) is not 
oxactlr the same. In Butler there is emphasis on the psycho-
logical make-up of man's nature. According to him human 
nature, as we have shown, is made up of several particular 
passions and general principles. These different principles 
of action are all arranged in a natural hierarchical order a.nd 
virtue lies in acting according to this hierarchy. An action 
becomes unnatural and therefore \!Trong \-Then tlti.s hierarchy is 
disturbed. In Nadhusudana the emphasis is on the fundamental 
characteristics of man. As we have already pointed out, 
according to Hindu ethical thought men are broa.dly divided 
into three classes - sattvika, rajasika and· tamasika according 
as the one or another of the three gunas predominates in them • 
. 
It is the predominance of these gunas that determine man's 
. 
fundamental nature. The caste-duties, which every man is 
required to perform according to the position which he occupies 
in society, are based on the fundamental nature of man. Thus 
virtue according to I~ladhusudana consists in doing one's 
appointed duties born of nature \·rhich in this context means 
- 204 -
one's fundamental nature. 
There is yet another point of' difference bet\·reen the two 
thinkers. Butler assumes too much uniformity in human nature. 
No doubt he also admits the differences in the inner constitu-
tion of man but it seems to us that in spite of all these he 
appears inclined to hold that men are all alike in their nature. 
Butler says: 11 If it be said, that there are persons in the 
world, who are in great measure without the natural affections 
tm·1ards thP.Lr f19llm·r-creatures: there are like-wise instances 
of persons without the common natural affections to themselves: 
but the nature of man is not to be judged of by either of 
these, but by what appears in the common world, in the bulk 
of mankind 11 • 1 Nadhusudana on the other hand 11rhile recognising 
certain uniformity in human nature also stresses variations in 
human beings. In fact this is a very important point in his 
ethical teaching. 'rhere are no doubt certain common duties 
\vhich are incumbent on all human beings but the caste-duties 
are based on men's inequalities in their fundamental nature 
at the moment of birth. Since men are not alike in their 
nature, their functions or duties cannot be the same. It is 
keeping in view these differences in the natural qualities, 
capacities and tendencies of men that11 as \ve have already 
shown above, their duties are prescribed. It must also be 
remembered here that probably it is because of these differ-
1. 1The \'forks of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Sermon I, sect. 13, 
PP• 47-48. 
- 205-
ences in human nature that \vhen Nadhusudana says 'follmv 
nature' it specifically means 'follm-T your nature' (svabhava). 
It must be remembered, however, that despite all these 
differences ,.,hich are matters of detail only, the fundamental 
ethical teaching of both Butler and l"ladhusudana remains the 
same. According to both virtue lies in following nature. A 
na~ural action, according to both, is a virtuous action. 
Again they both advocate and argue for the control, and 
regulation of the lower elements of nature. And lastly 
according to both an action is right if it is in accordance 
\ATi th the highest principle of human nature and wrong 'YThen:.th.at 
principle is disregarded. 
Chapter VII. 
A. Virtue and Self-j.nterest in Mad.husudana. 
In the last ch~pter we have explained what the duties of 
men belonging to the cli:f!'ferent classes are and also how· they 
are determined. Now the q_uestion arises how and in what spirit 
these duties should be carried out. Are we to perform them 
for the sake of satisfying our own interest·? Ar.e we to do 
them with a view to gaining private and selfish ends ? In 
this chapter we shall concern ourselves mainly with these 
questions. 
In order to tmderstand the full sign:Lficance of' thesA 
prol)lems that confront us in this chapter it is necessary to 
go to ·the root Ol"' the central idea that nnclerlies them. 'Ne 
have said that M:ad.husildana holds that salvation Ol"' moksa is 
• 
the highest encl of human J.j_fe. The attainment of mok~a is 
the ideal ~owards which the entire Hindu thought moves. "All 
life", as Dr. Radhakrishnan says, 11 is set to the music of 
this ideal 11 •1 Moksa literally means release or freedom, 
. 
freedom f'rom the wheel of births and deaths. It is trans-
cending the standpoint of mere incli vicluali sm and rising ta 
an impersonal universalism. The destiny of all men is to 
realise this supreme ideal which can only be attained when 
they rise above the narrow and the finite and compil:etely 
identify themselves \'lith God. It must be borne in mind here 
that Hindu thinkers including our author believe in and 
--------------------· --·----
1. s. Radhalcrishnan. ''£he Hindu Dharma', International 
Journal of Ethics, Vol. :DOOCIII, No. 1·, October 
1~~2, p. 7. 
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affirm the r>eality of the eternal the attainment of which 
means release or freedom from rebirth. It is that status 
of being in which the individual is superior to time, to 
birth and death. It is a new mode of being, an al togethe1• 
transformed life. In other words spiri.tual life is not the 
extension of the ethical and moral life. It is a new climen-
sion in which thine;s are viewed from an eternal r1oint of view. 
But the conception of the highest air~ of life and how 
1 t can be attained has not always been the same in Inc1ian 
thoue;ht. This hr=ts 1mrler-eonc '3. lJrocess of 13raduaJ. evolution 
in the history of Hindu ethical thought from the Vedic period 
to that of the Bhagavadgi'ta. The same wor>d salvation or 
moksa has been emr:,J.oyecl. but in different senses • 
• 
During the Vedic pe1•:i.oc1. salvation meant the attaimnent 
of happiness in heaven l:1y the 1)e1•fopmance of religious rites 
as :prescribec1 in the Ved.as. At this period the performance 
of duty or cU1arma which incluf.Led sacr•ifj_ces and rituals was 
prompted by a desire for- rewards either in this life or in 
the life hereafter•. During the periocl. of the ~e Vecla, 
Hin1lus prayecl for rrolongation of lU:'e and. pr.osreri ty here, 
f .. ]. t and or• happiness hereafcer. Nivrtti OP remmcia ·ion was 
• 
not consic1er·ed. as an essent.it:l.l condition for the attainment 
of salvation. 
When we come to the TJ:panis~tdic period we f:i.na. that there 
• 
-···---------------· 
---- ... ______ _ 
1. A.B. Keith. 'The Religion artrl PhU.oso:phy of the Veda and 
Upanishads', Harvaru oriental ser:i.es, VoJ.o 32, 
I-l:P·· Lq9-480. 
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is a distinct~·chane;e in the conception of' salvation. The 
T~ani~ads present a spirit of revolt ae;ainst the egoistic 
view of the Vedas ·which advocated the perrormanqe of rituals 
for the sake of rewar·cls and punishments. '.rhe idea of attain-
ing happiness th1 .... ough the per·foi·mance of sacrifices and 
rituals :l'ac1es into insten:lf':i.c:ance during th:iJ.s periocl.. 'l'he 
view that the world is full of sorr•ow and. suf:f'er:ine; occupies 
the minds of the thinkers and therefore the problem of J.i lJera-
t:ion and the emancipation of the soul from the bondage of 
SE!Jl1Se.ra1 becomes very important at this :pei•iod. 'rhe different 
systems of IncUan philosophy which developed. at this perioc1. 
all c1iscuss and eXIllaiE iE their own WfJ.Y the attainment of 
liberation from bondage. The idea of r•enu11ciation of the 
world and retirement from all the activities of life gains 
predominance at this period. Speculation cl>n the mysteries of 
life and death becomes very conspicuous and the attention of 
the Upanisadic: thinkers is centerecl mainly upon the l11unan soul . 
• 
According to them salvation can be attained only by following 
the path of nivrtti Ol'' cessation from activities. Renunciation 
• 
thus becomes an indispensable means of attaining salvation. 
The logic of the Upanisacls seems to be that since all action 
• 
binds, e.very action is a source of lJondage committing the soul 
to the empi:Dical world and preventing its nnion with God, the 
. -· ----------------
1. In. Hindu ethical thought expressions like 'SBJ'!lsara', 1 the 
cycle of birth emd death 1 , 'jagat 1 and 'the wheel of time 1 
etc. are employed to indicate the non-substantial character 
of the universe. 
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-emancipation or the human soul from the bondage of samsara 
. 
is possible only through rentmciation of' the worldly activi-
ties. 
I •· b " h th t t,.1e -Is'a UpanJ.· sad1 d t ·~ may e urgea ere a· ! a :voca es a 
. 
lj.re of activity as opposed to the life or renunciation. It 
says that a man_ should try to live a life~Sl)an of a htmdred 
years by constantly perfo~ning actions. In reply it may be 
pointed out that Is'a Upanisad no doubt seems to advocate an 
• 
ac:t;ive lire, but truly speaking it is not an active life, at 
least not the type of' active life that we find advocated in 
the post-Upa.nisadic period. It seems to us that in it there 
. 
is an echo of the performance or Vedic sacririces, the works 
enjoined in the Vedas. It cannot therefore be sa.icl to 
represent the general attitude of the Upanisads, which is the 
. 
attitude or renunciation from worldly activities. Professor 
- I Ranade rererring to this passage in the Isa Upanisa.d rightl~ 
. . 
points Ol)t that though the passage tells us that "w·e should 
spend our lire-time in doing actions, the actions that aPe 
here implied have no rurther range than possibly the small 
ci:ncumt:er.ence of 'sacririce'; and rurther, the way in which, 
even in the midst of a life of action, freedom from contagion 
with the fruit or action may be secured is not here lJPought 
out with.suf'ricient clearness".2 Dr. Farquhar also remarks: 
-, 1. Isa Upa.nisad, 2 • 
• 
2. R.D. Ra.nade. 'A constructive Survey or Upani~adic Philosophy: 
Poona. (India.), 1926, p. 298. 
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"According to the early Upanishads, all actions, whether good 
or bad, compel the soul to be reborn to undergo requital, and 
only inaction can lead to Release 11 • 1 
But in order to assess the proper attitude of the 
Upani~ads it is fair to go into the texts themselves. (1) 
Brhadaranyaka Upanisad says2 that 'one \-.rho lives a life of 
• 0 0 
peace, self-restraint, quietness (cessation from activity) and 
of patient· endurance and detachment sees the Atma \·ri thin him-
self'. Evils do not overtake him for he over-comes all evils. 
Evils do not burn for he consumes all evils. Free from evil, 
free from impurity and free from doubt, he becomes a knower of 
Brahman. 
This' passage from the Brhadaranyake Upanisad clearly shm·rs 
0 0 • 
that an aspirant must live a caJJn, peaceful and quiet life in 
order that he may be able to realise the Bra~nan. Here are a 
few passages from other Upani~ads which do not· directly speak 
of giving up all activity but in which the entire emphasis is 
laid on the development of the spirit and in \-Thich there is 
nothing about the performance of any activity. 
(1) Chandogya Upanisad says that 'it is the self (Atman) that 
0 
is below and above, behind and before, on the right and left. 
The self indeed, is thi s world. He \orho sees like this , thinks 
like this, understands like this, becomes one \>lho delights in 
--------·----
1. J·.N. Farquhar. •Karma~ its value as a doctrine· of life', 
Hibbert Journal, Vol. XX, No. 1, October 1921, P• 25. 
2. 'Br;had~ranyaka Upani~ad', IV, 4. 23. 
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the soul, sports in the soul, consorts with the soul, enjoys 
the soul; he becomes free and moves as he pleases in all the 
1 
Horlds' ..... 
(II) Again ~lundalta Upanisad says that 'a man \·Tho kno"~Jors that 
. . ~ . 
it is tho self (Atman) that shines forth in all things begins 
to play '\>Ti th the self, and to enjoy the self, for that indeed 
constitutes his action. Thus he becomes foremost among those 
who know the self 1 • 2 
From the above it seems clear that the attention of the 
Upani sadie thinl{crs \V"as centered on the self and their aim \·ras 
• 
solely directed to a systematic :search after the ultimate 
Reality. They occupied themselves almost wholly 'IIlith the 
philosophic wisdom of self-knowledge which could be gained 
through renunciation of the "mrld. Thus renunciation or 
cessation from \V"Orldly activity is considered necessary for 
the attainment of salvation. But this conception of salvation 
seems incompatible with the practical and social life. It 
goes against the demands of the society \·Thich advocate a 
vigorous and active life. The Bhagavadgita at this stage comes 
to our help. It seeks a formula and provides us with a 
solution \vhich brings about a happy compromise bet\·reen the t\·10 
incompatibles - renunciation of the world and active life in 
it, and the demands of society. According to it there is a 
way of performing actions in which they do not bind. If all 
1. 'Chandogya Upani~ad', irl"I. ':25~:~;2. 
2. 'Nuz:q.aka Upani~ad', III. 1. l~. 
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actions are performed selflessly and disinterestedly then 
these do not bind the soul in the sense in '\oThich selfish acts 
do. In fact by so doing a man is freed from the bondage of 
karma and finally attains liberation. The so:lution which the 
Bhagavadgita thus offers is that salvation can be achieved in 
and through the performance of one's o'\om duties according to 
one's station in life without any expectation of reward. A 
man should do the duties allotted to him by his nature and his 
social status but he should not act \·Ti th an~ selfish motive 
of gain to himself. Rather, he should do them in the spirit 
of service to God and should offer the fruits of his actions 
to Him. It is not actions themselves but the desire for 
result, the desire to enjoy the fruits of actions, that binds 
man. Thus we see that the Bhagavadgita changes the entire 
conception of human actions. It views them from a higher 
point of vie\¥. It spiritualises or idealises the \•Thole human 
activity. Dr. Sch\veitzer rightly observes~ "The charm of the 
Bhagavad-Gita is due to this idea of spiritualised activity 
uhich springs only from the highest of motives". 1 
It should be remembered here that in the Bhagavadgita the 
word •renunciation' is retained but it changes its connotation. 
The spirit of renunciation is preserved without abandoning the 
worldly activity~ Renunciation here does not mean renuncia-
tion of activities, renunciation of life in the \-Torld. It 
means renunciation of' selfishness, egoism and renunciation of 
---------------···-------··-----
1. Albert Schvreitzer. 'Indian Thought and its Development 1 , 
London, 1951, p. 191. 
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the fruits of actions. True renunciation means detachment 
from the fruits of all actions. Thus it is the renunciation 
in action and not the renunciation of action that is emphasised 
here. It is the desire for the results of works which is the 
cause of re-birth and which should therefore be renounced but 
not the \o~orks as such. It is not complete inaction, \o~hich is 
an impossibility, but actions fully and freely done '\oTi thout 
subjection to sense and passions \vhich are the secret of 
perfection, anu whlch a1·e th~:r:efo.L·~ ~mpho.::dsed hel~e. The 
fundrunental teaching of the Bhagavadgita is that 'we must act 
in such a \•Tay that our actions do not bind us' and it may in a 
sense be said to be an improvement upon the life \·Thich \ve find 
advocated in some of the Upanisadic texts. As we have already 
. . 
said, according to the Bhagavadgita it is not all actions that 
bind man, only interested actions, actions done vTi th egoism, 
selfis.tmess and hope of re\vard, that do so. Disinterested and 
selfless actions, far from binding, through the purification 
of buddhi and spiritual insight that follows such actions, 
lead to the realisation of self. This is probably the unique 
contribution of the Bhagavadgita to the philosophy of a-ction. 
Dr. Naitra probably refers to the synthesis and the happy 
compromise which the Bhagavadgita brings about between the two 
paths - the path of Pravrtti and the path of Nivrtti - action 
. . 
and renunciation,when he remarks 11 Shankara's higher path of 
nibrtti or cessation from activity presents only a negative 
• 
ideal \..rhich leads necessarily to spiritual bankruptcy. It 
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implies in its later stages the cessation of all d~ties 
including nityanaimittika or unconditional duties as \·rell as 
the kamya or conditional duties. (The nature of these duties 
is explained in the foot-note). It is therefore a condition of 
spiritual void without content, i.e., the negation or death of 
Spirit. Such nib~tti or cessation according to the Gita cannot 
be an end-in-itself and can be recommended only as preparatory 
to the attitude of disinterestedness and detachment. The 
highest ideal is that \ofhich !'ills this void oi' nib:rtti or 
cessation with concrete content, •••• the ideal or plane of 
nibrtta-ka.rma or disinterested performance of duty for duty 1 s 
. 
sake. It is the plane of lcarma \'Tithout material motives 11 • 1 
Note. Kamyakarma or conditional duties are those duties that 
are performed by the agent only when there is a desire for a 
particular end. These are also called optional duties or 
actions. It is the pleasure of the agent, not his duty, to 
perform such an action. But if he undertakes the performance 
of such an action he must not violate moral laws. Such duties 
qr actions presuppose a subjective motive of a personal nature. 
For instance only those who aspire to go to heaven or to attain 
m'lilndane objectives like the birth of a son or the attainment of 
wealth are to perform relevant sacrifices. The unconditional 
duties on the contrary are obligatory in themselves independent 
of personal motives. These duties must be performed in accord-
ance \<Tith moral la\<T· Their non-performance causes harm. Such 
duties fall into two classes, viz., (1) the nitya-karmas or 
duties which are unconditionally obligatory for all time and 
(2) the naimittika-karmas or duties \<Thich are the unconditioR-
ally obligatory only \<Then their nimi ttas or special occasions 
arise. For instance the daily prayer is an unconditional, 
nitya duty: it must be done every morning and evening without 
fail. Bathing in the Ganges in a solar or lunar eclipse, 
hm-Tever, is an unconditional naimittika duty: it is uncondition-
ally binding only on the occasions of the eclipse. In either 
case, however, the d~ties are unconditionally binding, i.e., 
obligatory independent of any personal motive of the agent. 
1. S.K. Haitra. 'The Ethics of the Hindus 1 , Calcutta, 1925, 
P• 109. 
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\ve have seen hmo1 there has been a gradual change in the 
conception of' salvation or molq;a from the Vedic age till the 
time of the Bhagavadgita and in this connection we have also 
indicated how the Bhagavadgita fills in the void created by 
the Upamisadic doctrine of nivrtti or cessation from activity 
. . 
with its principle of disinterested and selfless performance 
of duties of life. We shall novr proceed to discuss l,·iadhusu-
dana 1 s vie\-r about self-interest which is in line with his own 
emphasis on devotion or bhakti and \·lith the general teaching 
of the Bhagavadgita in this respect. At the very outset it may 
be pointed out that one of Nadhusudana's primary ethical 
teachings is that there is no virtue in performing an action 
\ofi th any selfish motive of gain to the agent. One should not 
perform any act with any selfish desire and motive. Hadhusu-
dana argues for the renunciation of all considerations for the 
private and individual self. He decries the very idea of 
self-interest and everywhere advocates the doctrine that one 
must perform the duties of' his station in life assigned to him 
by his nature without any attachment, without any selfish 
consideration. All work is evil if it be rooted in selfishness 
and therefore the abandonment of all personal desires and 
Inotive is insisted upon by him. He always advocates the ideal 
of detachment and disinterestedness which means having no self-
interest. Actions are good and virtuous only if they are free 
from the tinge of selfishness and are performed as relig~ous 
acts in the spirit of love and surrender to God. 
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We may also point out here that freedom from egoism and 
selfhood is, in fact, the key-note of the whole Indian ethical 
thought. The idee~. behind this emphasis on tho abandonment of 
all egoism and selfisimess is that actions done with personal 
desires and motives bind man, keep him confined to this 
Pemporal world of becoming, and thus prevent him from attain-
ing the Supreme end namely moksa or spiritual freedom. In 
. 
short, all actions ordinarily bind their doers by creating 
attachment to their result, t.h.ereforEl those "t.·rho act should 
relinquish all attaclunent to the result. 
Not only the desire for fruits of action but also the idea 
that man is the ~gent, the doer has to be given up. The teach-
rJ,~ 
ing is that man must have the knowledge that it is prkrti, the 
. 
cosmic energy that does everything. This knoHledge completes 
the process of renunciation of fruits of action. So long as we 
claim personal agency for all actions and desire: their fruits 
've get enyangled in successive embodiments through countless 
ages. We should therefore, as we have just said, renounce not 
only all desires for the fruits of actions including the 
meritorious ones, but we should renounce all personal agency 
for actions and dedicate them to prakrti or God • 
. 
In so far as 
man is able to efface himself and attribute every thing to God 
he escapes the inevixable results of actions. 
It may also be p0inted out here that according to the 
Bhagavadgita1 he is the true Yogi \'Tho sees inaction in action 
1. 'The Bhagavadgita, Chapter IV, verse 18. 
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and action in inaction. He sees inaction in action because he 
is ever active yet he does not claim to be the doer of the 
action. Again, he sees action in inaction because though he 
does not claim to be the doer of actions, yet he is really 
active in the sense that he does them in the proper spirit. 
The '·rhole idea is that the complete effacement of the ego is 
essential if truth is to be realised. Every taint of indivi-
duality should disappear for the realisation of self or God. 
In the Bhagavadgita such persons Ct::; act froi11 selfish 
motives are called deluded and fools. Nadhusiidana in his 
commentary on verses 42-44 of Chapter II1 denounces vehemently 
those deluded people who follow the Vedic injunctions for 
attaining svarga or heaven. Such people perform the Vedic 
sacrifices through passions, desires and ~version and thiruc 
that there is nothing greater than these. Nadhusudana argues 
that an aspirant should transcend the sphere of Vedic sacri-
, 
fices performed out of motives of self-interest. Samlcara 
• 
commenting on these verses and criticising those who work for 
heavenly re,-rards points out that such persons are um·rise; 'they 
are wanting in discrimination. They are enamoured of' the 
Vedic passages composed of many a praise to gods and unfolding 
various ends and means. 'I'hey hold that there is nothing else 
besides works which are the means of attaining svarga (heaven), 
cattle, and other such objects of desire. They are full of 
·------------·--- -··------· 
1. 'Gudhartha-dlpika', PP· 74-75· 
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desires and are ever in pursuit of' them. Their chief' and final 
goal is svarea. They talk words, fine like a flm-Tery tree, 
very pleasant to hear. Thus talking these foolish people Hander 
in the sa~sara. They regard pleasure and power as necessary; 
they are in love with them and have identified themselves Hith 
them. Their intelligence and wisdom are blinded as it were by 
this speech abounding in specific acts. In their mind no 
conviction of a resolute nature, no '·risdom concerning Sa1~hya 
0 ,.._ Yo"~ ,.T; 11 a ... ; ""e • 1 
- b- ·~·· ~~~ • 
Again Nadhusii.dana in his commentary on verse 49 of 
Chapter II2 strongly argues for the performance of selfless 
actions, performance of' actions ,.,i thout any desire for their 
·fruits. He says that those '•Tho make fruit their motive and do 
not 'vork without attachment are wretched (atyantadina). They 
take their birth again and again in a continuous cycle of 
saqtsnra. '£hose who work without any attachment and renounce 
the fruit of action are eventually released f'rom the bondage 
of re-birth and attain to the state which is free from all 
ills. 
It may be interesting to point out here the agreement of 
the Bhagavadgita with the Upanisadic vievr on this point . 
. 
Nu:t]ttaka Upani~ad3 also calls such persons who ,.rorl{ for heavenly 
- - - ~ - -1. 1The Bhagavad-Gita "rith the commentary of Sri Sankaracharyal 
Eng. Trans. by A. Nahadeva Sastri, Nysore (India), 1901, 
P• 52. . 
2. •Gudhartha-dipika', p. 79. 
3· 'Hundaka Upanisad', 1.2.10. 
. . . 
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re\-rards deluded. According to it the foolish who regard 
sacrifices and works of merit as most important and gloat over 
these as the highest good proceed again and again to old age 
and death. These deluded people, not knowing any other good, 
after enjoying the fruits of their good deeds in heaven, again 
enter this human \'lorld or a still lower one bf animals). Thus 
those who perform good works get their reward no doubt, but 
they are not united with God and are therefore regarded as fools 
in comparison \·lith the higher spiritual souls who seek God only. 
The point to be borne in mind is that the aspirant or the 
1nan who seeks divinity should renounce his lower aims, his 
private and personal aims. He should renounce not by \-ri th-
drawing himself from the \..rorld and thus forsaking his \'rorldl~ 
duties which are allotted to him by his nature nor 1nerely doing 
them either for worldly or heavenly rewards but by doing them 
in a spirit e.f selflessness or disinterestedness and as a 
matter of duty. He should perform actions to which he is born 
because they ought to be done, because there is a moral necess-
ity to do them as a service to divinity and because if done in 
this spirit, \..ri thout any hope of re\..rard, they free him from 
his bondage to the sa~p.sara and make for his sp:i:ritual freedom 
and liberation. To explain this point fully it may also be 
stated here that the ascetic gives up all work in his search 
for the truth but that is not the proper way to cultivate the 
spirit. As \-re have already said it is not by renouncing \>Tork 
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but by renouncing in ,.,ork that '\ore can cultivate the spirit. 
No one should renounce his duties tmvard the "'orlcl but should 
do them in a spirit of selflessness. Works done in this spirit 
helps the attainment of knm'lledge by producing in the aspirant 
the spirit of dispassion for material things. Again the 
ritualist performs actions but not in the right and proper 
spirit, the spirit of renunciation. He performs his actions 
in the hope of a reward either here or hereafter ,.,hich, far 
from leauing to liberation, only intensifies his feeling of 
egoism and separateness. But he '"ho '\oTOrks as a moral necessity, 
as a service to divinity, without fostering selfishness, is 
illumined ,.rith the divine light of serenity. He is freed from 
all taint of individuality, all the stains of selfishness are 
erased, because he '\oTorks for God alone and he dedicates all 
fruits to Him. He is thus freed from the bondage of satpsara 
and ultimately becomes one with God., ,.,hich is the Supreme ideal 
of life. 
Thus the '\'Thole ethical and moral teaching is, in a sense, 
staked on the question of 'desire and motive'. An action done 
from personal motives causes bondage to karma and re-birth and 
prevents the realisation of the Supreme moral ideal. Professor 
Narsin].ham seems to suggest this when he remarks: "The whole 
doctrine centres round .'.desire', the essential nature of the 
power personal self; because, desire is in its various degrees 
of subtleness, so to say, the most powerful of our enemies, 
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'"'hich blinds us from perceiving the true nature of Reality". 1 
It may be useful to refer to the vie'-1 of Ramahuja here. 
Hadhusudana accepts that it is possible even in this life to 
attain a stage of such spiritual development (Jivanruukti) that 
even though activities may continue, the duties as duties 
cease for the man '-rho has attained it. Ramanuj a however does 
not agree '11Ti th Nadhusudana on this point. According to him 
moral and religious duties continue all through life because 
Jivanmukti is not possible to attain. But what is of interest 
in this context is that he nlso emphasises the principle of 
discarding all selfish motives and desires and doing everything 
as duty. According to Ramanuja there are punya.karmas or works 
of religious merit which though not directly, yet eventually, 
lead to divine l<:nm·rledge. There are also papal<:armas or works 
of religious demerit which are positive obstacles to·divine 
knm.rledge. The point '11Thich we want to emphasise and bring out 
here is that Ramanuja also believes and holds that even 
punyakarmas (not to tall<: of papal<:armas) if done from personal 
and selfish motives become positive obstacles to the attain-
ment of divine kno'lrrledge. So according to Ramanuja also as it 
is according to Nadhusudana, all acts including the meritorious 
and religious should be accomplished disinterestedly, that is, 
free from interested desires for reward and happiness. It is 
Mirv.l., 
1. P. Narasimham. 'The Vedantic Good' ,!Vol. XXIV, Ne,·r Series, 
· No. 93, January 1915, P• 51. 
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on:J_y when even the relieious acts are performed from a sense 
of duty that they become means which g_ualif'y man fo1• the 
spiritual life. 
We have seen how Macll1usudana and other Indian thinkers 
all with one voice pr·each and ar&rue for the rem.mciation of' 
selfishness and egoism and advocate the principle of detach-
ment and disinterestedness. We shall now pass on to consider 
some of the objections that have been and that are still 
raised against the doct1,ine of detachment in the performance 
of one's nol"'ms.l fw1ctions of life. 
Professor McKenzie in his book 'Hindu Ethics' raises 
certain o1)je:ct.ions to this theory. To follow fully the discuss-
ions of' these objections it may be useful to q_u.ote some of his 
statements here. He says: 11 The ·wise man should do his appoint-
eel work, it is said, without regard to the f'rui t of works, in 
the same spirit as the Supreme performs I-Ii s works. What does 
unattachment to the fruit of works here mean ? In some places 
at any rate one is f'orcecl to the conclusion that it involves 
the idea, as an essential element in it, of absence of purpose. 
In the Bhagavadeita we have a conception of the ·world different 
from the orthodox Sam~1va .••• (According to the Bhagavadgita) 
. ... 
the phenomenal world is no longer the outcome of the mePe 
lighting up of Prakrti by Purusha, but it. is created and 
• 
continued under the direction of the Supreme. We seem to be 
forced to the conclusion that God created the world, imposing 
laws upon nature and upon man, and yet that in all this He 
remained free from attachment, not loving His creation, not 
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seeking the fulfi~nent of any purpose through it; but at the 
same time, man's dharma, established by the Supreme without 
attachment, is to be performed by man \-Ti th similar absence of 
attachment. The finite world, and dharma with it, thus lose all 
meaning. • . • In the light of this statement \oJ'e can see that ¥re 
cannot without some qualification say that morality receives 
in the Bhagavadgita a positive content. It certainly does so, 
but it is a content cold a.nd lifeless, fixed and immutable, 
not a content \'Thich becomes ever richer and more vi tal to him 
~rho seeks to perform it. • • • (Then again) the emphasis (iu the 
Bhagavadgita) is rather on those (virtues) connected with 
absence of attachment than those connected \vith the performance 
1 
of positive duty." 
Dr. Sch\·reitzer also \1hile comparing the teaching of the 
Bhagavadgita "ri th the speculative philosophy of J .G. li'ichte 
remarks: "In the Bhagavad-Gita, on the other hand, man plays a 
part in the drama from a blind sense of duty, \·ti thout seeking 
to find out its meaning, and1 along \vi th that, the meaning of 
his m·m action". 2 
These criticisms may perhaps arise from an inadequate 
comprehension of the idea that lies behind the ethicnl thought 
of the Bhagavadg!ta, and,in fact of the whole V~danta philoso-
phy, the school of Indian philosophy to which our author 
Ivfadhusudana belongs. Why Jvfac"Uillusiidana lays considerable emphasis 
-------------------------------------------·-----·--------------------
1. J"olm l'1cKenzie. 'Hindu Ethics', Oxford, 1922, PP· 132-133· 
2. Albert Sch\<!eitzer. 'Indian Thought and its Development', 
London, 1951, p. 192. 
- 224 -
on absence of attachment or as Professor HcKenzie calls it 
'unattachment' should be understood in relation to the Supreme 
ideal of human life, the ideal of self-realisation. Equanimity 
of mind, detachment and self-control are the necessary. condi-
tions for spiritual life. It is through the cultivation of 
these that the highest good can be realised. The development 
of such an attitude is thus not only essential but an inevit-
able pre-requisite to the realisation of God. The equanimity 
or 8tauility of wind is possible only if \-re '\-rork through un-
attachment and self-control. The non-attached man is he '\-rho 
has developed dispassion to the material objects and whose 
senses are completely under his control. He is one who works 
without any thought of the enjoyment of consequences. He 
is not at the mercy of his passions and affections. He thus 
being free from affection and aversion obtains peace and 
stability of mind, harmony and tranquility and thus eventually 
realises the self. On the other hand if '\-re '\·rork \<Ti th attach-
ment, if we '\..rork '\'Ti th a desire to achieve some private and 
personal ends to which there is no end then our mental harmony 
and eqp.alibrium is upset and '\'lith tl'lis all evils arise in life. 
In the Bhagavadgita attachment to objects ofsense is regarded 
as the root of all evil. From the attachment to objects 
arises desire. Desire prompts man to activity. If he is 
frustrated in his efforts he becomes angry. Anger breeds 
delusion and delusion leads to the loss of reason and vrith the 
/. 
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J.oss of reason the man himself is utterly ruined. Worl{ \oTi th 
attachment thus far from helping man in any 'IITay ultimately 
brings about his ruin by breaking the peace and stability of 
his mind. It is to escape this doom that the cultivation of 
detachment is emphasised. Thus it is clear from what has been 
said above that it is only through unattacl1ment, through the 
perfect control of the senses that proper conditions for the 
realisation of the highest good of life can be brought about. 
1iTherefore, \oli thout attachment perform always the work that 
has to be done, for man attains to the highest by doing \mr.lc 
\ori thout attachment 11 • 1 This is why Hindu ethical thought 
abounds in prai~e of unattacrunent or performance of selfless 
acts. 
It seems to us that this is also the reason why so much 
emphasis has been ~aid on the necessity of becoming •st~ita-
:Prajna 1 "YThich means one \'Those mind is fixed and steady. The 
man v1ho has his prajna fixed is not troubled in sorroHs and is 
not eager to gain pleasure. He is one from \oJ"horn desires, fears 
and anger have fallen away. He has no attachment on any side 
and is indifferent in prosperity and adversity. He withdraws 
his senses from their object on every side as a tortoise does 
its limbs. Such a man attains true peace, true contentment. 
It is only when the mind is at peace \-ri th itself, fixed, 
unruffled and filled with contentment that deep contemplation 
---------------·--· 
1. 'The Bhagavadgita•, Chapter III, verse 19. 
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and through it the realisation of the Supreme end of life is 
possible. 
\ve may explain it in a slightly different \•ray. 'To attach' 
means to bind or to fasten. Thus actions done \>Ti th attachment 
are those that bind men. It may be asked here, to what do they 
bind or fasten men ? The answer is that they fasten them to 
the spatio-temporal world, the world of becoming. Such actions 
fetter men to the chain of births and deaths. Again to detach 
means to unfasten or to r~lease. Detached actions are those 
actions that unfasten or release men. Unfasten from what ? 
From their bondage to this empirical world. Thus we see that 
actions with attachment are those that bind men tb" karma and 
re-birth and prevent them from attaining union with God. On 
the other hand actions with detachment are those that enable 
men to free themselves from the bondage and thus gain spiritual 
freedom. 
We may explain the srune point yet in another \•ray. \'lhat 
do ,.,e mean by life ? \</hat does it really consist in r( Does 
it consist in mere satisfaction of desires and enjoyment of 
pleasures ? No\>T if by life we mean a life of constant seeking 
and hankering after pleasure, and thus becoming a prey to the 
mad dance of passions and affections, then of course unattach-
ment has no meaning. But if on the other hand by life we 
mean a rational life, a life in l-rhich the senses are controlled, 
then the life of unattacrunent acquires full meaning and 
significance. It is a perfectly rational life. It is an 
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unselfish life - a life of unsell.fish·devotion to the good of 
humanity. 
Er. \rlidgcry had probably Professor l1icKenzie • s criticism 
in mind Hhen he remarked: 11The notion that actions should be 
performed \oJ"i th •non-attachment • has sometimes been represented 
by Western thinkers as a psychological absurdity and a practi-
cal impossibility. That has been due to misunderstanding of the 
position criticized. The implications seem to be some\-rhat as 
follO\·!S: All o.ctions \ihich are 'at~aciled: are performed for the 
attairunent of their fruits either for the agent himself, or for 
others or for both. The teaching of 1non-attachment• is that 
the person should perform right acts \·rithout doing so for the 
sake of any consequences to be enjoyed by self or others. I•·.ioral 
conduct should in other \vords be 1 disinterested 1 • Here there 
appears to be nothing much more or less than the Kantian 
doctrine of duty for duty•s sake ••.•• In short, selfishness 
has to give place to a sense of disinterested duty, for thms 
only can bondage to the law of karma and finite rebirth be 
1 
overcome 11 • And again, 11The over-coming of attachment to the 
consequences or results of action also has the implication of a 
state of equanimity of' mind. One who fears these results of 
action.:or hopes for those is not likely to have equanimity; if 
self-interest in results is abandoned there may be equanimity. 
Now such equanimity is a main characteristic of Hindu moral 
1. Alban G. Widgery. 1The Principles of Hindu Ethics•, Interna-
tional Journal of Ethics, Vol. XL, No. 2, January 1930, 
p. 236. 
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attitude. It is attained when the rajasik is sybordinatedto 
the satt'\..rik, '\>then the individualism is subordinated to univer-
salism. ul 
The '\lrhole point is that the aspirant should endeavour to 
e.ttain to the right composure and develop proper ethical 
attitude of mind to realise the highest good. 
In our consideration of the criticisms we '\•Tould like to 
go a little further. These criticisms are perhaps based on 
the belief that i1' men are to perform their actions '\·rithout 
attachment then the finj. te world and dharma. '\·Ti th it lose a.ll 
meaning. In vie'\·T of -,.rhat has been said it is difficult to 
agree '\·rith this view. A little reflection shm.,rs that the case 
is just the reverse. Even for those who are earnest about 
realising the sell', (not to speak of those '\oJ'ho alvrays work 
\orith attachment and for '\IThom the world is full of meaning) the 
finite \vorld is full of significance and meaning in the sense 
that it is in and through this that they can realise their 
ideal. The inf'inite and the eternal is not out of all relation 
to the finite world. The infinite can be realised through the 
finite. Nan 1 s life in this '\vorld is to be looked upon as a 
bridge over which he has to pass in order to reach his 
destination. Thus the wheel of bmrths and deaths no doubt 
binds man but in a sense it also provides him with opportuni-
-------·-·- ---
1. Alban G. ~Iidgery. 1 The Principles of Hindu Ethics 1 , Interna-
tional Journal of Ethics, Vol. XL, No. 2, .J-anuary 1930, 
PP• 236-237· 
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ties to transcend it. In this sense it becomes a means to 
perfection. The world is the training ground, so to say, since 
it provides opportunities for the soul's progress, and it is 
here and no \ofhere else that man can \'IOrk out his salvation 
through the performance of his dharma. It is only by dis-
charging his ·duties to the 1<1orld in the right spirit that man 
can prepare himself for spiritual freedom. Madhusudanas ethics, 
\•thich is the ethics of the Vedanta, consists in gradually 
trnining the individual in this finite 1t10rld in order that he 
may rise above the dualistic position to one of non-dualistic 
realisation. 
Again the meaning and significance of the finite world 
does not lie in l{eeping man confined to it and thus making 
him blind to the Supreme ideal of life. On the contrary the 
significance of the finite world lies in enabling man to 
transcend it, but to transcend it through it. The importance 
of dharma lies in the fact that it is in and through the 
performance of one's dharma here in this finite 1r10rld in the 
proper spirit of non-attachment that one can realise perfec-
tion. It is thus not by renouncing the world but by perform-
ing one's dharma in it that God can be attained. Thus \ote can 
say that the finite 1trorld is a means to the realisation of 
the end, namely God. 
Hr. Homo Leone seems to realise the value of this 1mrld 
according to the Vedantic ethical thought, and in order to 
emphasise this point to his readers he italicises the words 
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'in the ,.,orld 1 in his observation: "True Vedanta does not make 
one sink to the level of the beast or the stone, but see one 
mighty unity in all nature and work more efficiently 1in the 
I 
world for the very light it thro'\oTS bn the problems of life -
a sort of spiral apex, to use a simile, where activity and 
inactivity, being and not-being, subject and object, in short 
all the dualities of this world of appearance culminate and 
'lose 1 themselves in a higher unity". A fe,., lines after the 
ones quoted he ~.e;cdn says: "Verilj• the world exists by opposi-
tion or contradiction and when once '\ole get 1 behind 1 it by 
transcending it, '\ole 1 see' Reality 1 as it is 1 ; for 1 there 1 
Kno-vrledge, Knm·rer and Knmm are One (to use intellectual 
1 terms)". 
Again it is difficult to say how the life of unattacrunent 
is cold and lifeless. It is not very clear in '\orhat sense this 
criticism has been made. Let us therefore bPiefly analyse the 
position. By s 'lifeless life' is often meant a life of 
inactivity, a life in which there is the absence of all 
activity. But a life of.unattachrnent does not reality mean 
renunciation of activity. It does not involve irresponsible 
renunciation of ordained duties. It does not mean any break 
from social life. The Bhagavadgita does not approve of 
inactivity even on the part of those who have attained perfec-
tion. It is a life of inaction in action. It is a kind of 
·----·-----
1. Homo J .. ione. 'The Vedantic Absolute', l•lind, Vol. XXI, New 
Series, No. 81, January 1912, p. 63. 
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freedom from action but reached through right action. It is 
not proper for man to remain \ofithout contributing his share 
in the maintenance of the world when God Himself ceaselessly 
works for it. 1 Besides, so long as man lives, he cannot 
remain even for an instant \'Ti thout activity. Una.ttachment 
thus does not mean inactivity. It only means activity uithout 
desire, activity without self-interest. 1'--iadhusudana al\·Tays 
and everywhere advocates that man must perform all his func-
tions in o. detached "tJTay, as a matter of duty till his life is 
pilgrimage is terminated by liberation or till he is lifted 
beyond the ethical and moral plane. Thus it is clear that 
the criticism does not apply in this sense, namely in the sense 
of inactivity. 
Again does the criticism mean to suggest that the life of 
unattachment is cold and lifeless in the sense that it pro-
vides no incentive to work ? The criticism does not seem to 
apply even in this sense. Because even though a life of un-
attachment is a. selfless life, a life from '"hich all selfish-
ness and egotism have been eliminated, this does not mean that 
one '"ho acts selflessly has no incentive, no motive before him. 
He has to realise the Supreme end of life (God) which is the 
greatest spur to activity and "\oThich can be said to be the 
greatest incentive to work. J;ioreover, the aspirant is neV.er 
asked to renounce his normal work. Indeed, it is by perform-
-----·----·--- -----------------
1. 'The Bhagavadgita', Chapter III, verses 22-24. 
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ing his \oforldly duties that he can prepare himself for the 
fulfilment of his supreme duty namely realisation of God. He 
is thus a.s much a man of this '\ororld as a.ny other individual. 
The moral man accpets all the conditions of his life accord-
ing to his station in society. This involves a living of 
normal life and fulfilment of all obligations. F'urthermore, 
it should be borne in mind here that duty for duty's sake, 
though a beautiful ideal, is not recognised by Hindu thinkers, 
including oul· author, as an end in itsel!·. "rhe pursuit of 
this ideal is only a means to the realisation of the ultima.te 
end, mok~a. \ale shall exp+ain this point more fully in Chapter 
IX but it is sufficient to point out here that according to 
them, to perform any voluntary activity without any motive is 
a psychological impossibility. They, however, argue that 
instead of having different motives for different works, man 
must have and should work only for one motive namely the 
attainment of union \oTith God. Thus, to work without attach-
ment does not mean performing an altogether motiveless action, 
but it means performing all actions \-Ti th one motive, reali sa-
tion of the Supreme only. A man who works without any attach-
ment fulfils all the obligations of life and has thus as much 
incentive to \-Tork as, if not more than, : · a man who works 
'\'Ti th attachment has. Indeed a man Hho is free from all attach-
ment knows that happiness in the sense of earthly ~oys is not 
man's goal. According to him, pleasures of the senses are a 
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delusion and he is not enticed and allured by the glitter of 
the world. He sees the fleeting and impermanent nature of the 
things of the \·rorld and is thus not satisfied with temporal 
happiness which is perishable and always mixed with pain. 
The man \'Tho works without attachment seeks eternal happiness, 
lasting bliss or as lvfadhusudana says 'bliss unmixed \·rith 
misery' which is immortal and imperishable. Thus this eternal 
happiness or bliss can be attained only by the realisation of 
th.e ~u.preme. 
1 Professor Ranade probably means to suggest this when he 
says that this eternal happiness, o•r great happiness as he 
calls it, is experienced when the 'Infinite• is seen every-
'"here; \ofhen the Being that calls itself the 'I' is realised 
-
every\•There; \'Then the 1 Atman • is seen everywhere. He who thus 
realises the t'riune unity of' the 'Infinite', the 'I' and the 
-
'Atman• and experiences the truth of the sentence 'So Aham 
Atman' alone enjoys the highest happiness. 
In the face of all these it is difficult to maintain the 
view that the Bhagavadgita recommends a life which is cold and 
lifeless, or, as Dr. Sch\>~ei tzer says, that in the BhagavadgJ: ta 
one is asked to do an action from a blind sense of duty. 
With regard to the criticism that there is more emphasis 
on the absence of attachntent than on the performance of positi-
ve duty it may be pointed out that the attachment to the 
objects of the world is considered by Hindu ethical thought to 
·---·----------- -----·--
1~ R.D. Ranade. 1A Constructive.Su)rve~ of Upani~adic Philoso-
phy', Pooma (Indl.a , 1~26, P• 30::>· · 
- 234 -
be the greatest obstacle to the realisation of the goal. He 
who "'ITorks '\oTi th attachment is always haunted by fears and hopes 
of consequences and. loses stability of mind. As ¥Te have been 
repeatedly saying it is only by abanclonine concern for results 
that that equanimity of mind can be attained, which is a 
necessary pre-requisite to the realisation of the highest good. 
Attachment is thus the greatest enemy of man. It makes it 
impossible for him to obtain moksa. There is no wonder that 
• 
there has been so much emphasis on the absence of attachment. 
B~t it must be remembered that this is only one side of the 
picture, the negative side vrhi ch consists in freedom from 
hampering attachment. The other side of the picture, the 
posj.ti ve side is not lost sight of. The virtues inculcated a.s 
the varl).asrama-dharma and samanya-dharma are not a.ll negative. 
Good deeds are ah·rays to be practised. Charity, compas-sion, 
hospitality and other philanthropic '\-rorks have ahmys been 
extolled and wicked actions universally condemned. A good 
action·is extolled in the Hahanarayana Upanisad thus: "The 
. 
perfume of a good deed spreads afar like that of a tree laden 
with flO\vers 11 • 1 lrurthermore even virtues like 1 truth 1 , 'non-
1 
1 r I 1 I 
violence, steadfastness and renunciation etc. are not merely 
passive virtues but represent active social morality. Also the 
injunction not to do wrong implies and is often coupled with 
the injunction to do right. 
----·----- ·---·-·----·-··-----· 
1. 1Nahanarayana Upanisad 1 , 9 • 
. 
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Again, the practical side of Hindu ethics is portrayed 
in the B:rhadara~yaka Upani~ad1 , vrhich narrates the story of 
hovr gods, men and demons once went to their common father, 
Prajapati and requested him to instruct them. In reply 
Prajapati uttered the sound 1 da 1 to the gods who correctly 
interpreted that to mean 1damyata, practice of self-control. 
This means that the gods were asked to practice self-control. 
To men again Prajapati uttered the syllable 1 da 1 which they 
rightly understood to mean 1 datta', pra.:;tict'l t:ha:.r::i ty. This 
means that men were asked to practice charity. To demons also 
Prajapati uttered the same syllable 1 da 1 which they interpreted 
to mean 1 dayadhvam 1 , practice compassion. This means that the 
demons are to practice compassion. Prajapati thus outlined 
th1•ee cardinal virtues - self-control, charity and compassion. 
The Upani~ad further tells us that even now the Creator 
(Prajapati) gives the same advice about the moral la\·T, the 
same triple instruction through the voice of thunder, \oThich 
produces the sound 1 da-.da-da 1 • 
In the face of \oThich has been said above it is not clear 
how it can be maintained that there is no emphasis on the 
performance of positive duty. 
Again there does not seem much force in the criticism 
that in the virtues enjoined in the Bhagavadgita it is chiefly 
the inner attitude that is emphasised. It is common psycholo-
1. Brhadataanyaka Upanisad. v. 2. 1-3· 
. . . 
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gy that all overt actions have their root in the inner nature 
of' man. They all spring from the inner nature and an in'\<rard 
change is, therefore, very essential for the performance of 
overt activities. Inner purity is more important than outer 
conformity because every action is notlung but the outer 
expression of the inner man. !he mind must, therefore, be 
purified, for it is no use cutting the branches and leaving 
the roots intact. Again, it must be remembered that the inner 
11ature and the outer conduct are, after all, the two sides of 
one and the same life, and one cannot very rigidly distinguish 
one from the other. 
vJe have explained in \vhat spirit every man has to do the 
work that is allotted to him by his nature, and in this coru1ec-
tion \ve have also considered in detail some very important 
objections. But before we conclude our discussion and pass on 
to dra\v up the comparison, \•Te would like to bring out one more 
point here \vhich '\ole think is important. A question may still 
be raised whether, when a man aims at self-realisation, that 
may not be regarded as a matter of self-interest, - '\othether 
one engaged in the search for kno\•Tl'edge or self-realisation is 
not working for self-interest. The answer to this question 
\-rill depend on \-That \<Te mean by interest and also what is the 
nature of self in this context. It has been repeatedly said 
that all personal and selfish desires for temporal obj,~cts of 
enjoyment must be abandoned, and one should do one's duty for 
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the mere sake of the performance of duty, as a contribution 
to the co~non eood of one's comraunity and even to the life of 
the universe. Thus petty egoistic interest has no place in 
this scheme of things. 'fhe realisation of the self can be 
said to be a value but it is a value "1hich doe.s oot stand in 
opposition to the attairunent of the values of other people. 
Also, the ~elf that is to be realised is not a pr~vate.indivi­
dual self which stands in ppposition to the self of others, 
because according to 1-Iadhusudana the self is one, undivided, 
and is the same in all. Liberation does not mean that the 
self acquires something which it does not have, or becomes 
something which it is not. It means only the realisation of 
the true self which is already there and is the same in all. 
Indeed the very idea of a private self has tm be renounced 
because the seeming separateness of the self is due to 
ignorance. Ahruqkara (the ego-self) separates us from.others. 
Each inclines to his own ahai~ara, and deliverance f'rom this 
limitation is what realisation of the self means. Hr. Leone 
rightly points out1 that 'there is no greater hell for the 
Vedantin than isolation; and \<That is isolation but a temporary 
identification with a 'this' or a 'that• ? 1 It is the know-
ledge of the one-ness of the \·Thole, \-rorking in one's life that 
enables one to save oneself from these compulsory isolations 
of life, and 'links' one with the one divine life. The lower 
1. Homo Leone. ~The Vedantic Absolute'. Hind, Vol. XXI 1 New Series, No. g1, January 1912, pp. 70-71. 
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self, the separative self "YThich has private interests, is 
exactly that from "'hich release ~s sought, and thus the aim 
of the realisation of the self does a\..ray vTith any seeldng for 
what are normally called selfish interests. Thus it is clear 
that neither the aim of realisation nor the self of \vhi·ch it 
is a realisation countenances the aim of seeking interests in 
the sense of values \•Thich conflict "'ith t.t).ose of others. In 
short, if interest means the pursuing of aims and objects 
\'lhj_ch stand in opposition to other people~'s aims and ohjects, 
then the realisation of self in Nadhusudana is not an interest. 
Dr. Radhakrishnan has very aptly remarked: 11 In one sense the 
Upani~ad morality is individualistic, for its aim is self-
realisation; but 'individualistic' ceases here to have any 
exclusive meaning. To realise oneself is to identify oneself 
\·Ti th a good that is not his alone. i"ioral life is a God-
centred life, a life of passionate love and enthusiasm for 
humanity, of seeking the infinite through the finite, and not 
a mere selfish adventure for small ends. 111 
1. S. RadhakrislLnan. •Indian Philosophy', Vol. I, London, 
1951, p. 212. 
B. A comparison bet\oreen Butler 1 s and I•iadhusudana 1 s 
account of Virtue and Self-interest. 
We have explained . :}\fadhusudana 1 s conception of virtue 
and self-interest. We have also seen (Chapter III) Butlerls 
view on this problem. We are now in a position to compare 
the two thinkers. 
It is obvious from what has been said above that there 
is no essential agreement betv-reen the t\•TO thinkers on the 
question of virtue and self-interest. They differ fundament-
ally on this issue. Hadhusudana denounces all selfishness and 
egotism in his ethical and moral teaching. According to him 
the aspirant should abandon all personal and selfish desires 
and perform his \>Torks 1.-li thout any atta.cl"unent. Thus self-
interest has no place in his mora.l scheme. Butler, on the 
other hand, considers it as a species of virtue. The faculty 
within us (conscience) which is the judge of actions approves 
prudent actions and disapproves imprudent ones. 
But there seems some agreement however in so far as 
Butler also denounces narrow and petty selfishness in his 
ethical and moral scheme. To appreciate this point in Butler 
it is necessary to explain it at some length. The first 
point \-lhich we have to remember here is that Butler demolishes 
and rejects the theory that man is all selfish. In fact as 
we have seen his supreme aim in his Sermons at the Rolls 
Chapel was to overthrov-r the Hobbsian theory of universal 
selfishness, and there is no denying that as a principle 
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Butler has killed it altogether. Professor Barnes rightly 
remarks: "Whatever criticism may be made of other parts of 
Butler's ethics, this at least \'lill remain a monument to his 
insight into the human mind 11 • 1 Professor Broad also considers 
. 2 
it as 11the classical refutation of psychological egoism". 
It might be pointed out here and perhaps rightly that by 
his refutation of universal egoism Butler only proves the 
existence of' altruistic elements in the human nature, he only 
demonstrates the existence of social impulses in man's consti-
tution. But he regDrds self-love an a permissible motive on 
,.,hich to act, and, indeed he also considers it as part of 
virtue. 
In reply it may be pointed out that Butler no doubt 
admits self-love, that he considers it as part of virtue but 
it must be borne in mind that the conception of self-love 
changes altogether in his hands. It is not mere selfishness. 
Butler spiritualises self-love, he gives it a new character, 
new meaning altogether. One of Butler's aims in refuting 
Hmbbes's universal egoism was to re-evaluate self-love. The 
self-love '\aThich Butler adrni ts should thus be distinguished from 
mere selfishness and egoism which, as we have said elsewhere, 
consists in the strength of the private affections and the 
\'leakness of the public affections and according to \oThich a 
1. W.H.F. Barnes. 'Joseph Butler: Moralist', Durham University 
Journal, Vol. XII, New Series, No. 2, Na.rch 1951, p.42. 
2. C.D. Broad. 'Five Types of Ethical Theory', London, 1951, 
P• 99· 
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man's only duty is to try to produce as much good for himself 
as he can '\oTi thout any consideration for other 1 s good. I•;ere 
sel1'ishness is thus op·posed to public or social good. The 
type of self-love Hhich Butler admits is 'reasonable cool self-
love•. In this sense it is not only not opposed but involves 
social good. Reasonable cool self-love thus includes benevo-
lence. Butler is very anxious to see that self-love is not 
misunderstood as selfishness and he therefore qualifies self-
love \oJ"ith double adjectives - (1) reasonable and (2) cool. 
It seems thus clear that Butler also denoun.ces selfishness, 
egoism and interestedness in the sense in which these terms 
are generally and normally used. So far Butler and l·iaclhusudana 
agree \·ri th each other. But then the fundamental difference 
between the two thinl.{ers lies in the fact that Nadhusudana does 
not allo"\-r any place even for 1 reasonable cool self-love • in 
his moral scheme. He does not consider 'reasonable cool self-
love' as a permissible motive on which to act. Butler no 
doubt spiritualises self-love. It is a higher kind of self-
interest in the sense that it implies the interest of others 
also. But nevertheless it is self-interest. Nadhusuda.na 
dismisses any consideration of even reasonable coolsalf-love 
because it is an obstacle to the realisation of the ultimate 
goal, mok~a. In order that an aspirant be able to realise 
his goal there should be absolutely no tinge of self-interest 
in the performance of his functions. Probably that is why 
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expressions like 'renunciation• 'absence of attachment' and 
'self-control' are so very frequent in Nadhusildana. The 
teaching goes further. 'fhe aspirant, as \.re have seen, should 
efface all sense of ego. He must even gi v·e up the idea that 
he is the doer by developing the knm..rledge that it is prakrti 
. 
that does everything. 
It may also be stated here that Nadhusudana's rejection 
of self-love as applied to actions does not mean destruction 
of life itself. Effacement of the ego does not mean extinc-
tion of the person altogether. Self-control does not mean 
self-torture. It means only moderation. Preservation of the 
body and the life is an ethical duty for every man. If the 
body, the mind or any other faculty of a man is suppressed he 
cannot even realise the Supreme goal of life. The Bhagavad-
"1" -1 g~ ta calls those people fools "'ho torture their bodily organs. 
2 At another place it extols the man who is temperate in his 
food and recreation, temperate in all activities, temperate 
in sleep and vTaking. It is not only that every man should 
preserve his life. We have seen '\·Thile explaining the Q.ifferent 
stages of life that after the first stage is over the student 
should marry and settle dcino~n as a householder. In the 
Taittirfya Upanisad3 we have again seen that no one should 
• 
neglect his vTelfare and prosperity. Noreover, Nadhusudana 
1. 'The Bhagavadgita 1 , Chapter "III, verse 6. 
2. do. Chapter VI, verse 17. 
3, 'Taittiriya Upani~ad', 1. 11. 
---------
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admits kama as one of the four purusharthas or ends of human 
life. 
But it must be remembered that a+l these (one 1 s ,.,elf are 
and prosperity) including the preservation of life should be 
in accordance with dharma. Even kama or desire is not to be 
understood as the gratification of the senses merely. It has 
a much \vider meaning than that. Its chief purpose is the 
support of life and the propagation of the race. It should 
also be remembered that the indulgence of kama is alloHed only 
in accordance \d th dharma as laid down in the sastras' and 
only to the extent to which it may be necessary to contribute 
these ends. It follows from all this that man 1 s purpose in 
this \<TOrld is not to satisfy his private and personal interests. 
His purpose is to realise the Supreme in and through the 
fulfilment of all the obligations of life in the right and 
proper spirit. We thus see that the two thiru{ers do not 
completely coincide as far as the question of virtue and self-
interest is concerned. l11iadhusudana accepts self-love as 
applied to life but even then this should be observed in accord-
ance with dharma. 
We shall proceed further to see if there is anything 
similar between the two thinkers on the question of duty and 
interest. Butler admits, as \ve have seen in Chapter III, 
that duty and interest are coincident though only partially in 
this \·rorld but perfectly in the next "Yrorld. 'rhe fact is that 
Butler believed that human nature is so made, it is so 
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naturally adjusted to the vmrld, that if man simply acts 
according to his nature (in \·rhich all virtue lies according to 
Butler) it will lead to his interest and happiness. 
Furthermore, according to Butler, happiness can be 
attained in a '"BY quite different from \'That most people think. 
According to his conception there could be no real happiness 
where there is no virtue. Real interest can be served only 
through virtue. Butler could not think of happiness \vi thout 
vil·tue. Vice at least cannot lead to it in his scheme of moral 
life. Probably Butler wanted to emphe.sise that from the point 
of view of expediency also it is desirable that virtue be 
practised. He seems, as we have held, to give a double support 
to virtue. This seems to be one of the reasons why Butler 
speaks of coincidence between virtue and interest. But, as \..re 
have already shO\m, this does not mean that he held virtue and 
interest as identical. 
\'Je find the same idea of coincidence bet\..reen the perform-
ance of one's duty or dharma and expediency in Nadhusudana also. 
Krsna while explaining to Arjuna that having regard to the fact 
... 
that fighting is a k~attriya's duty, he must not swerve from 
that duty which is natural to a ksattriya, (and there is no 
. 
higher good for a ksattriya than a righteous war) prot:Zeeds to 
• 
tell him that this is good from the point of .view of expediency 
also. He tells him that such a fight, coming unsought as an 
open door to heaven, falls only to the lot of happy k~attriyas. 
If on the other hand, he vrill not fight this righteous battle 
/ 
/ 
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\vhich is enjoined on him as a duty, he vrill not only be 
neglecting his duty but \•Till also lose fame and honour. Hot 
only this, pe0ple will for even recount his infamy and for a 
man \·Tho has been esteemed as a hero and as righteous and as one 
possessed of other such noble qualities, death is preferable 
to such infamy and disgrace. Furthermore, the great heroes of 
the other side, Duryodhana and others will think that he has 
lvithdra.\m. from the battle through fear and not thro~gh compass-
ion. He \·Till thus fall very lmv in the estimation of those 
very people by vThom he has been esteemed so highly. 'fhere is 
no pain more unbearable than that of scorn thus incurred. 
Krsna does not stop here. 'l'he idea of expediency and interest 
... 
reaches its climax \•Then krsna tells Ar juna that he has the 
... 
advantage in either case. If he is slain, he goes to heaven, 
if he is victorious he gets the kingdom. Thus he advises him 
to fight the righteous battle regarding it as a duty and \-Thich 
\·Till be to his interest as vTell. 1 :t·Iadhusudana also thus up-
holds the vie\v of coincidence bet\•Teen virtue on the one hand 
and expediency and interest on the other. It might be said 
that the cotncidence between virtue and expediency is only 
incidental here. !vir. Desai in interpreting these verses "'here 
~rsna points out the coincidence observes: "Indeed Krishna 
'/ ... 
puts his finger on Arjuna•s \-Teak spot when he reminds Arjuna 
of the duty of a kshatriya, a duty to \-Thich he \'Tas born, the 
1. 'The Bhagavadgita•, Chapter II, verses 32-37· 
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fulfilling of, and not running away from, '·rhich led to 
1 heaven and glory". Nm•! whether k:f~z:a is touching the weak spot 
of Arjuna by telling him about heaven, kingdom and glory etc. 
and thus tm make him fight the righteous battle or whether 
Butler is touching the '"eak spot of his audience by emphasising 
self-love and thus 'vinning them over to virtue, the idea that 
the performance of one's duty and dharma leads to the interest 
and happiness of the individual is there in both. Thus the 
observation by l·,r. Desai quoted above far from contradicting 
supports the point '·1hich \ve vmnt to establish here, namely 
the coincidence bet"Yreen virtue and interest. Besides, Hindu 
ethical thought goes so far as to so.y that it is through the 
performance of one's dharma in a proper spirit of non-attach-
ment that one can realise the Supreme goal of life namely 
perfection. It is through moral and virtuous conduct that one 
can attain God. 
'.rhus according to both Butler and 1~1adhusudana man 1 s true 
happiness and real interest are always best served by virtue, 
by performance of one's duty. According to both thus duty and 
interest coincide. This is not to say that duty is to be done 
for the sake of interest. The idea of prudence and expediency 
in the moral scheme of both the thinkers is probably to give a 
double support to virtue, to vindicate that the performance of 
one's dharma is desirable from the point of view of prudence 
--·-··---------------------
1. l1ahadev Desai. 1 The Gi ta according to Gandhi 1 , Ahmedabad 
(India), 1951, P• 57· 
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also. 
There is yet another point which we may mention here. 
It may be asked, in fact the question has been raised by 
Arjuna himself: \vhat happens to those individuals \¥ho have 
follov1ed the extremely difficult path of realising the self 
but have not succeeded in achieving their end ·:- Is there any 
good in follO\ving such a difficult course the goal of \·Thich 
one may not achieve '? Krsna here assures Arjuna,virtually 
... 
makes a promise, that no effort is ever lost. No honest man 
'\ATho has chosen the right path can ever come to grief either in 
this life or in the life hereafter. Every step taken in the 
right direction is a eain to the individual. No good man can 
come to an evil end. A man has therefore nm cause for despair 
for honest and sincere efforts never go unrewarded. The idea 
expressed here is very similar to that \'lhich \ve find in Butler 
who also implies a similar promise. Butler also sincerely 
holds that virtuous people should be happy. Nay further, they 
are in fact actually so even in this world. He says that "the 
temper of compassion and benevolence is itself delightful and 
the indulgence of it affords ne'\-T positive delight and enjoy-
ment11. Butler does not stop here. He proceeds to say that 
whatever exceptions there are between virtue and happiness, 
11 all shall be set right at the final distribution of things. 
It is a manifest absurdity to suppose evil prevailing finally 
over good, under the conduct and administration of a perfect 
... d'' 1 N~n • 
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It may be interesting to point out here that Ivianu also 
expresses a similar idea to the one we find in Butler that vice 
cannot finally prevail. He says: "liT either a man \·rho lives 
unrighteously, nor he "Y.ho acquires \·realth by telling false-
hoods, nor he who all-rays delights in doing injury, ever attain 
happiness in this \ororld "· He says again: "Unrighteousness, 
practised in this \vorld, does not at once produce its fruit, 
li}fe a cow (Hhich at once yields benefits by its milk); but, 
advancing slmvly, it cuts off the roo:ts of .hj.m who committed 
"til 2 ~ . 
l'loreover the principle preached mn the Bhagavadgita which 
our author upholds that good and honest people never come to 
grief, that honest and sincere efforts never go unre'1rrarded 
compares well vri th Butler • s theory of reward and punishment 
and his belief that vlrtue is always rewarded and vice punished. 
Butler says: 11Horal government consists, not barely in re\..rard-
ing and punishing men for their actions, which the most tyrran-
ical person may do: but in rewarding the righteous and punish-
ing the wicked; in rendering to men according to their actions, 
considered as good or evil. And the perfection of moral 
government consists in doing this, with regard to all intelli-
gent creatures, in an exact proportion to their personal merits 
1. 'The Wotks of Joseph Butler~, Vol. II, Sermon III, sects. 
1~ & 12, PP• 73, 75. 
2. 'Manusmrti', Chapter IV, verses 170 & 172. 
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and demerits 11 • 1 
We thus conclude that there is difference bet't.reen the 
t\'10 thinkers on the problem of' virtue and self-interest though 
in one or two minor points there is some agreement also. 
1. 1The Works of Joseph Butler•~ Vol. I, Part I, Chapter III, 
sect. 2, p. o4. 
Chapter VIII •. 
A. Virtue and General Happiness in t·iadhusudane .• 
We have seen in our last chapter that according to 
Nadhusudana man should perform his appointed duties without 
any attachment. He should not ¥rork \vith a vie\v to realising 
any private and personal end. Nmr the questions arise: 
Should public or social good be made the motive-force in the 
performance of one•s actions ? Is the promotion of the 
general happiness of mankind the right and proper motive for 
man 1 s conduct ? In this chapter \•Je are going to consider 
these questions. While man must al\•Tays vtork for the good of 
mankind, while he must live for others and thus make his \vhole 
life a sacrifice (yajna), yet that should not be the impelling 
motive of the doer. He should not work from any inclination 
of the mind. He should not be led away by the consequences 
of his actions. He must al¥rays \vork in an impersonal sense 
of.right as being the demand of the ideal. In short, he must 
perform his functions simply because he ought to do so. 
\'le have said above that a man should make his \-Thole life 
a sacrifice. The word •sacrifice• is very significant in 
this context. In the history of Hindu philosophy its conno-
tation has undergone a change to which we think necessary 
to refer here. 
We have seen that during the Vedic age the greatest 
.emphasis was on the performances of sacrifices and elaborate 
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rituals. Dharma consisted in the performance of sacrificial 
rites enjoined in the Vedas and the primapy object of these 
sacrifices was to please the god or gods to \·Thom these 
sacrifices were offered either to "Tin some favour or avert 
some evil. But in the Upanililadic period there is a change in 
the atmosphere. According to the Upanisads sacrifices do not 
• 
mean the mechanical performance of fixed rituals. The Upani-
sads reject the idea of the performance of sacrificial rites 
• 
\·Ti th a view.; to gaining any 1·eturn either in this or in the 
life hereafter. To put it in the words of Dr. Radhakrishnan 
11~/e should not do our duty vri th the motive of purchasing 
shares in the other \-TOrld or opening a. bank account vTi th God 11 •1 
It may be pointed out here that the hm:HJ.aka Upanililad in 
one pas sag e2 mentions the performance of ritualistic \mrks as 
. the means of securing certain values of life. But these 
values are exhausted through enjoyment and it must not be 
forgotten that the same Upani~ad i~nediately after this warns 
us3 against performing sacrifices in the sense in which these 
have been enjoined in the Vedas. It says that the different 
sacrificial forms are unsafe or unsteady boats. The fools 
considering these as the highest good fall again and again 
into old age and death. The idea is that the ultimate goal 
-- -----·---·---·-------------··--------· -· 
1. s. Radhakrishnan. 'Indian Philosophy 1 , Vol. I, London, 1951, 
p. 225. 
2. 11•1undaka Up ani sad, I.2.1. 
. . . 
3· do. I.2.7. 
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of life namely immortality, or freedom from the bondage to the 
wheel of births and deaths, cannot be attained by the perfor-
mance of the rites and sacrifices. It can be attained through 
the development of spiritual insight into the universe by the 
realisation that it is the same spirit ,.,hich animates all life. 
Thus it is clear that in the Upanisads there is more and more 
• 
emphasis on the inner spirit rather than the outward obser-
vances. In other words, in the Upani~ads there is an insis-
tence on the life of spirit And not on a mechanical perfor-
mance of rituals. 
'rhough there was a distinct change in the conception of 
'sacrifice' from the Vedic to the Upanisadic age yet the full 
. 
implication of sacrifice in the sense of disinterested and 
unselfish devotion to the good of humanity at the cost of 
private and individual good is not fully \-TOrked out until the 
time of the Bha.gavadgita. The author of the Bhagavadgita re-
evaluates 'sacrifice' and gives to it its full content. 
Sacrifice here means sacrifice of the lover self, sacrifice of 
the private and individual self for the higher self. Accord-
ing to the Bhagavadgita ·every act is to be regarded as a 
sacrifice, yajna, an offering to God. Thus while the Vedas 
declare that the way to salvation is through the performance 
. . 
of sacrificial rites and elaborate rituals, according to the 
Bhagavadgita the greatest sacrifice consists in the sevYioe 
of humanity, unselfish devotion to the general good. In it 
service to humanity takes the place of sacrifices offered to 
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the gods during the Vedic age. Sri Aurobindo observes: 11The 
Gita accepted the Vedic theory of sacrifice, but gave it a 
profound turn, an inner, subjective and universal meaning, a 
1 spiritual sense and direction which alters all its values". 
In verses 42 to 44 of Chapter II 1-iadhusildana distineuish-
es true karma from the Vedic rituals and tells man to \'TOrk 
renouncing all selfishness and making the \-lhole life a sacri-
fice. We can strive towards the realisation of God, the goal 
of our 1; fo 
..&.... ""'' l·rhcn \te i•Tork for ~he well-being of the \>Thole 
mankind. In short, the path to the realisation of' God lies 
through the performance of all our duties tovrards others. 
l'iadhusiidana in keeping with the general standpoint of Hinclu 
ethics expounds and a.dvocates everywhere that all. \YOrks, all 
appointed duties, should be done in a spirit of sacrifice and 
selfless devotion to the general social good. Every act 
should be a means of promoting the general happiness. Before 
proceeding further in the discussion of the prolblem of social 
good, it may be pointed out that this question has not been 
discussed separately and specifically by 1'-·iadhusiidana. To 
explain this aspect of his moral philosophy we shall refer (1) 
to the four asramas or the stages of life, and (11) to the 
institution of caste. We shall first refer to the stages of 
life. Among these stages also \-Te are here mainly concerned 
,.,i th the second stage ii.!n which the social aspect has been 
-----------·----- ---·-----·----
L. Sri Aurobindo. 'Essays on the Gi ta I' Ne\.Y Yorl{' 195'0' p .458. 
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emp,tlasised. 
As we have already seen in Chapter VI the first stage of 
life is devoted entirely to the training and discipline of 
body and mind. The student has no other responsibilities, no 
other obligations. Strictly speaking it is a stage of pro-
bation and not of action. But \oJ"hen this stage of life is 
over and a student enters the second stage, the life of 
garhasthya, then the active life of man really begins. At 
this stage he is called upon to fulfil certain obligations of 
life. It may be useful to refer to the Taittirlya Upanisad 
• 
here in which the responsibilities and obligations \ofhich every 
householder is expected to fulfil have been very exhaustively 
discussed. Having taught the Veda, the teacher is giving 
final instructions to a pupil who is about to· depart for 
home to assume the householder 1 s life: ·.•!Speak the truth; do 
your duty, do not neglect your study. After procuring for the 
teacher such fees as he desires, see that you do not snap the 
continuity of your family line. You should not s\-rerve from 
truth; you should not swerve from duty; you shouid not neglect 
your welfare; you should not neglect prosperity; you should 
not neglect learning and teaching; you should not neglect the 
duties towards the gods a.nd the ancestors. Adore your inother 
as god; adore your father as god; adore your teacher as god; 
adore the guest as god. Those actions of ours that \·lere blame-
less, those you must follmoJ', not the others; \vhat good acts we 
have done, those you must cherish, not others. And those 
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Brahmans ('l'ea.chers) \vho are superior to us, them you should 
honour. You should give with faith; you shouil..d not give \·Ti th-
out faith; you should give in plenty, give vri th modesty, give 
~rlth fear, give with due regard. Then, if you should have a 
doubt about a duty or conduct - conduct yourself there as is 
done by such Brahmans ('reachers) as can deliberate \'Tell, are 
devoted to their duties on their o'\lm or others' behalf, are 
not severe, and are desirous of righteousness. Regarding then 
things that are prohibited, conduct yourself again as those of 
Brahmans (Teachers) of judgment 7 who are devoted to duty, mild 
and virtuous, do. This is the command, this is the adVice; 
this is the inner teaching of the Veda; this is the instruction; 
thus should one cherish; thus should this be observed". 1 
An important point to be borne in mind here is that it is 
not merely the cultivation of certain social virtues or obliga-
tions that has been emphasised here but also the spirit in 
"YThich these are to be practised,. 
\·le Hould, in the interests of consistency, li)te to make 
a brief digression here. We have held (Chapter VII) that the 
general tone and spirit of the Upani~ads was one of renuncia-
tion. They laid sole stress on a life of spirit. But in the 
passage \oJ"e have quoted above considerable emphasis has been 
laid on the due d!scharge of all social obligations. The fact 
is that there are one or tvro passages in $hem \>There emphasis 
--- ____ .. _________  
1. 'Taittitiya Upanisad, 1. 11 • 
. 
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on activity, in the sense of performance of one 1 s \•rorldly 
duties, has been lailid. But it should not be understood to mean 
that these represent the general spirit of the Upani~ads. 
Professor Dasgupta seems to support our vie\v when referring to 
the passage in the Taittirlya Upani~ad which we have quoted 
above remarks: "But fe\·r Upani~ads give such moral precepts, 
and there is very little in the Upanisads in the way of 
• 
describing a course of moral behaviour or of emphasizing the 
fact that man can attain his best only by trying to become 
great through moral efforts. The Upanisads occupy themselves 
. 
almost wholly with mystic meditations and \·lith the philosophic 
'\>risdom of' self-knovrledge 11 • 1 
After a brief departu~e we come back to our main point, 
the functions and responsibilites of a householder. Social 
obligations \•Thich have been listed above, in the passage quoted 
from the Tai ttiriya Upanisad, and \vhich every householder is 
. 
expected to fulfil, are so exhaustive that it is difficult to 
add anything ne\·T· In a nutshell they cover everything. But 
we thinl{ it necessary to mention a few words by '\>ray of elabor-
ation here. When the student enters the second stage of his 
life, the life of a garhasthya, he is expected to marry and 
settle do'\>m as a householder. l•Iarriage is, in fact, the 
starting point of the life of a householder. It is the beginn-
ing of a more responsible life. The Hindus regard marriage as 
--------·--- ---·---·-
1. Surendraneth Dasgupta. 'A History of Indian Philosophy', 
Vol. II, Cambridge, 1932, p. 494. · 
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sacred. Its main purpose is the development of the personal-
ity, continuance of the family ideal and the propagation of 
the race. According to the Hindus a man's religious life is 
regarded as incomplete and deficient \vithout his wife's active 
participation in it. There are a fe\·T ceremonies '\Arhich cannot 
be performed unless a. man's lvif'e is with him. The fulfilment 
of social obligations and the promotion of general happiness 
is mainly associated with this order. At this stage the 
individual becomes a responsible member of the family tovrards 
\vhich he should discharge his duties faithfully. Besides his 
family duties and obligations he has certain other obligations 
also which he is expected to fulfil. ~nong all the duties 
of the householder, very great el!lpha.sis has been laid on the 
daily observance of the five great sacrifices1 (Hahayajnas) 
which are so many ways of discharging one's debts to the 
universe in \•rhich he lives. The first sacrifice consists of 
the daily recitation of the Vedas. The idea is to preserve. by 
constant study the knovTledge of the Vedas \oJ"hich one acquires 
during the first stage of life. The second sacrifice consists 
in the daily offerings of water and food called Tarpana to the 
forefathers. The idea is to remind one of his being a part or 
necessary linl{ in the chain of historical continuity. The 
third sacrifice is made to the gods and consists of burnt 
oblations. It is a symbolic recognition of the fact that 
1. 'i"lanusmrti', Chapter III, verses 70, 81 • 
. 
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whatever man has be+ongs to God. The fourth sacrifice, called 
Bali offering, is offered to the bhutas (beings). The ethical 
implication of this sacrifice is to inculcate t!jle principle of 
unselfishness. It requires a householder to allow the needy 
fellorr-beings to share his possessions. The fifth or the last 
daily sacrifice consists of offerings to men. The implication 
is to encourage the idea of hospitality. These five great 
sacrifices '\·Thich include the duties of a householder 1 s life 
c.nd \'Thich therefore every· hou~t::holuer should observe clearly 
shma1 that his duties are not confined to himself or to his 
family but to his community, nay, to the entire creation 
including gods and manes. A householder's life is thus the 
mainstay of the entire community. Probably it is because of 
this that Nanu is full of praises for this order of life. He 
regards it as the most excellent order. 1 
We can explain· the same point in another ,.Tay. 'rhe four 
asramas or orders of life nre not ends in thOOlSelves. They 
are only successive and progressive stages leading to the 
realisation of the molq~a, the Supreme end of life. To borrow 
a metaphor, these four stages constitute a fogr-runged ladder 
by climbing which an individual can reach his ultimate goal. 
Manu holds2 that a twice-born3 man must discharge his duties 
1. 1Nanusm:rti 1 , Chapternr-;- verses 77-78. 
2. do. Chapter VI, verses 35-37. 
3, Those men are lmown as the t'\·rice-bcnm '-rho belong to the three 
higher castes - brahmin, ksattriya and vaisya and '\-rho have 
passed through the sacrament of initiation which is their 
second birth. Technically speaking, the scheme of the four 
stages of life is applicable only to the first three castes 
but it is an ideal '"hich is acce_pted by aJ-.1 Hindu.s. Sannay-
sins from all castes are revered by all FiJ.ndus 'a thout 
distinction. 
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to the world by passing through the different stages of life 
before directing his mind to the attainment of the final 
liberation. He says that it is only after having studied 
the Vedas in accordance \.fi th the rule, having begot children 
according to the sacred la'\>I and having offered sacrifices 
according to his ability that a man can seek final liberation. 
A 1ndce-born man who seeks final liberation \oJ"i thout having 
studied the Vedas, without having begotten children and with-
out having offered sacrifices sinks downwards. 
It may be useful to point out here, though \•le have already 
mentioned it earlier, that even according to the Upanisads the 
. 
usual rule is that one has to pass through all the successive 
stages of life, though exceptions are also permitted. In 
special cases man can give up the world from any stage of life 
if he has properly developed dispassion for material things 
of' the \vorld. vie are told in the Jabala Upani~ad that when 
once Janaka, King of Videha, approached Yajnavall{ya and asked 
him to teach him about renunciation, Yajnavalkya said: After 
completing the life of a stud.Ant.; l13t one become a householder; 
after completing the life of a householder, let one become a 
forest-dweller; after completing the life of a forest-d\veller, 
let one renounce. But when a suitable occasion arises let 
one renounce even from the stage of a student or from the 
stage of a householder or from that of a forest-dweller. 
Whether one has or has not completed the injunctions, \·rhether 
he is a student or not, even if he has not completed the 
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sacrificial rites, on \'That ever day he has the spirit of 
renunciation, that very day let him renounce and become a 
1 
recluse. 
The underlying idea behind the principle that every one 
must pass through all the successive stages of life seems to 
be in keeping with the psychological and sociological make-up 
of human nature. It seems quite in accord \'Tith the natural 
course of human life, as according to it the first part is 
devoteu to education; the second part to the fulfilment of 
one's duty to the society, to community e~.nd. to the \·rorld; the 
third part to the cultivation of the att!i:tude of indifference 
to the world; and the fourth or the last part to the taking 
up of smmyasa. 1•'urthermore, it is also in keeping. \·Ti th the 
practical demands of the society Hhich require that '\ole must all 
perform the normal functions appropriate to our nature for 
\mrld maintenance and its progress. If on the other hand 
every one is allowed to take up sanny5.sa "'i thout possessing the 
necessary qualifications then the ¥Thole social fa.bric Hill 
collapse and break do'\om. 
We have seen how a good deal of emphasis has been laid 
in the social aspect of the life of a householder. lrle shall 
nm·T· try to see ho'\"T the social life of the Hindus has been 
emphasised more fully through the institution of caste. As 
,.,e have already indicated in Chapter VI the social implication 
-- ··--·------------
1. •Jabala Upanisad', 4 . 
. 
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of the caste-system '\-Te shall refer to it very briefl~r here. 
The caste-system is the basis of the entire social organisa-
tion of the Hindus in India. This system on which the entire 
Hindu ethics lays considerable emphasis is adapted to the 
maintene.nce of the v!hole social organisation. It is adapted 
to the welfare of each and all. The caste-system assumes the 
unity and the interdependence of the whole society. It takes 
into account the various needs of the society and of the 
individuals who constitute it. In order to run any society 
various types of acti vj.ty are required. All kinds of activity-
intellectual, military, commercial and manpual are necessary 
for the \>Tell-being of the society. Nay, they are all equally 
valuable for the maintenance and grov~h of a healthy society. 
The "\-Thole idea seems to be that society is a functional 
organisation and for its effective maintenance and smooth 
,,,orking the division of labour is very essential. The 
institution of caste takes all these into consideration. The 
caste-duties, prescribed for people belonging to various 
classes, recognise ho"YT individuals vary in their nature and 
capacities and hmr they can best contribute their share to 
the society by performing the functions ,..,hich have been laid 
down according to their natural capacities. The function of 
the brahmins is the pursuit of knowledge. ·.rhey are the lavr-
givers of the society. They interpret dharma in cases of 
doubt. The military organisation is in the hands of the 
ksattriyas. They are the defenders of the society. Their 
. 
- 262 -
function lies in maintaining order in the society by 
suppressing the evil and the unrighteous. The vais'yas are 
required to look to the economic \-Telfare of the society. 'fhe 
~udras are required to serve those engaged in other social 
activities. 
There is no consideration whether a function is ~igh or 
low. As \·Te have already said all kinds of function are 
equally necessary and therefore all equally good for the 
solidarity of the society. The progress of society can be 
maintained \'lhen all men make their contributions from respec-
ti ve stations \·rhich they occupy in life. It is then only that 
the requirements and needs of each and all can be met and 
satisfied. Thus though all men are not equal in their natural 
endm·nnents and capacities, their contributions or services are 
equally necessary for society. 
Nr. Widgery observes: 11The social vie\'T of the ethics of 
the Hindus is found in the principles of the var~a~ramas. 
These are concerned with the main divisions of human society 
for the organization necessary for the performance of the 
diverse functions needed for its welfare •••• This division of 
labor involves specific duties to be performed by each group 
for the general \'Telfare of each and all 11 • 1 
Besides the social duties implied by the caste-system, it 
1. Alban ·G. Widgery. 'The Principles &f Hindu Ethics•, Inter-
national Journal of Ethics, Vol. XL, No. 2, January 
1930, pp. 240-241. 
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has also a deeper ethical import. These are not only equally 
necessary and equally good for the \vell-being of society but 
they are also ethically important in the sense that if per-
formed in the right spirit, in the spirit of ~edication, they 
all prepare man for the realisation of the ultimate goal of 
life. This is because what is really important for realisation 
of moksa is not the nature of \vork but the spirit in which that 
• 
\'rorlr is done. It has been rightly remarked by l'•Ir. Desai: 
==Before God the vmrk of mau \·rill ue judged by the spil'it in 
which it is done, not by the nature of the \·rork \·rhich makes no 
difference vrhatsoever. \•Tho ever acts in a spirit of dedication 
fits himself for salvation 11 • 1 
Jviadhusiidana probably vri th this end (realisation of moksa) 
. 
in view repeatedly asserts in his commentary on Chapter XVIII 
r· t 
t.l:iat every __ body not only must perfmrm the duties respective to 
his station in life but he must do them in the spirit of 
service to humanity and to the world. In his cow~entary on 
verse 16 of Chapter III2 he points out that every one must work 
to keep in motion the '\'Theel of the 'I!Torld which has been set in 
motion by the Brahman, the ~ceator Himself (Parame~vara). The 
idea is that no o~e should abstain from his duty to the world. 
He \'Tho· in this \>rorld \·rorlrs for himself and does not work to 
k~ep the \vheel of the \YOrld in motion is sinful. He is evil 
---- --··- --------
L. Nahadev Desai. 1 The Gi ta according to Gandhi 1 , Ahmedabad 
(India), 1951, p. 166. 
2. 'Gudnartha-dipika, PP· 105-106. 
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in his nature and he lives in vain. Nadhusudana goes so far 
as to say that death is preferable to such a life probably 
because in a future birth he may have the opportunity of 
practising dharma. 
1 Again commenting on verse 25 of the same chapter he 
repeats and emphasises the same idea that a wise man, a man 
vrho seeks God, must \'rork '\>li thout attachment for the vrelfare 
of the entire humanity. 
Accor~: to l;iadhu sudana all actions, including the moral 
and the religious, that ought to be dono should be done. 'rhey 
should not be neglected. He in his conunentary on verse 5 of 
Chapter XVIII2 clearly points out that the acts of sacrifice, 
charity and penance should not be abandoned. These should all 
be performed without any desire for fruit. According to him 
the performance of sacrifice (yajna), charity (dana) a_nd 
austerity (tapas) in the proper spirit leads to the purifica-
tion of mind (a_ntahkaranasuddhi) and should therefore be 
. . 
practised. 
It may not be out of place to point out here that the 
emphasis on the performance of all functions for tl1e good of 
others, as a service to mankind, is due to the metaphysical 
basis of the Hhole Hindu ethical ideal. Nadhusudana holds 
2. do do p. 458. 
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that Brahman is the sole reality and the different inrUvid.uals 
or more correctly differ·ent beings aPe only modifications of 
it. In keeping VIi th this metaphysical monism he argues that 
man must work for others as all are the same in the sense that 
the same Gocl is seated in the heart of all. It j_s this meta-
IJhysical view of the lm:l verse and of man in it that leeds to 
the ethic:s of Jove and brotherhood. Love is thus the essence 
of' all ethics· and mor·aJ.j_ty Ftnd man's duties to his fellovt-
creatlu~es follows from it. Strictly spealdng to v10rk for 
others, to keep the wheel of the world in motion, is to work 
for Gocl. It is co-operating with God. •ro serve hu.rnani ty- is 
to serve God's creation. 
According to Madhusi1dana it is only when we realise this 
truth and cultivate love for all beings that we can be freed 
from bondage, we can Pi se above the chain of bil"'ths and deaths. 
Professor Ec1gerton seems to sue;gest this when he observes: 
"Those who are completely perva.decl by the awar·eness of this 
trut:O. (oneness of all), 'Yho feel that all beings are the same 
as themselves, th~.t all as well as themselves are one with God, 
are freed from the effects of action and from re-birth" •1 'rhi s 
seems to be the only justification for the cardinal moral 
rn~inciple "Thou shall love thy neighbom" as thyself" - because 
thy neighbour is thyself. God is both in thee and thy neigh-
bour, and both are in God.. Dr. Schweitzer probably overloolcs 
1. 'The Bhagavad-Gita. •rranslated by Franldin F:dgerton, 
Harvard Oriental Ser•ies, Vol. 39, 19L~L~, p. 61. 
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this point in the Bhagavadgita when criticising the ethical 
teaching of Rarnanuja, he remarks: "The thought that love to 
God must be expressed in active love to mankind is ju.st as 
- - 1 far from him as fr·om the Bhagavad-Gi ta". 
We have discussed Madhusudana' s view about benevolence, 
the promotion of general happiness. We shall now proceed to 
consicler an important objection raised against the general 
ethical teaching of the Vedanta which Ma.dhusudana propounds. 
It is of'ten stated that the ethics of the Vedanta is 
anti-social, that it favours an anti-social a.."ld other-vrorldl;y 
ethj.cs. The duties of social life cannot be deduced from the 
ideal which the Vedanta presents. According to it the ideal 
is expressed not in. the ft!lfilment of one's social duties but 
in the negation of them. 
Dr. Schweitzer seems to make a more or less similar 
criticism. He fii•st raises a few q_uestions and then remark:s: 
"Moved by these doubts the pessimism of the Hindus and that of 
Schopenhauer refuse to alloY/ any importance to the rna terial 
and social achievements, which form the outward. ancl visible 
part of civilization. About smciety, nation, manl<:ind, the 
individual is not to trouble himself; he is only to strive to 
2 experienc~ in himself the sovereignty of spirit over matter". 
1. Albert Schweitzer. 'Inclian Thought and its Development", 
London, 1951, p. 198. 
2. Albert ·s·chweitzer. 'Civilisation and Ethics', I.onclon, 19~9, 
P• 11. 
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Professor ''/ashburn Hopkins in his book 11Ethics of India 11 
has already refuted such criticisms, and '"e shall therefore 
refer to only a fe,·T points here. 
It seems to us that in the face of '-rhat has already been 
said about the observance of obligations not only to one• s m·m 
family but to the entire creation including gods an~.manes, it 
is difficult to acc?pt the criticism that the ethics of the 
Vedanta is anti-social. There is no injunction in the entire 
Hindu e·thical code "Yihich has the slightest implication of 
being an~i-social. We have referred to varnas'rama-dharma and 
. .. 
also saamrana-dharma. in Chapter VI. F'ar from being anti-social 
or even unsocial they all advocate the ideal of service to 
humanity. 'l'he Hindu ethics is;, as we have explained above, 
based on metaphysical monism. It inculcates the principle 
of oneness of all beings. It requires us to look upon the 
whole creation as one. The Vedantic ethics thus advocates 
the principle of non-difference. Sir Siraswamy Aiyer remarks: 
11The duty (of a Hindu) is based upon a recognition of the 
sanctity of all life and especially animal life and a belief 
in the sensitiveness of animals to suffering 11 • 1 
Then again the vie'\>T that only anti- social ethics can be 
deduced from the Vedantic ideal is perhaps due to a misconcep-
tion of the position criticised. It seems a travesty of the 
'\IThole truth about the ethics of' the Vedanta. The criticism 
1. Sir Siraswamy Aiyer. 1 Evolution of Hindu lvioral Ideals 1 , 
Nadras, 1935, pp. 184-185. 
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is disproved from the fact, as has repeatedly been said, 
that the realisation of self or God \·Thich is the· ideal of the 
Vedanta is possible only b3· working for the entire being, by 
realising that all are members of the same family. In short 
one can realise the Supreme goal of one's life only by becom-
ing one vrith the Hhole stream of life. In the Bhagavadgita 
K:r~:t:a says: 11He-who sees me everywhere and sees all in me; I 
am not lost to him nor is he lost to me 11 • 1 Is'a Upanisad also 
. 
says that h:e ioiho sees all beings in hi::i m•m st:l.f ~nu. his ovm 
self in all beings, he does not feel any revulsion by reason 
2 
of such a vie'"· 
Again as ,.,e have already pointed out elsewhere 1\iadhusudana 
in his comn1entary on verse 19 of Chapter III3 clearlY says 
that one \vho \•Torks for God (Idvararthaya) attains molq;a through 
knmvledge. It is needless to repeat here that to worl{ for God 
means to vTOrk for humanity, to serve His creation. 
It is interesting to point out here that Bhart:rharil~ also 
by classifying men into four classes extols those vrho \vork 
unselfishly for others. He says: 11Those men are good men vrho 
work for the good of others \vi thout regarding themselves. 
Those men are ordinary men "rho, \oJ'hile they benefit others, do 
---·-----
1. 'The Bhagavadg1ta', Chapter VI, verse 30. 
- , 2. 1 I sa Upani~ad', 6. 
3. 'Gudhartha-dipika', p. 109. 
4. It is very difficult to give any satisfactory account of the 
personal history of Bhart:rhari. It is alleged that he \oJ"as of 
royal descent and the brother of King Vikramaditya. He is 
the replil.ted author of three Sataltas or centuries of cou'iets 
(1) S;angara sataka, a purely amatory poem, (2) Niti s'ataka, 
dealing vTi th polity and ethics' (3) Vairagya sataka' dealing 
'ofi th religious austerity. 
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not neglect their mm imterests. 'l'hose men are demons who 
destroy another's good for their own profit. v/hat shall '\·Te 
call those '\oJ"ho aimlessly destroy that vrhich is another 1 s ? 111 
As regards the criticism that the Vedantic ideal favours 
other-'\mrldliness j_t may be pointed out that 1t1hile it is true 
that. man belongs to both the worlds, the lo'\oJ"er and the higher, 
the empirical and the eternal, it is also true that the higher 
can be attained only through the lower. The empirical is the 
path'\-Tay to the eternal. Dr. i~iees rightly points out 2 that 
I 
only by performing one's work does one attain ·spiritual in-
I 
sight and liberation, not .. by running away from it. As '\·Te have 
already discussed this point at some length in Chapter VII, 
1t1e think it unnecessary to repeat the same here. 
It is true that the vedantic school of philosophy, 
' especially according to Sal!lkara, holds sa1myasa as necessary 
for the attairunent of final liberation. It is also true that 
taking sannyasa means renouncing everything and becoming a 
recluse. Dr. Radhakrishnan probably points this when he says: 
"Each imli vidual is called upon at a certain stage of his life 
to give up his '\-life and children and his caste and vrork. · The 
last part of life's road has to be walked in single file". 3 
But the '\!Thole point '\oThich \·Te \•Tant to bring out and emphasise 
1. Bhartrhari 'Nfti's'ataka 1 , verse 74 • 
. 
2. Gualterus H. Nees. 'Dharma and Society 1 , The Hague, 
Holland, 1935, p. 26. 
3. S. Hadhakri shnan. 1 The Hindu Vi e'\or of Life 1 , London, 1949, 
P• 90. 
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here is that this stage of life comes tovTards the end of 
life's journey. It occupies a very small fraction of human 
life and that also the last portion.· of it l:1ianu gives1 very 
clear indications as to Hhat part o:f life is to be::spent as 
sannayasa \•Then he says that one must enter the third stage 
vThen one becomes a grandfather, ·or one's skin begins to shm..r 
\•Trinkles or one's hair turns grey. From thi.s it is clear that 
the larger part or the major portion of life is social life, 
a life devoted to the good of mankind. 
----··--· 
1. 1Nanusmrti', Chapter VI, verse 2. 
0 
B. A comparison between Butler's and 
Madhusudana 1 s account of virtue and 
~eneral Happiness. 
Vle have discussed ~ .. 'Tadhusudana' s view concerning benevol-
ence or the promotion of general good and have also considered 
a few other points in this connection. VIe shall now pass on 
to draw up a comparison between the two thinkers in this respect.. 
Butler and M~dhusuc:."..3.n~ are both in fundamental agreement 
in emphasising the cultivation of benevolence in their• ethical 
teaching. According to both man must work. for the good of 
his fellov: creatures. In order to be able to serve others, 
Butler says, "A man 1 s heart must be formed to humanity and bene-
1 
valence". To emphasis benevolence Butler devotes two Sermons 
at th:3 Rolls Chapel 1 Upon the Love of our Neighbour'. He goes 
so f~r in his emphasis on benevolence as to appear to identify 
virtue completely with it. There are several such passages 
in Butler, some of which have already been quoted in Chapter IV, 
which produce this impression. 
For the purpose of comparison we shall refer to one or two 
passages here wherein Butler emphasises benevolence. In Sermon 
XII, he says that the principle of benevolence is an advocate 
within our breast to take care of the interests of our fellow-
2 creatures. A little later in the same Sermon he again says 
1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Sermon XII, sect. 5, 
p. 213. 
2. do do do do sect. 4, 
p. 212. 
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'.it (benevolence) is the chief, nay, the only effectual security 
of our performing the several offices of kindness we owe to our 
fellow-creatures•. 1 Thus it is clear that Butler in his ethical 
t•3aching emphasises very much the idea of v1orking fo1· the r;ood 
of others, for one's fellow-creatures. 
According to i\iadhusudana also the feeling of fellowship is 
rooted in our nature. H~ also luys much emphasis on the ideal 
of service. In fact it is a most important element of his Hhole 
mo·ral philosophy. TlLi.s ick:..1.l h<Js been Ci.!J.JhDsiscd so much that 
it ifl considered on8 of the qualifications vlhi-.:h ..:.n aspirant 
must possess in or·der to realise his ultimate goal. Among other 
things he r~1uct \lOl'k .l'o1· the welfare of others. In his corrunen-
tary on verse 25 of Chapter V llfla.dhusudana 2 points out that only 
those whose sins are vviped outt through sacrifices etc., v..rhose 
doubts are resolved (nivr:tta sarvasamsayah) through s'ravana etc., 
~ . . 
C' 
v1hose senses are restrained (san:r,.atmanah) through nididhyasana 
and who are concerned with the welfare of all beings (sarvabhut-
ahiteratah) obtain moksa (brahmanirvanamlabhante). Thus to be 
devoted to the welfare of all beings is, we can say, one of the 
conditions which must be fulfilled in order to be able to obtain 
moksa. The ideal of .service is pitched so high that i' inclu-
des the good of all. The field of love and service is not con-
fined only to men but to all living creatures. 
At various other places some of which have already been 
1. 'The Uorks of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Sermon XII, sect. 5, 
p. 213. 
2. 'Gudhartha-dipika', p. 184. 
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r.eferred to Madhusudana advocates this ideal of service to 
others. VIe must according to him live for others. At one 
1 place, as we have seen, he goes so far as to say that a man 
\Vho lives for himself and does not work for others is better 
dead. 
It may also be pointed out here that the ideal of service 
is continued even after the attainment of moksa. Even the 
• 
liberated souls work for the welfare of others (sarvabhutahit-
eratah) though in a different spirit. \"lh ile for the aspirant 
benevolence is to be practised as a matter of' duty in order 
that he may realise his ultimate ideal, in the case of the per-
fected soul who has no ideal to attain service of others becomes 
automatic and spontaneous. To serve others becomes his nature 
and to borrov1 an analogy he cannot help doing it, just as a 
sunflower cannot help pointing to the sun. Probably also the 
well-being of' others is the only concern of a realised soul. 
Because of his spiritual insight which he has attained his love 
for others is far deeper than it is in others. 
Thus it is clear that both Butler and Madhusudana emphasise 
and advocate the ideal of love and service to fellov'l-·creatures 
with the same zeal and fervour. 
There is yet another very important point of similarity 
betvll'een the two thinkers. According to both there is a comnun-
ity of interest. Society is an organic whole and the individ-
'~ ual '·s good in inextricably bound up with the good of others. N'o 
1. 'Guqhartha-d"ipika', commentary on verse 35 of Chap.ter III, 
p. 119. 
one can stand in complete isolation from the rest, no man can 
realise any end by c.:onfining himself' to himself. Butler in 
Sermon IX 'Upon the Forgivsness of Injuries' clearly says that 
mankind is a corrununity and that we all stand in a relation to 
each other. Ea.ch particular individual is obliged to promote 
the interest of society. Again in reply to an imaginary objec-
tion to his view of benevolence Butler says that our own happi-
ness in this world consists only in 1•egard to others. All the 
enjoyments of life, even the pleasures of vice, depend upon 
regards o.L 1 one kind or another to our fellow-creatures. 
That the individual good and the social good imply and in-
volve each other is illustrated more fully in Butler's theory 
of the coincidence between self-love and benevolence. Not only 
is there no clash between the individual good and the social 
good, but no one can promote his ovm real happiness without 
regard to othel~s. In fact one of Butler's important ethical 
teachings is that the true good of the individual lies in the 
good of others, which includes his ovm good also. In the very 
first Sermon Butler points out that self-love and benevolence 
are so per·fectly coincident that the greatest satisfaction to 
ourselves depend upon our having benevolence in a due degree. 
2 He cannot promote the one without the other. 
According to fviadhusudana also there is a community of 
1. 'The Vlorks of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Sermon III, sect. 8, 
pp. 71-72. 
2. do do Sermon I, sect. s, 
p. 38. 
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Though like Butler he does not specifically speak 
of self-love and benevolence and their mutual coincidence the 
idea of' the coJrununity of interest is involved in the institu-
tion of caste on which his ethical teaching is based. The 
caste- system i::; based on the very principle of the organic 
nature of society. It is, as we have seen, a functional 
organisation. It is based on the principle that the individ-
ual good and the social good are bound together. It takes 
into account the nee:Js ancl requirements of both the individual 
and the society. The f'ull demands of an individual can be 
met and satisfied only when all do their appointed tasks. 
Caste-system thus caters for· the needs of each and all members 
constituting the society. 
We have shmm the points of similarity between the two 
thinkers. But there is, however, a point of difference also 
which it is necessary to point out here. It may seem at first 
sight that there is little or no difference between Butler and 
l\k9.dhusud.ana on the point of the place of benevolence in moral 
life. For there is such great emphasis in Madhusudana on 
service to other•s and as we have already explained Butler makes 
benevolence one of the virtues. But if we think about the 
matter closely we shall see that there is a real difference on 
this point. \"lhile Butler is not utilitarian in the ~sense of 
taking conse4.uences as the only motive of action, he still 
gives some consj.deration to conse4.uences. His ideas of self-
love and benevolence as ideals of virtue confirm this. But 
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in Me:1dhusudana conse4.uences do not enter into the ideal of: 
rightness. Service to the universe according to l'viadhusudana 
should be regarded not from any motive other than the categor-
ical imperative. In point of fact however there is very 
little difference between the two thinkers with regard to bene-
volent acts. In Madhusudana almost the whole 1 ife of man is 
to be dedicated to the service of the world. Butler also 
emphasises benevolence very much. The difference is very 
subtle and is a matter~ of emphasis on the attitude and does not 
involve any practical difference. But still on the point of 
ethical thought the difference may be noted. 
Chapter IX. 
Duty for Duty's Sake in I~dhusudana. 
In this chapter we shall discuss in some detail Madhusu-
dana 1 s view that all acts at•e to be done as duty. According 
to him \vhen all the functions of life are performed in the 
spirit of duty, without any thought of their fruits or conse-
quences, the ultimate goal of life can eventually be attained. 
But before v!e actually begin v:i th the discuss ion. of the theory 
of duty for duty's sake we would like to point out how it is 
a later development of the Vedic conception of duty. 
\'le have seen that during the Vedic age the performance of 
dharma which included rituals and sacrifices was prompted by a 
desire for rewards in this world and in the next. The perfor-
mance of sacrifices was meant to please the deities either to 
win some favour or avert some evil. Thus it is the hope of 
getting earthly rewards or the attainment of' heaven (svarga) 
that lies mainly at the back of all ethical activity clul"'ing this 
period. 
It may be useful to t--efer to the tVJo schools of Purvamim-
amsa here in which the Vedic conception of' duty has been 
f'u1•ther analysed. In the Bhatta school of Purvamimamsa there 
is an emphasis on external observances. According to this 
school virtue or dharma consists in the performance of ceremon-
ials and sacrificial acts enjoined in the Vedas. These cere-
menial acts are authoritative only as being prescribed by the 
Vedas. Kumarila Bhatta, the founder of this school, held 
•D 
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that since the ceremonial and sacrificial acts are prescribed 
by the Vedas, they must also conduce to the agent's good and 
happiness. It must lead to the attainment of heaven or the 
enjoyment of unalloyed happiness. In short according to 
Kumarilla the final justification of the performance of Vedic 
sacrifices lies in the satisfaction of man's needs and the 
production of' his happiness. Thus according to this school 
also as professor D:l.sgupta says: "The sacrifices •nere, no doubt, 
performed out of regard for the law of Vedic comuands; but 
that represented only the psychological side of' the question. 
The external ground for the performance of Vedic sacrifices 
·was that it produced happiness for the performer and satisfied 
hj.s desires by securing for him the objects of desire". 1 
But there was a change in this conception in the other 
school, the PrabhiiGara school of Purv~nlin~sa. According to 
the Prabhakaras the authority of the Vedas is der:ived not from 
their conduciveness to any ulterior end or consequence to be 
inf'ert•ed from their being scripturally enjoined, as we find in 
the Bhattas, but from t!1eir intrinsic validity. 
••• 
It is not 
imperative that the right should produce a desirable result • 
. lt is right in itself. 
Thus in the post-Vedic ethical thought there is more and 
more emphasis on the inner spirit, inner will, than on the 
outer or external consequences. During this period there is 
1. Suranclranath Dasgupta. 'A History of Indian Philosophy', 
Vol. II, Cambridge, 1932, p. 485. 
- 279 -
a gradual tendency tovJards the performance of duty for duty's 
saJce. 
The clearest ann most emphatic expression of this theory 
(duty for duty's sake) is found in the Bhagavadgita. Its 
author has very eloquently p1•eached th~s doctrine. Dr. Schwe i-
tzer rightly remarks: 11Kant is not the first to lay down the 
doctrine of the Categorical Imper~tive. It had already been 
preached by ~rishna in the words 1 'l"'hw interest shall only be 
1 directed to the deed, never to the fruits thereof'. 11 
The view that the Bhagavadgita advocates the principle of 
duty for duty's sake may be seen from the general trend of the 
book itself. 
Vlhen Arjuna comes to the centre of the two ar-mies and when 
he looks at the kinsmen against whom he is expected to fight, 
he is overpowered by the thought of the dire consequences that 
would follow from the fratricidal war. He therefore refuses 
to fight. Krsna then in order to disabuse Arjuna's mind of 
. ... 
the wrong notions which caused despondency in him begins his 
philosophical dissertation which is embodied in the Bhagavad-
gita. The dissertation takes the form of' a dialogue between 
Krsna and Arjuna and takes place in the very battle-field 
1 '-
where both armies were drawn out in battle-array. The attempt 
continues from verse 11 of Chapter II to verse 72 of Chapter 
XVIII. In verse 73 of Chapter 1.'VIII Arjuna is persuaded to 
1.. Albert Schweitz.er. 'Indian Thought and its Development', 
London:i 1951, p. 188. 
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fi6ht. The main point of Krsna 1 s advice i::; that Arjuna was 
~~ ~ 
a ksattriya anc1 as a ksattriya it was his duty to fight for 
• • 
righteousness. This shows that the main aim of the author 
of the Bhagavadgita is to inculcate the doctrine that one 
must do the acts which one is I'equ ired to do according to one's 
position in society from a sense of duty without thinking of 
the consequences. 
In keeping VJith the general spirit of the Upanisads and 
the BhagavadgTti, Madhusudana lays eraphasis on the inner spirit, 
inner· vlill. 'l'here is no vil·tue in the performance of actions 
for the sake of enjoying their fruits. He advocates the view 
that all works must be dona without attachment to the fruits of 
action. \'le must perform the various duties of our life disin-
tere stedly, without any desire for their external fruits. JIJ'an 
must dedicate all acts and their results to God. He must make 
every act an offer of devotion and love. In short, man must 
perform all his functions solely from a puT·e sense of duty 
leaving their conseLlUences to God. 
rvradhusudana develops this theory at various places in his 
commentary. We shall refer to a few of them here. In his 
- 1 . comm~ntary on verse 47 of Chapter II M.adhusudana emphat1cally 
declares that man's concern is with actions only and never with 
their fruits. In the performance of his duties he should not 
be prompted by any thought of the enjoyment of the fruits of 
1. 'Gudhartha-dipii~, pp. 77-78. 
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actions. They are miserable creatures who work for results. 
A man should not v1ol"'l;: even for· the sake of' enjoying heavenly 
hl iss etc • This does not however mean that he should take to 
. inaction and thus desist from all work. It does not mean 
r-enunciation of' actions but renunciation of' the fruits of' 
actions. In other words it rneans that the fruits of actions 
should never be made the gu icling principle in 1 ife and all v1ork 
should be done nithout attachment to the result. Thld difference 
between the ignorant anc.l the wise 1 ies in this that v1h ile the 
fo:r·mer acts from at tachr!!ent, the latter wi thou.t any attachment. 
The: 1:dse 01· enlightened thus having given up all attachment per-
fo1·ms Dll his functions as duty. 
Then again in his comr.1entary on verse 19 of Chapter III 
- 1 1'-.!Ti.u.lhusudana repeats the same idea namely the dis interested 
perfor·mance of all duties. He argues thc..t man must always 
v1ork without any regard for the fruit of' his action. To use 
his ovm terminology one must be 'asaktcl' (detached) and 1phala-
lc'Dmnar·ahita1 (free from the desire for fruits) and thus pcn·form 
sacrifices and offer gifts in accordance with the r·ules as laid 
,,_ 
down in the sastr·as. He holds that such acts not only do not 
bind the soul in the sense in which selfish acts do but it is 
the performance of such nisvartha-lcarmas or selfless actions 
which lead. to moksa through pure knowledge. 
• .2 
I•,!adhusudana refers to this again in Chapter XVII, verse II 
____ ,_.,_~_, __ , __ 
1. • Gudhartha-dipika' , p. 109. 
2. do do p. 4.43. 
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\"/here he says that thot sacrifice is sattvika which is offel'ed 
vJith [JUre heart (pu:ce motive) vfithout any hOi)6 of reward and 
solely from a sense of duty. 
The passages referred to above a1·e only a few examples. 
But ther·e are various other such paseages v1here i'!iadhusudana 
a(Jvocates the performance of all actions aE: duties. 
It may be useful to point out her·e thc.t Yudhisthira1 , the 
., 
embodiment of dharma or· righteousnes~; also ~::;eems to preach the 
same doctrine of duty for duty's sake. ·~'Then addressing his 
(.1ueen he says: "I f'ollovl dharma not with an eye for any immeU.-
iate r~eward or profit but because it is dharma, it is my duty 
to do so. '}hether there is any l'eward or not I do as a matter 
of duty whatever must be performed by a householder. I follow 
dharma because I am convinced. that virtue is to be follov1ed for 
its O'rm sake. He v1ho practices dh~trma for its rev1ard is con-
temptible among those who talk of dharma". 2 
It may be stated· here that !v1a.dhusu&·ma emphasises the 
renunciation of all desires for the fruits of action, and per-
formance of all duty for its own sake, because it is then alone 
that man can prepare himself for divine grace and salvation. 
Vlhen he performs ~1 his functions with the pure motiye of' duty, 
without any thought of consequences, without any hope of re\yard, 
he can attain stability o~ the mind ~nd purity of the heart. 
2.. • Mahabharata t, Vana-Parva, 31, 2-5. 
·f·. The eldest of' the Pa:t:J-,9-ava brothers who is regarded as an 
embodiment of dharma or righteousness for· his devotion to 
truth. 
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A man of pure hcal't alone is capable of understanding the 
Scriptures and pr·actis ing the higher spiritual disciplines 
namely the love of God an( surrender to His vlill. On the other 
hand if man v1or•ks fo1· the sake of enjoying the fruits of his 
actions there can be no stability of mind and pur-ity of heart 
as there is no end to such a process. Before one desire or 
fruit has been completely achieved and enjoyed there will appear 
another desire and so on ad infinitum. The rc is no end to the 
process of hankerings and desires. Thus so long as one is 
haunted by the thought of the cons e~..1uences, by hanke1·ings and 
desir·es for resultsJ one cannot hope to gain peace and stability. 
Therefore the aspirant must discard all thought of the consequ-
ences and thus be tot·mented by them no longer. Probably this 
is why Madhusudana argues that all work should be done in accord:-
.,_ -
ance with the injunctions of the sastPas in a pure spirit of 
duty, leaving all results and conse4.uences to God to whom the 
initiation of all the world~y happenings really belongs. Works 
clone in this spirit are really no works, and prepare man for 
divine erace and salvation. Spil"'itualised activities do not 
mean merely ·~he performance of one 1 s normal duties of 1 if'e but 
performing them with a different attitude. In other words the 
significance of these activities does not consist merely in 
doing them for the continuance of' the pilgrimage of' life but in 
doinr; them from a sense of duty, without expecting the enjoyment 
of the results ther·eof. Dr. Sch"·~eitzer rightly observes: "Tpe 
ultimate question man has to ask himself is whether the work he 
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resolves on comes to him as a task which must be fulfilled, 
and whether he accomplishes it in purest self-devotion to God. 
If' he possesses this certainty, then he is f'ree from any kind 
of guilt, even when he kills".1 
It may be useful for further clarification to L!UOte 
Professor Car"'!~ itt's remarks with reference to Bradley's 
criticism of Kant's account of morality. "He (BracUey) criti-
cizes the Kantian account of morality", writes Professor 
CarTitt, "as fulfilling om· obligations simply because they 
are our obligations, on two main g1·ounds, both 1'ound also in 
Hegel: 
1. That it is purely 1 for·mal', since it gives no hint, what our 
obligations a1·e, and would fit the most fantastic opinion as 
v1ell as any other. 
2. That to fulfil all our obligations simply because they are 
our obligations is an unrealizable ideal, or at least one whose 
realization does not depend v1holly upon us, and that therefore 
it always leaves us unsatisfied and self-reproachful". 
Professor CarTitt then proceeds to say that these critic-
isms which Bradley brings against Kant are applicable to his 
own theory which he advocates in his essay on 'My station and 
its duties'. He says: 
(1) "It either does not tell me what the duties of my station 
are or it tells me falsely that they are exactly what all or 
most l~espectable persons think them to be, and so makes all 
--------
I. Albert Schweitzer. 'Indian Thought and its Development'. 
London, 1951, p. 189. 
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that is un9opular wicked. 
(2) No man ~·tou.ld claim that he had perfectly fulfilled all the 
duties of his station any more than that he ho.d fulfilled all 
his duties. In fact the two statements are identical. But 
a man may sometimes be satisfied that he has fulfilled an obli-
gation, and even that he did so because it was an obligation". 
Having made these above mentioned critic isms Professor 
Carritt further observes: "'rhe difficulties which Bradley finds 
with the formula 'Duty f'or Duty's Sake 1 , and which, as Vie have 
seen, he ought to find with his own formula, really point to a 
view different from both. 'Duty for Duty's Sake' is a culpably 
i'ormal formula if' it means that our duty is to act from a good 
motive, f'or then Vv'hatever we did in a cel~tain frame of mind would 
fulfil our obligation, and the answer to the question, 'What, in 
this situation, ought I to do ? 1 would be 'Anything, provided 
our motive is good 1 • And, on the same interpretation, it would 
be a formula impossible to comply with, since our motives a1·e 
1 
not wholly Ol' directly in our pow·er". 
These criticisms, which Bradley brings ag9.inst KaJ•s 
account of morality and vthich Professor Carritt restates in 
his ovm way, do not apply to Madhusudana 1 s theory of dut;y for 
duty's salce. His theory of duty for duty's sake is not a mere 
formal forllUlla, it cannot be saicl to be a mere form without any 
content. According to his scheme of moral life, as we have 
1. E.F. Garritt. 'Morals and Politics 1 , Oxford, 1935, 
pp. 142-143. (Note) 
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discussed in some detail in Chapter VI, the duties of all the 
four classes of' men and also the duties of all the four stages 
of life have been S!Jecifically laid down in the Scriptures and 
other authoritative works based on them, in accordance with the 
natural capacities and individual development of men. The 
(1uestion of passing from the form to particular concrete duties 
does not arise so much in the case of Madhusudana 1 s theory. 
Accor·ding to him everybody is required to do the duties of' the 
st<..=ttion which he occupies in 1 ife; the duties, as vve have just 
down 
said, vihich have already been laid/according to the natural 
endowment of men. Thus one is not left in doubt as to what one 
should do. Therefore in moral life one has to cultivate the 
right temperament and spirit in which •.-Jhat has to be done - the 
specified duty --- r -- is to be done. There is thus no occasion 
for 1 doing anything provided the motive is good'. The only 
point is, as we have already said, that eve1•ybody must perform 
hj_s normal function in a pr·opei· spirit, by which is meant that 
he must not be led away by the thought of the consequences of 
actions, by the idea of the enjoyment of the fruits thereof. 
In shoPt, he must work under the notion that it is his duty and 
he must therefore do it. Dr. Schweitzer Jnakes an observation 
which supports our view. He says: 11\vhilst vrith Kant the cont-
ent of absolute duty remains obscure, Krishna states it with 
exactitude. He defines it as the totality of obligations which 
naturally belong to a man's stat_ion in life 11 • 1 
1. Albert Schweitzer. 'Indian ThouEZht and its Development', 
London, 195!. p. 188. 
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V'/e have discussed 11adhusudana 1 s theory of duty for duty's 
sake and in this connection we havE! ;.! lso I"eferred to some allied 
problems. We shall nov! consider some objections that have been 
raised against this theory of the Bhagavadgita which as we have 
seen Uadhusudana accepts and elaborates. 
Professor McKenzie remarks: "An act and its consequences 
cannot be isolated fl'OJn each other, nor can it be judged apart 
from them.. The value of the ethical teaching of the Bhagavad-
gita i::: impaired by fa.ilu:::·e to recognize this, at any rate 
explicitly; and the injunction to perform works without attach-
ment to their fruits amounts to a denial of the value of all 
actE: performed ·with purpose - a position which it is of course 
impossible to maintain consistently".1 
There are two main points in this criticism. (1) An act 
a."1d its consequences cannot be isolated from each other nor can 
an act be judged apart from them. ThiEl point is riot recognized 
qN -- () in the Bhagwadgi ta. 2 The injunction to perform works with-
out attachment to their ft·uits amow1ts to a denial of the 
value of all acts performed with purpose. We shall discuss 
these points separately. 
It does not seem to us very clear \ovhat is meant by the 
statement 'an act and its consequences cannot be isolated from 
each other'. It seems that the statement is intended to mean 
simply that every act is followed by its natural and inevitable 
consequences. If it means this, as it must, then it is dif'f'i-
I. John McKenzie. 'Hindu Ethics•, Oxford, 1922, pp. 135-136. 
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cult to say that the author of the Bhagavadgita does not recog-
nise this point. That the Bhaguvadgi ta I'ecognises the necess-
ary and inseparable relation between an act and its consequences 
is conclusively proved from the f'act that its whole ethical and 
1 
moral teaching is based on the doctrine of karma and 'as you 
sov1, so you reap' is its main dictum. 
What the Bhagavadgita teaches is not that an action will 
not produce its results but that the enjoyment of' these results 
should not be the motive of the actions. li'ar from ignoring 
the natural connection between actions a:ud c.;unse(-IUences, the 
Bhagavadgita 1 s whole moral teaching is based on the perception 
of this fact. Because there is no possibility of escaping 
f1•uits of action it is time and again said that one should 
gradually withdraw one 1 s mind from them and concentrate more 
on the action itself. The consequences when thus naturally 
follow do not affect the inner detachment of the man who has 
already given up desire for· them. This detachment cannot be 
achieved if desire for its fruits is not r-enounced. Thus the 
teaching of the Bhagavadgita ancl that of Madhusuda.na ar·e not 
based on the non-recognition of the inseparable connection 
betVleen act ion and its r·esult. On the contrary the teaching 
is VJhat it is because this is never lost sight of. 
There is another point which may be submitted in this 
connection. Not to have the desire for fruits does not mean 
1. For detailed discussion please- refer to Chapter VI. 
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not to seelc any value. On the contrary moksa or sph•itual 
• 
liberation is the ultimate value towards which all activities 
of life are to be directed. But moksa is not the fruit of 
• 
action because by the latter pht•ase are always meant particular 
results which come to an and through enjoyment and are exhaus-
ted through experience. MokfiW being in essence the same as 
the fr·eedom of the self is not something exhaustible and perish-
of' 
able. Thus in the context /the ethical thought of IVIadhusudana 
it is supremely necessary to make the all important distinction 
between moksa as an end and all other desirable consequences of' 
t 
actions, that is to say, earthly and heavenly enjoyments. 
that 
It may not be out of place to mention here/Hindu thinkers 
speak of three lcinds of activity. They are (1) mental (manas-
ika), (2) verbal (vachika) and (3) physical (kayil<a). It is 
not only that we act physically but we also act mentally- we 
act not only with our body but also with our thought. Some-
times a mental act is considered more vicious than a rash phys-
ical act. Consequently in any ethical evaluation of a man's 
conduct it is difficult to ignore and leave out of account the 
inner· nature of man which is the spring of all activities. 
Indian ethical thought cons ider·s the inner nature. of man more 
important than the outward consequences and consequently lays 
considerable emphasis on the former. This also seems to be 
one of the l'easons for t.he criticism that the Bhagavadgita does 
not recognise the fact that an act and its consequences cannot 
be isolated from each other. 
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In regal'd to thG s cconc~ ... 10 int in the critic ism that the 
Bhagavadgita denies any value ·::.:.> qcts performed with purpose, 
it mo.y b2 pointed out th~!t t.h ir. is the main tGaching of the 
aut.hor of the book. He repeatedly argues that man must not 
perform any act vii th a view to fulfilling any purpose if by 
that is meant thu SL'..tisfaction of personal des ires and motives. 
This is the fundamental teaching of tho Bhagavadgita • 
But perhaps what Professor McKenzie means to say here is 
that if all acts are to be performed without purpose then the 
normal activities of life becomes valueless and as such it 
,/ 
becoriles difficult to maintain consistently the doctrine of 
performing all works without purpose. In reply it may be 
submitted that the no:rmal functions of life do not become value-
less if done without purpose. On thG contrary they become 
more meaningful and significant than when done with purpose. 
The point to be borne in mind here is that the principle of 
pe~"'forming works without purpose does not mean renouncing works, 
not does it mean their disparagement. Far from it. It means 
performing all the functions of ordinary normal life but perfor-
ming them in a different spirit and not with a view to realising 
any purpose or• end. 
The whole idea seems to be that a duty should be done 
regardless of its result. It should be done because it ought 
to be done. This principle is applied and extended to social 
vtork as well. ~reither the private nor the public end should 
be made the sole motive for doing an action. A man must 
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perform his action because it ought to be done. 
We shall explain this uoint with an example. Let us 
to:1..1<e the example of the education of a child. There can be 
as far as we can see three possible motives on the part, let 
us say, of the father behind his child's education. First, 
his natural inclination. It is the natural wish of every 
fathel' to give as good an education as he can to his child. 
Secondly the father may desire to educate.hio child in the 
hope that it will support him in his old age. Here the pre-
dominant idea behind the child's education is the satisfaction 
of a purpose or end. It is done with a view to getting supp-
ort in the old age. It may be pointed out here that these 
two 1notives are usually combined. A father• provides education 
to his child both as a result of natural inclination and with 
a view to getting support. Over and above these two there 
may be a third motive. A father may educate his child as a 
matter of' principle, as a matter of duty. As father it is 
his duty to educate his child. It is one of his obligations 
\Jhich. he ought to discharge. The desire tho.t he will get 
support in his old age from him or her is simply irrelevant 
in this case. 
, 
&J' - -Now the author of the Bhagwadgita and also our author 
emphasise the third motive. ~o pe1·fol'ln works without pur·pos c 
r:'enns pcrf.o:::·e!.in.3 them <)S <: !:latter o:' duty and in th::: spi!·it 
of duty. 
There are probably t\·Jo i.LliJlications behind this emphasis 
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on the IJarformance of actions in a spirit of duty. The fil·st 
is that it prepa.1·es men for Peal ising the supreme goal of 1 ife, 
it creates the proper mood for God-realisation. Because it is 
only through the perfornwnce of actions in this spil'it that a 
man can get r•id of egotism and selfishness. It is only through 
such actions, as we have already pointed out above, that. the 
purification of the heart and the soul, which is the prerequi-
site for pra.ctising the higher spiritual disciplines n~nely 
the love of God and surrender to His will, can be brought about. 
'."Jork done in this spirit is a mode of worship to God. The 
aspirant offers all his actions and their r•esults to God. The 
second implication seems to be that if an action is done from 
the principle of duty f'or duty's sake there is no occasion, no 
chance for shirking on the part of an individual from the perfor-
mance of his duties. 1':hereas if inclinations and desires or 
satisfaction of personal ends be made the motive for the per-
formance of an action then there is ample scope on the part of 
the doer to evade his duties especially when his inclinations 
gr·ov1 weak or when he finds that there is no chance of satisfy-
ing the personal end. Thus the whole teaching of our author 
is that all works should be performed as a matter of duty. 
There Bhould be no impelling force other than the regard for 
the inner law of duty. 
It may also be stated here that while there is a conflict 
between doing duty for the sake of duty and being moved to act 
for the sake of fulfilling of personal desii•es, there is no 
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conflict between carryine out one's duty as duty and doing it 
fo1· the sake of love. Obviously 'love' in this context changes 
its meaning. In the example we have given if' the father wishes 
to educate the child because he loves it and not because he 
feels it to be his duty, he may not do anything for the educa-
tion of' the child if his love dries up. Here his sentiment and 
morality are not reconciled. On the other hand the father may 
have a clear sense of duty as father to educate the child and 
also have over-pov1ering love for it. His sense of duty would 
p1·evail even if his love did not. Thus if thr~ fo.t.he r felt the 
duty to educate his child as father, it need not necessarily 
cancel his love. 
It may also be pointed out here that when the Karma:-:-y.ogi 
(one who follows the path of action) is advised by ~adhusudana 
to give up desires but not actions, the underlying principle 
is love of God. i'Vhen desires as ·· J motives of actions are 
cY"-C. 
absent it is the love of God which moves" to activity. 'fhe 
devotee wishes to fulfil God's wUl in the world which, in the 
context of' the Bhagavadgita, is the maintenance of the cosmic 
order. This task involves fulfilling what are considered 
man's duties towards man. Thus the love of God finds express-
ion in doing one's duty towarc:ls one's fellow-beings, though 
in the context of the Bhagavadgita it is to be done eventually 
not J'l'lrely as duty but also worship of God and as a means to 
doing His will. Therefore in the ethics of the Bhagavadgita 
there is no conflict between love and duty. Love of God 
? 
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becomes love of men. Actually vJhat ha.;.Jpens in such a case is 
that servics is done as duty but love also is f'elt for those 
who are served. 
But another objt!ct ion might still be 1·a is ed here if r~~adhu­
sudana holds tha.t we ~:n·e concePned with actions only and not 
\'lith their l'esults, if' v;e are asked to pe1·form all our actions 
vrithout l'egard to their consequences, how can we then according 
to him meet those cases regarding which there is no specific 
injunction, or those situations in which there is a conflict of 
duties ? Madhusudana cannot deny that. situations arise in the 
li£'0. of almost every individual at one stage or another when it 
becomes difficult to decide what to do and what not to do. Let 
us tako Mr·. Toul.rnin' s example1 for illust.1·at ion. That I prom is-
ed to let Jones have his book back will seem to me reason for 
taking it ·to him in time - if that is all that tbere is to it. 
But, if I have a critically ill relative in the house (my 
grandmother), who cannot be left, the issue becomes complicated. 
Now the question which confronts us is, what should I do under 
such circumstances ? Should I keep my promise and go out leg.v-
ing the ailing relative unattended and thus risking her life or 
should I remain with her ?. 
In a situation like this, somet:i.mes, if not always, the 
dharmas which Madhadsudana preaches are not of much avail in 
the sense that they do not give any specific jnjunction, any 
1. S.E. Toulmin. 1The Place of Reason in Ethics', Cambridge, 
1953' p. 147. 
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direct indication what to do and v1hat not to do. There is no 
doubt that there are varJtas'rama- dharmas and also sadharna- dhar-
mas. But despite all these it is not difficult to imagine 
cases, like the one we have just mentioned, in which it becomes 
dif'f'icult to take any particular course of action. Thus though 
Madhusudana 1 s theory of duty for duty's sake is better eLluipped 
in the sense thc.tt it provides for many situations of life, it 
nonetheless suffers to some extent from the same defect as Kant's 
theory of duty for duty's sake. 
What has· been said above should not be understood to mean 
that the ancient Hindu sages clid not anticipate such situations, 
such specific instances, in which there might be no moral guide 
1 
at all. Manu clearly anticipates such situations. According 
to him besides the Vedas, the Smrtis, and the practice of' the 
& 
virtuous, if one still has no moral guide in a specific instance, 
ens 1 s last resort, when in doubt, is the approval of one 1 s en-
liehtened conscience. In the absence of any other guide consc-
ience has supreme authority in matters of conduct. No one 
should stifle its voice in o1·der to conform to external codes. 
It may well be taken as the voice of God within us. This com-
pares very well with Butler's conscience v1hich is the final 
arbiter in matters of conduct and which is the voice of God. 
But it seems to us that it is not enough to say as Manu 
does that in doubtful cases our conscience is the last resort. 
1. 1 1\~nusmrti', Chapter II, verses6, 12. 
'" 
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In such doubtful cases and conflicting situations where dii'f'el'-
ent sets of facts d1l'ive us in opposite direc·tions, it must take 
into account the situation, the ci:::,cumstances, the probable 
conse,.uences and such other factors before deciding upon a 
particular course of conduct. Thus though it is a disputed 
point among the writers on ethics whether or not the rightness 
of an act i.- dEftermined solely by conseq_uences, it seems true 
that it is determined at least partly by these. 
Idadhusudana and other Indian thinkers probably feared, 
pc:;:haps they also believed, that if private individual judgment 
be ma.de the crite1··ion of rightness and if private interest be 
allov1ed free scope, then these ,.,ould lead to lawlessness and 
ultimately to the disruption of the whole society. They 
ther·efore tried to base morality on a more stable foundation 
namely- the principle of duty for duty's sal{e. But in this they 
seem to have gone so far as to lay the \"Jhole emphasis on the 
inncl"' nature of man. 
Two points may be submitted ·in this connection. First in 
Madhu~uc1ana the entire emphasis is on the realisation of the 
Supreme end of 1 ife, namely God. Secondly the notion of duty 
has not been very critically analysed and systematically worked 
as it has been in the West. There are important reasons for 
this lack of speculative ethical thought. The first reason 
seems to be that duties as given in the Scriptures are accepted. 
The reasons for this acceptance are (1) belief in super-human 
knowledge revealing the fundamental truths of the existence of 
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life, (6.) the correspondence between duties as given in the 
Scriptures and VJhat ar-e seen to be the proper functions of 
man in accordance with his nature. 
The second reason for lack of cr~itical speculative ethical 
thought seems to be the interest of the ancient Hindu th inlcers 
in metaphysics • They wer·e probably too much occupied with 
metaphysical problems. The pr·oblems 1 ike 'the nature of the 
ultimate Reality', 'bondage and liberation' etc. had taken 
possession of their minds. Since a particular- attitude of 
mind is conducive tot he attainment of moksa, they have every-
where a.a id dovm considerable emphasis on the development of 
such a mental attitude. The fact that the Hinclu thinkers were 
mainly occupied voJith metaphysical problems sometimes gives rise 
to the impression that there is no ethics in Indian literature. 
Even a gr(~at thinker and eminent Sanskrit scholar like Professor 
Max lVrUller l'emarks: "as a popular philosophy the Vedanta would 
have its dangers, that it v1ould fail to call out and strengthen 
the manly qualities required for the practical side of life, 
and that it might raise the human mind to a height from which 
the most essential values of social and political life might 
1 dwindle away into mere phantoms". 
But there is yet another very important reason why there 
is lack of critical speculative thought which Professor IJfax 
•• lVI:uller and other such thinkers probably overlook. The fact 
is that the value of moral action is recognised by the ancient 
1. li'. Max Muller. 'Six Systems of Indian Philosophy', Ne'.'l York, 
1899, p. 253. 
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Hindu th inl{ers. ~thical and 1noral discipline is necessarily 
implied in the metaphysical speculations. They cons ide1• mol·al 
discipline as o necessary step in the progress tovv'ards spiritual 
freedom. JCa~ha Upanif?t&d says that self- knovJladgc is denied 
to him 'v;ho has not ceased :t'rom bad conduct, who is not tranquil 
1 
and composed and whose mind is not at peace' • Thus certain 
ethical disciplines are p1·esupposed by all students of meta-
physics. Morality is a necessary condition for mok9a because 
the moral life is asswned as a 1Jrerequisite for em1uii·y into 
the no.tu:.:'e of Brahman, the ancient Hindu sages do not elaboPate 
on ethical problems. But because they consider moral discip- · 
line as a necessary step to spiritual freedom, a.nd probably in 
consequence did not think it necessary to critically analyse 
ethical notions it may be wrong to conclude that there is not 
any ethics in Hindu ;philosophical literature. 
\"Je hav":: dis·cussed the theory of duty for duty• s sake. It 
presents a lofty ideal. Duty for duty's sal-ce is a categorical 
imperative. It is unconditional in the sense that there is 
no higher authority on which it is dependent and by which it 
can be set aside. Those v1ho adhere to this view regard moral-
ity as an end in itself. If it is asked, 'Why should I do my 
duty ? 1 their only answer is, 1 because it is your duty'. 
But in spite of the high ideal of the theory of duty for 
duty's sake, Madhusudana, as we have already pointed out in 
Chapter VII, does not regard it as self-sufficient and self-
1. 'Katha Upani~ad', 1. 2. 24. 
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cxplana tory. Hindu ethical philosophy in 3eneral is not 
satisfied by the thought, 
'Their 1 s not to reason why, 
Their's but to do~ die'; 
It holds that there can be no voluntary activity vlithout some 
soi•t of' motive. Ther·e must be some desire behind every w-ill. 
Consistently with this general spirit our ;:mthor advocates the 
P2l'f'Ol'mance of both motiveless and 1.10tivated action. It is 
::Iotivelcss in the sense that one should not have different 
::wtivcs fo1·· diffel'ent activities. It is motivated in the sense 
th.:d:, om; should have one and the same motive for all activities, 
namely the realisation of God. Accor·ding to Madhusudana mo1·a1-
ity is only a means to the realisation of molcsa. It leads to 
the purification of mind (cittasuddhi) vmich is a necessary 
requisite to the o.ttainment of knov1ledge which leads to mok~a. 
Morality thus prepares man for his spiritual journey in and 
through purification of' mind and is valuable as leading to it. 
·:ihen the mind is pur•ified, freed fl"'Om all impurities, man can 
move on the spiritual plane and ultimately realise !JlOk~a thr·out;h 
knov1ledge. Morality according to l'II'Iadhusudana is thus not an 
end in itself' but a means to the realisation of the Supreme end 
of' life. 
~-::e have shovr.1 tho.t according to Madhusudana morality leads 
to the pm.'ification of mind or cittasuddhi. It may be said 
here, vJho. t happens after purification of mind ? I-Imv about 
morality after that" ? Madhusudana's view in regaPd to these 
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questions is contG incd i~1 h:is conr.!cmt;;r::y on verse.:: 56 and 63 
1 
of C.'1-.._ptet• XVIII. E12 says (.h.:.:tt a b:.·ahmin rJhose uind is pul'i-
::·:i.ed Dll~ \'Jho is devoted to God r:1ay take sannyasa o::.' renounce 
t.h:: ·io::ld u:::'t~i.' t.h.:::t, bcc.::mse he ic c:n~itlc.d to do so by vil·tue 
O.L _ _,. i_·11'~=: -l)='_,_.l1-.' ::! b-.L·-•:=t_l_·'!ll1l·n, 01• "'!"" ··1av 11o·t. ;- ... '·e ...,...,-L1D'T--;:;sa ,,,,~-. ·ne ''1.11 
_ _ ~ _ • , _,,_.I vun. C"~' • uv'-' -' .:,..:.v • ·-
But u :csattriva OP 
• y 
:.:.o 
,_ 
·t11C so.st,r·::.1.s eve11 aftCI' 
I-Ic '::ill ::!ii1<:::nc ij_)&t ion ult im-
HG believed 
that Br·ahuo.n c~n bs c.tt;.;:incd. th:.·ou~.h loviu; devotion to Him. 
r!ot only ::.::..j he believ·:: in this' hs hiw::elf ..?ollo\·ted t:'le l,J:::th 
of bha:-:ti in spite of' his bcinz a non-dualist in philoso.:,Jhy. 
Pl·of'essor Da.sgupta 2·eferring to this point in Ea_dhusudana 
r·ema::.-·Jcs: "It is hOi.'l3V2 r, int~~1·est ing to note that, though he 
\'las such <J coai:'ir-:n:;d ;·,10nist in 11is pbiloso.!.;hy, he \Jas a theist 
j.n his l'r.?lieion <:md followed 
is ev~dcnced by his nu::-n·:: L'OUS 
1"\. • • ·J 1 
u;:·. L3h2.dev;.i.n n -SO : :;_~ int<.:."'. in a s iElilar view about 
----- ---· ------------------------- ---- ---·- ------
1. • Guclh~~:·t~l~- dipika' , so4- sos &: sos. 
2. ~~urendl·-.=tnD th D.: s;~upta. 'A Histo:::·y of Indic:n Phi los op!1y 1 , 
\1 1 II c·· , . ~ 1°'-' 2 ,.,..,6 0 • - ' ... ; 1 !!l~) .. ! . "'J.age' .-.. Jo.) ' p. r..J'- • 
''• 'I'.r.:.P. l.'~;;·l'::.adevr:n. 'l'hc Philosoplly o:;: .""dvaito.', London, 1938, 
1). ?.52 
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1 ib~1·.::.1 i11 the r.1<-~ttc1· o~' ~he methor1, he \:as unco;:l:·:.·oJilis in~ 
•. •• 1''"\ 
\J v 
e:· itc:l vlith the expe1·ience of .:1 bhai;:te. r:w:t be ~iven. 
"I'hou=;h \rc ha.ve slready briefly refePrecl to th2 stat2 of' 
-.. '.ol.·:_.c_~"'- ·· .. '' .. --_;1_= -.-.;v.:n. -.,1 ;-,-,J.1·or'hlr'+-;o,~ -;-o '·l1·· p·'·h.;C'·ll ·'·-.-,ch;,, .• or'"' 1,;,.), ............. .L __ ......... _.., ... t.,., _ _ ~.,.. _ _,....,_ .... v lJ . ......, -V:. ... ..I- c. l ..... t."' .. - ..... 1 ... ...::. 
L:a,lhusuC:u.n& in Cnc:,pter VI, it :·::c.y be useful eve!"!. at th~ ccst 
~-:_etc.:. ir: tb::: st~: t : in r:l1 ich the in:::~vi(_~uc.l :::ises Ct bovc th2 level 
' 
ITE! b,.:;CCH:1~s j ivc.'.namul.:'Ga •. Goo6. and 
just actions flo~: sl_:so:ltcmeously :fror-! the n2.ture of the j ivun-
n--r,k+·"l·'' ... ,..,l- c~l1Ch ~r.·t1'on~ >t:•p -,1\·;a,>"<" ·:'o .. • ·'·h.:: '~·'el·"'"'"e o·P l~lal11rl'nr'l. c.;;..a_ ...... vC...-· ( ......... t- • ..... C.·.- --- U .. -· '-"' , J•· - .. l,.., ... _. ~. J..~J. ..a.. .. 1.. -
Th:: i:::· Vel'-./ e:dstence in the: ·.JO'!.'ld i::: fo:.· th>2 .suidance ::..nd 
cnli~:htcmment of hu::1anity. Thus though libere.ted men remain 
on eca·th so lon; a;:.: t.hc )hysical body continues, t.i1~.::y cn•e yet 
£'..bove it in the sence thc~t 'th2y O.l'e not bound by <:ny e<..'l_rthl~r 
Their actioE8 do not Dffect t.hcrn just 8 s the 1!1Ud Coes 
not Dl'f'ect 'i:.h~ leaves of t!1e lotus. Since ths liberated bein[ 
becor.Jes one "1ith th::~ •:_;hole, his '::ill becomes God's \'lill .:;;.nd 
his 1 il'e becomes a ,:odly 1 ife. His love c:.nd ser-vice become 
univcl'sal .::nc spontaneous. Thue according to I'hdhur.; ucmna 
'[;Ctions, vil:ich nay bs said to begin in selfid1nesG for the 
rectlisation o£' one's Pl'ivc:t.e c::nd .i_)C:::"'sonal ends, must fh·st be 
made no:ce1l anc: becor;H~ unselfish unc.l ultinKttel~r they l'each their 
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fTl" • • 
... nJ.S lS 
th: i0ecl o: life. 'l'his is J.'td.'~-1Usu0.<:.:na.'s philoso)hy oi:' o.ction. 
Tn is ic "i:.h:.:. r-: toga . "i1~ r·c love of :1.2.11 is the rssul t o:::· freedom 
~·:·on ~·.he:: e~~clus ive ego. Consequently thc...t love uocs not have 
-~.o b;:; cultivc..,ted but :is <.:! der-ivci.tive of the love o;=: God. 
:.:.::: 7)1~ 2tage \!here on;: sees God in everyt.~ling <.'md evel'ything in 
God. 
zenith j_n ;.·eli[ion. Fo· "-Jl 2' tv -.)·.,C!_' <'"~ 
.... .L '- ·'~· It 
is fuliill6d in reli;ion. 
'.''e havG practically concluded the main discussion of this 
chapter but befoi'e \'le finally close it and [.lass on to d.row up 
the cor,l[la:·ison it may be useful to cons icler here \!hethe.r· the 
I 
ethics 2s i_"Jr·opouncied by Eadhusuclana cnn be r·egarded as subjec-
tive o-..:· objective. 'l'hough the p1•oblGm dicl not ari:::.e in his 
ti1~1c <·ind the \"iords 'sub~iectove' and 'objective' _Jere fo1·eign 
to ~1:im his views on this seel!.I.S clear. .tkcording to him the 
j ect. ive unci. objective. Uo actions a1·c eood or bad in themselves. 
It is onl~r thG spirit in \lhich th~;.y are clone t..hc..t r.1o.ka::~ the.m 
.:;;ood. o-..· bad. If' an action is C:.one out of desire and uith a 
viev! to sutisfyinz any !Jersonal end thE:: action iG bad. But 
i:~· the same <J.ction is done in a spirit of duty because it ought 
to be done it is JOOd an~::. l'ighteous. For instance, the act 
o:f killine on ths battle- field even by a ksattriya (whose (uty 
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Consi.::.e1·ed :'rom this l:;oint of view the ethics \!hich L!adhusud.ana 
.:1d.vocctes i:- subj ~ctive. 
objective. For instance, t.hcre are caste-duties \lhich have been 
objectively det2I'~.:inc:d and \ihich every one is required to folloYi 
<.:•cco:.:c1in:_ to his {)Osition in society. The sc au; e.ll. def:initely 
fixed <:·.nc. no on.; ::houlcl t:em1sg1·ess them. Thus it is clear th&t 
tlL.: eti1ics \,::~.ch i.:C.C.husuda~1a £J:.'O)ounds is :10t ·.::1011~, E'Ub,j ective 
r!ir:.sd Llel·Gly by subjective notions, it is not dependent solely 
on i:..h8 ar'l..:::oval o:c disnpf)I'Ove:l ;~ither oi' the individual Ol"' of 
11ost .t)e ople. Hor is it cnt :i.:::·ely objective in the sense the:: t a. 
.-.-o-,-·tl'cul,..···· qc .... .;o~' 1·., .,l····~v" ·~;-,h+ !.,.~c. ... v c;.......i. ,,.\ \..1..._ !.a ._; u. \rl..::.t,jC l. .a..:_:- "' of any con~idere-
tion of the l)sycholozical ;.·ttitude in vJhich it. is done. In 
It is subjective 
b'2c.:mse vL:tuc ::mel. vice conr~ ist in the feet -~.hct tlEse depend 
O!l ·~he attitucle and spirit in Hhich acts are per·fo::·J~1ed. It is 
objective bGcaus e .::utics c:n·e all fixed c:,nc_ one s!1ou::.d not viol-
~-:.te them. 
B. A CO!.ne::::...s:Lo:::. bet\!een I3utlcr 1 s c.ccount of 
Virtu"<:: as an End in itself .::.nd ldadhusudana' s 
th..::ci.'Y of Duty f'o1· Duty's Sake • 
.. e hc.ve explained L:adhusuC:ana 's t.heo1·y o: duty Io-.:· duty's 
sake &nd we. hnve seen hO\i his ethicA :L'inally culmin<..;.tes in the 
I'eal isa tion of God. 
'fhe fi:r·st point o:i:' .::..::;ree:·::2nt in the ethical teachi1~2 oi' 
, .: 
.LJ.eS iu i..hc J::'e:H.:t. thut virtue is to be pursued 
:or its oun snke. In I·:!adhusuC:a!la w: hove seen thc.t c:ll c:cts 
r.:..·.:: to be done ii1 thE spirit of duty, reg&rdless of thc-:ir result. 
.kCOi.'din,e; to hin on C.Ct is to b8 C.one beco.use it is rir-ht .:md not c 
because o: ;:;.ny ext2riol' end Hhich :aa.y be achieved thei·eby. In 
othe~ ~ords actions ar~ to be perfo1med not for the sake of the 
enjoy:n~~nt oi.' their f1-uits ~.:ither by the agc::nt himself' 01· by 
othz:::s o:.· by both. The c:~gent should pc::.:form hi::; a.ction b~cause 
it. ought to be done. Thou,::h in Butler thE: m.:;tte::r· C:.oes not go 
as far as that because in him r·easonable cool self-love and bene-
valence are pe!'r:tissible i::-:otiv,zs on lilhich to act, yet it must be 
remembered that in the last analysis acco1·dine to him also riEht-
ness of <.m <:-:".Ct is ths only cri te::.'ion on th.:;. be.s is off uh ich 
consc icnce accords its ap..,:i:·Oval. have seen that while self'-
love ap.rn·oves .:,n c-,ction bec.:mse it is prudent, benevolence appl'o-
ves it because it leads to the good of others but conscience 
C-'.j_;proves it only because it is right. It (conscience) l)l'Onoun-
ces cl.eterminately some actions to be in themselves just, rieht 
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ancl ;~ootl G..ud s01:1e actions to be in themselves evil, \!!'ons and 
l 
unjust. It 1~y Glso be st.::tted here thct consc icnce f:or:1E:times 
api_l'oves E.:ven those \~ actions that a:_·e clone in conse,1uence 
of pc:1·ticular pc?.ssions and aff'sct:!.ons but then it must not be 
:~'or;;ot ten thet even in thsse cases -;:-.he bas is of approval is 
the same namely ::ightness. 
Thus t.houJh the two thinkers differ on the question of 
L-:otives on \"lhich acts are to b.::: done they ag1•ee in the. P.P.n~P. 
th.:.t in the la~t unalysis ths ultimGte criterion or !i!Orality 
js the f'ame o.ccordinz to both. 
'I'hr.:: second yoint on Vlhich the:::·e is agreement b-::tucen t.hc 
tv10 thinkers iE on the relatioh b~tv1een mo1•e.lity and 1·el igion. 
In Liadhm:ud<:ma v1e have seen the. t morality is not c..n end in 
itself'. It is a r,1sans to ·t-he ·c·:;alisation of' God. Dut it 
r;:ust b~: remembe1·ed here the:~t thou~h uo1·alit.y is a means to the 
:..·ec)l is a tion of mok~a, it does not, ac co:::dinn to IIadhusudana, 
C.L:ectly lcc.C1 to the l'e<J.lisation o:r thiG end. It only creates 
nece~sr:.ry conditions - the purification of mind and the deepen-
inc; of' inner life etc. - by rrhich the ul tilnate end (God) can 
eventually b::: realised. Thus in Eadhusudana 1:1orality is ultim.-
ately fulfilled in religion. .In Butler, on the ethel' hand, 
\"!e have seen that morality is its ovm end. He does not, at 
any rate, specifically mention self or God realisation as the 
ultimate end towards \"ihich all ethical and t·!01.'E!l life moves. 
--·----· .. ·------·---·-----~-·--·---- -------------------·---
1. 'The Vlorks of Joseph Butler•, Vol. II, Ser•mon II, sect. 10, 
p. 59. 
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Thou~:)l it is true that in Butler virtue is its ovm E:nd yet it 
seems to us th<..:.t in his vievJ it can be fully vindice.ted from the 
stundp~:d.nt or· Ch:;:·istian ::·evelation alone. 
\'le have a.ll·eady expL:.:ined this point in Chapte1• V, we shall 
therefore, to avoid repetition, only b:-iefly mention it here. 
i"!hile it is true th.:!.t therz are certein moral cluti<=:s \:hich can 
be knovm by r-eason independently of revelation there are certain 
positive duti€s, for example baptism in th~ n.;;IJ11e of the Father, 
Son, D.lld Eoly Spirit, V·!hich can be lcrlO\'Jn from Ch:;.'"'ist ia.n revel a-
tion 8lone. Then u.r:.:.ain thSl'C a"L·e certain obligations, r·eli2-
ious regards, which arise from the fact that Lord Jesus is the 
Saviour, the redeemer of the HO!·ld, tha God and Holy Spirit, 
the Sanctifier. These relit;ious l'ega1·ds are of Peverence, 
honour, love, t1·ust, tratitude, fear,~~.hope. These obligations 
·,~hich VJe all owe to these divine persons arise out of' t!'le very 
nature of the office:-:- and the relations in which the;'{ stand to 
us. Butler says: "And the obligation vve are under, of paying 
these relieious regards to each of these divine persons respec.t-
ively, arises from the respective relations V!hich they each 
1 
stand in to us". Christian revelation has thus an important 
JJoral element in it. "Fo1· the office of our Lord being made 
knovm, E•nd the relation he stands in to us, the obligation of 
reli,::ious regards to him is plainly moral, a.s much as charity 
to mankind is; since this obligation arises, before external 
··-·-··- --· ----------·-------· ·- --- -- ·--
1. 'The \Jorks of' Joseph Butler', Vol. I, Part II, Chapter I, 
sect. 19, p. 198. 
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EutlGl' DO::s fu-.·ther-. It is not. only th;.:t 1·::gard to Lo"L·d 
Jcr.:us is due 1Jor.::lly, th~t ~t is a moral C.uty (mt also that 
·' 1 .._ "- '1 · h t · t 1 11 1' -.L" l'l.a (C11·~·1· ~·.t) 1 1.~ ne g_ec ~.. en t.a 2 s pun 2s. !Jen J.n a na ura v1ay. ~ _  
be indeed our Lord, our Saviou:·, Dnd our God; no one can say, 
r!hc:\t uo.y l'ollmv, not only the obstinate, but the careless dis-
-~c-.r:~ PC' ·to l11J' ·1 -i11 .._ !10"'.::. 
.1. .._.ctt- L • I ' -·· L... •-"- 'n 1· ~h ~- ..... lat; ons li'o·.L·· ..... ~ tho ·.n.atu~-• E,; .. -.:- - • • • • • .. ' '-''--' __ ,_ 
al conse<.iuences of vice in this life a1·e doubtless to be consid-
ered 2.s judicial punishments inflicted by God: so likewise, for 
ou.:;:ht we know, the judie ial punishl!1ents of· the futu1·e 1 ife may 
be, in a like way or a like sense, the natural consey_uence 
of" vice: of men's violatins or disregarding the relations v1hich 
2 
God has plnced them in here, ~-.,nd r:1ade knovm to them". 
From all these it seen1s to us thot according to Butler 
c:.lso :JOI'8lity can be fully vindicated from the standpoint of 
Christian revel2.tion alone. This is not to say, D.s Vie hcve 
already said in Chapter v, that according to him one cannot be 
mo-:::al unl<:.ss one is -;,·elieious. But per·haps acco:.:·ding to him 
to be: fully mor·al it is necessary that a man should bG a true 
Christian. Beccuse as v11e have pointed out, there are certain 
positive duties which can ba knovm only from Scriptur·e. The 
vievJ th;;:;.t morality can be :Zully vindicated from the standpoint 
1. 
2. 
----·----------·---··--------·--·---------
''I'he 'Jor·ks of Joseph Butl(2r', Vol. I, 
do do Vol. I, 
Part II, Chapter I, 
sect. 22, p. 200. 
Part II, Chapter" I, 
sect. 23, pp. 200-01. 
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of re.lieion alone may also be seen ~rom the fact th.::.t p~n·fect 
co·.·respondence bet\'Ieen virtue and ha;;piness can only be brought 
about in the next life. 
There is also another 1)oint in Hhich the two thinkers seem 
to agree. There is a synthes if:: of the eth ica.l and the is tic 
positions in both Butler and M3cTI1usuc::.ana. ;·:h;;.·. t is virtuous 
is also religious and also vice ve:~a. The theistic view of 
conscience in Butler ~mggests this position. ~::e have seen 
·r h ···1 ... Bu+ 1 "l" v •• u. v ... w ' by holdins that corwcience is the viceroy of God 
::nc!. th8t its voice is th-::: voice of God Hhich V1e must all obey, 
\'!ants to emphasise th(2 fact thot to act according to conscience 
1<1eans not only to act a.cco1·ding to one 1 s nature but also to act 
accordin6 to the plan a.nd pu1·pose of God. Conscience is the 
tie which holds J:tot·8.lity and religion. To follovT conscience 
is natui·al, virtuous and religious. 
The synthesis in Butler betvreen vir-tue r::nd r-eligion may 
further be seen in his very conception of the different elements 
of human nature. According to Butler the different elements 
of natur•e are not ohly adnpted to virtue but also to the divine 
moral.scheme. They have been implanted by God for particular 
ends or purposes • These ends CClll be r-~a.l is ed only ,._,hen v;e act 
in such ways and degrees as were originally planned and intended 
by the 1\uthor. To act suitctbly to ou:· nature is, of' cour·se, 
virtuous in the sense that vir·tue lies in follov1ing one's natu1·e, 
but it is also in accordance with th2 divine mo1•al scheme in the 
sense that it is acting according to God's design and intention, 
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His plan and )U::.'j,;ose. On the othc1- hand if nan violates the 
la~ or his nature his action not only becomes vicious but it 
also goes against the divine ~oral sch~me. 
I.ia(husudnna. 's ethical thou.zht is saturated nll throu.:;h 
\dth the idea of synthesis betvieen virtue and religion. ',}e 
have seen that accor·ding to him all acts are to be performed 
as Vio~·ship to God. .lUl acts in this sense ore -..·el ir.ious acts. 
Ee repeatedly aP~ues i:,h<:t all the appointed duticG should be 
done in a spil·it of loving su:::·render to God and therefore of 
selfless sePvice to hunanity ~~hich impart spiritual and religi-
ous significance to the merely ethical acts. Again Uad..husudana. 
accepts the view, os we have set forth in Chapter VI, that ~.he 
division oi' men into i'ou:.· castes v1as made by the C1'eator himself 
in accordance viith their innate qualifications and functions. 
By recognising the caste-system as the divinely appointed instit-
ution I.:Udhusudana seems to emphasise that by doing the duties 
of ths caste to which one belongs ohe not only doc:s one's moral 
duty but c:lso one's religious duty. Nay f'u1·the1·, just as in 
Butler- to follov: consci-2nce is natural, virtuous and relegious, 
so ~lso in r,'fadhusudana to do one's caste-duties is natural, 
virtuous and. also r-eligious • ':Ie should rel:1ember here that 
caste-duties are deterr.1inEld by the characteristic nature of 
m.::~n. Thus in doin.cr one's mo:r·al duty p:i:Operly one does what 
is naturnl to him c.ncl thereby also carries out the pl.::~n and 
purpose of God. Dr. Radhakrishnan quotes Yiith approval from 
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3uk:;.~~m iti (I, 08-t;.2): ·"The l'oul' classes cot. .. respond to the 
intellectual, th'J militant, ·t.he industrial c.nd the unskilled 
'.!Oj_'kcrs. All of them se1ve God's creation, by th2ir o~n 
c.::.1pacit.ies, th~ Breh!:l311S by their spir·ituality-, the kshatriyas 
by their heroism, the Vaityas by their skill and the Sudras 
by ·::.hr:>il' se1-vice". 1 
.l.cco:;:din·:· to the Hindu think'Jrs, inclu::linc ou~: c:uthor, th~r·e is 
a divine .::;overnment in the vtorld, c.:1.nd in the moral scheme of th ::.s 
c!.ivin-::1 ~ovet·nll!Gnt t.he1·0 ir~ tbc nc8d for all t::,.·:;>es of' ac:t:i.or... 
In this uoral rovernment the vil·tuous anu the JOOd a1·e l~evJarded 
and t.hc vic iou.s ancl. the bad al'e iJUnished. This divine pu::.:pose 
can be \'!Oi:ked out only if all finite beings conside1· themselves 
as instruments for the carrying out of the divine plan and in 
this spirit fulfil tile i'unct ions of their reS.i,)ective classes. 
Ho om: shoulG. the1·efor•e avoid doing his duty, no matte1• how 
unpleas<:mt that might be, because if one does so lle Hj.ll be 
violating the moral scheme of God vvho r·ealises His plans and 
PLE'pose in and through finite beings. This seems to be the 
only r·eason why krsna exhorts Arjuna to fight the l .. ighteous 
battle against the unrighteous Kaurvus. It \4as the c1 uty of 
Arjuna as a k~attr·iya to suppress evil and thus to maintain 
the moral scheme of the divine govez·runent of the world. There 
is thus the sy:nthes is of the r.lOl'al 2nd religious duty. 
1. S. Radhakrishnan. 'Hindu Dharma' , Inter-national Journal 
of Ethics, Vol. XXXIII, ~ro. 1, October 1922, p. 10. 
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'."!e can pu1·sue ou::: discussion c:: little further. Butler 
antic ipa. ::.es Goci. through human nat.ure. The love of God is 
r·e:.!.uired by our· very na.ture. It not onlv su-onlies a blanK. in 
.. ~ -
nature but c.s \18 hove sa :d is due ;~or·ally to Him. 
I I 
Butler 
se.ys: "By the love of God, I would understand all those -::egards, 
all those affe:ctionc of mind which are due immediately to him 
fro1:1 such a creature as man, and v·lhich rest in him c.~s their 
1 
end". Thus the full demands of man's nature can be met only 
by his love to God. He is not complete without reference to 
God. It is not only that conscience is t.he vice1·oy of God 
seatE.:d in the heart of us all but that there are also cer·tain 
other elements in human nature which necessarily point to him. 
VJe may say, for instance, that benevolence ieac1s up to the love 
of God. Butler says: "That wh~ch we more strictly call piety, 
o·:· the love of God, and Y!hich is an essential fJart of a right 
temper, some raay pe·~~haps imagine no vJay connected "Iilith benevol-
ence; yet surely they must bG connected, if there be indeed in 
being an object infinitely good. Hwnan nature is so constituted, 
!300d. 
that every/affection implies the love of itself. Thus, to be: 
righteous, implies in it the love of' righteousness; to be benev-
olent, the love of benevolence; to be good, the love of goodness; 
e;D.d. the love of God as a being perfectly good, is the love of 
.i_)erf'ect goodness conte:-;1plated in a being or person. Thus mor-
ality and l'elision, virtue and piety, will at last necessarily 
coincide, r-un up into one and the same point, and love will be 
-----·--·------
------------------ ----------
1. 'The ~7orks of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Se1·:.1on XII+, secj .• 2; 
p. 230,. 
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1 
in all senses the ~~J.c. ..;;:;:· the COJ;·u.;andmsnt".- ,...,.Dll·'·., -,-, -r.ns '~. l•..L ~J.. ,:.u~ 
"I r 1 • 
. ., .. -- ... -..
- i,..L.;, 'J.!.. ~... -· rn• .• ,..,. - -'· h ~ ...av•_!61l .• t:;; does not, <:~t. ;_,ny Pate, 
:: .i.)G.C ifically E1ention God-realisation <=~s th.:: ul tim~.:·.te ideal 
as Kaclhusudana does, vurtuo.lly his teaching n:-Jounts to this. 
completely Ratisfied viith the merely earthly, vlith anything 
less than God himself. too much occupied VJith the 
things of the viorld <:.lnd vie must withdraw ourselves from them 
in order to concenti~te on God who is present in us all. 
Butler ~oes s~ fo.r as to say that vie must resign ou:r·selves 
cou1:Jletel:y to God in order to knov,; Him. Butler pi·obably referr ... 
~DB t.o the Holy- Spirit says: "He is al'-'iays equally present with 
us: but we are so much taken up with sensible things, that 'Lo, 
he goeth by-us, and we see him not: he passeth on also, but we 
perceive him not• (c.Tob lX.ll). Devotion is retirement, from 
the world he has made, to him alone: it is to withdraw from the 
ad.vocations of sense, to employ our attention 'Nholly upon him 
as upon an object actually present, ••• is th.a natural and only 
2 
adequate object". Butler :!lakes some more categorical state-
:_:cnts in this connectio:l1 VIhich p1··oves that God is the only c.:md 
for mc.n. T.V~:> c:hPll ,...,UQi· 0 1[1 :.r•e 
- - --~- ~ .. .... 1;: only two to prove our point. 
(1) "It is plain that thera is a capacity in the nature of man, 
1. ''rhe \"Jo:;:ks of Jouc-:ph Butler', Vol. II, SerE1on XII, ::::ect. 23, 
p. 228. 
2. do do do SermonXIV, sect. 3~ 
:p p • 24 7- 248 • 
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which n:;::i.t.hcr ·2:icl1es, nor honours, nor sensual srat:i.fications, 
nor any thing in this world can pe1·f'ectly fill up, or satisfy: 
there is a deeper c-,nd i:1ore essc~:;.1tial want, than any of these t 
1 
things ca.n be the supply of". 
(2) Our resignation to the Viill of God may be said to be perfect, 
when o;.n· vrill is lost and resolvzd up into his; \ihen r.'e :-est in 
his \'till as our end, as be:i.n£ itself most just, .:;,nd ri3htJ and 
2 
~·--od"  •J • 
This t::aching of' Butler· is in com:;)lete agreement '."lith 
EadhuGud:o~na bcce.use this is nothing less than devotion to God. 
It is true tha.t in the last analysis Madhusud(;.no. bel:!.eves in 
C·.:.c;.-·1..:.t'2 id".J:-::.tity ;.;,:. t· .. ·'--'~- ::.~.:;; individu<:l c.n6 the Absolute in 
'tihich even devotion to the .i.:Jel'sonal God is trancended. \7hile 
it is t:.."'ue t£1<J.t that is the nature of mok~a in his metaphysics, 
ha lays ereat e;,;phasis on bhakti o::: devotion ·co th~ Absolute 
seen as a )ersonal God. Ind-2cd c-~cc o:..·cl:..n_: ·t.v l-::.i::: GoJ. ~~:: the 
only obj:ct o: ou~ search. Thus for our· l)u:..·_pose here it. ney 
uith justification be said th'-!.t Butler's ide$. of man's only 
natural and adequate obj2ct :::nd th·~ object o.f the seeker of 
moksa accordin::~ to Madhusudana are the same. 
. ~ 
~·:e thus conclude thc.tt wh:il:. it is true that in f•.Tadhw::uct..1.::1a 
ethics and rel:i.gion 2re ins e_t)a-..'ately bound up ;:i th one another 
and it is difficult to separc>.te them from each othc:o.', so .:.leo 
1. 'The Works of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Serrnon XIV, sect. 11, 
p. 250. 
2. do do do do sect. 6, 
p. 246. 
- 31~-
t.!1is is true in a sense in Butler. Bu-~ler 1 s '\;"Thole ::1eto.phys i-
cal background ~as religious, Biblical. Mo j_ ... al i ty, in him, de-
rives its impulses and may also be said to l'each its climax in 
religion because, as 111e have shovm, it cannot be fully vindica-
ted vtithout reference to Christian revelation. Again according 
to both the ultimate object of man 1 s search cannot be ·what is 
merely l'Edative, it cannot be '.Yhat is confined \'lithin the bound-
aries of the finite and empirical 1·eality. It must be trans-
cendent to the inm1ediate flovJ of events. In other v1ords it 
must be God Himself. 
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Conclusion. 
We have explained the ethics of both Butler and 
Madhusiidana. We have also tried to draw up a comparison 
between the two thinkers and in our comparison it is not only 
the points of agreement but also the points of cliffei•ence that 
we have tried to bring out. \iife would now say a few words in 
conclusion about their ethical teac:hing. 
Butler no doubt sometj.mes mal{eS statements which ap11ear 
incongruous and do not seem to fit in with h:i.s e~n.err:~J mo:ral 
scheme with the result that he has not only l)een interpPeted 
differently l1y d.if':f.'er·ent writers on moral philosophy bu.t has 
also been sometimes sulJjected to most severe criticism. It is 
often pointed out that despite al1 that Butler says he has not 
succeecl.ed as a moral philosopher. He does not provide his 
readers with any criterion of' rightness or wrongness as applied 
to actions. He does not point to any conunon quality peculiar 
to right actions alone on the basis of which the;y can be 
distinguished from the wrong ones. Hovv does conscience clecide 
that a particular cotu:-se of action is in harmony with human 
nature and is as such natural and th.erefore also virtuous ? 
What connnon quality does conscience discern in order to approve 
or cUsap:prove an ~ction 7 Butler gives no clefini te and clear 
answer to these questions. The jolJ of a moral philosopher is 
not so much to say that an ac·~ion is right or that an action 
is wrong. His more important function is to indicate how and 
why it is right. Judged from this viewpoint and standard 
Butler's system of moral philosophy falls short of adequacy 
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ancl completion. 
It seems to us that much o:f what has been said by way o:f 
criticism of Butler's moral philosophy loses its force if we 
bear in m~nd the fact that Butler does not profess to give us 
any system in morals. He does not claim to give any adequate 
and perfect system of moral philosophy. Butler was not an 
academic philosopher. He was a practical preacher of right-
eousness and the function of a preacher is more to persuade 
man to do what he knows man ought to the.m to give any elaborate 
system. Butler's :problems, his purposes in li:fe were entirely 
dj.:fferent. It seems to us that most of the contradictions, 
inconsistencies and such other irregularities as are pointed 
out in his ethical and moral teaching by various writers can be, 
as we have tried to show, very well reconciled if we keep in 
view his practical problems, his own purposes, the atmosphere in 
which or against which he was worlcing and also it: we remember 
the particular technique and the typical method which he 
aclopted in his discussion of moral problems. Butler himself 
says in his last Sermon at the Rolls Chapel 'Upon the Ignorance 
of Man 1 that "6ur province is virtue and religion, life and 
manners; the science of improving the temper and making the 
heart l)etter. ul In opder to achieve this end Butler had to go 
against the main current of the day. It was a time when people 
as a result of the scientific spirit had lost all faith in 
1. 'The Worlcs of Joseph Butler', Vol. II, Sermon XV, sect. 15, 
pp. 272-273. 
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religion and morality. In other words it was a period when 
irreligion end immorality were growing. Butler's mind, very 
naturally by virtue oi' the position he was then occupying, was 
more preoccupied with making people vh•tuous and religious than 
giving any elaborate and adequate system of morality. It seems 
to us that perhaps it is in order to realise these ends more 
effectively that Butler maintains that the voice of conscience 
is the voice of God Himself' and to act according to it is to 
act according to the plan and purpose of God. To ensure the 
realisation of these ends Butler is aclopting a dquble measure. 
As we have a:tready pointed out that by attributing theological 
origin to conscience he is giving a double support to virtue. 
To act according to conscience is to act according to one's 
nature. Again to act according to conscience is also to act 
according to the plan and purpose of God. Thus by the use of 
this double-edged weapon Butler wanted to make everybody 
vii•tuous and religious. This seems to be an important implica-
tion of Butler's theory of conscience as the voice of God. 
Keeping all these in view we can say without any shadow 
of doubt that despite all his defects and inadequacies Butler 
has, as Professor Broad1 rightly says, given us the great 
principles according to which decent people do feel, act and 
judge. He is in consequence still accepted as the masiber of 
e·thical speculation and his influence is recognised even today. 
---·---
1. C.D. Broad. 'Five Types of Ethical Theory', London, 1951. 
p. 55. 
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When we come to Madhusiidana we find that his ethics is 
realistic in that it bases man's functions on his nature, on 
his dispositions and abilities. This has the advantage of' not 
expecting of' man what he is not capable of. At the same time 
it has also the advantage of making o:ne' s natui'al !'unctions 
the means of' one's moral progress. In the sphere of practical 
affairs this should lead to the want of' feverish competition 
which, to a great extent, mars modern social life. Madhusudana's 
ethics is also realistic in the sense that it provides for the 
satisfaction of nat-ural htmgers and desires and yet it is not 
psychological hedonism because the satisfaction is not made the 
motive but the need to outgrow the desires. This means that 
the sense of duty is brought to bear upon those activities 
which are almost instinctive. This has the effect of' lessening 
their instinctive character and rationalising them. 
While the.above is true, it should also be observed that 
Madhusudana's ethics is too idealistic in the sense that 
perhaps it expects too much from man. It expects that man will 
be more interested in moral progress and spiritual life than 
in worldly values. Vfuile the ethics is based on human nature, 
it also at the same time does not take surficient notice of 
the actual tendencies of man and his motivations. It may be 
possible to put this idealistic ethics into practice in a 
small community but in a large ccbrrununity like the Indian where 
with the passage of time life, as everywhere, is becoming more 
and more complicated, other factors need to be taken into 
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a~acount which were probably not present bef'ore Mad.husudana's 
mind. Of' course, we should rememlJer that they were not 
present in his time either. Modern ideas of' democracy f'or 
examp~e and desire f'or a higher standard of' lif'e have much to 
c01mnend them and yet a system of ethics based on a rigid caste-
system caru1ot meet the reqLtirements of' the spirit that 
animates these ideals. 
One can see the f'undamental wisdom in Madhusilidana's 
ethics. Certainly the ideals of cluty f'or duty's sake, doing 
more f'or the good of' the cormmmi ty than for one's mm self::-
interest and the idea of' the close relationship between all in 
the universe, these certainly are noble principles and in any 
system of' ethics should play their part. The problem bef'ore 
Indian thinkers and social leaders is to f'ind out ways and 
means how to reconcile the spirit of' this ethics with the 
modern values of' eq_uali ty and social progress. '11he tar;;lc 
certainly is not easy and yet it is urgent. Progressive minds 
in India are tryine; to cl.o away with-the injustices to which 
the rigidity of the present caste-system has led. But even 
the most bold among them do not deny that all f'unctions cannot 
properly be carried out by all people. How f'ar and in which 
aspects of lif'e eg_uality is admissible and where it is not is 
the problem bef'ore the Indian ethical thinlcers and social 
leaders. It is true the:(; in spite of' the caste-system, f'oreign 
elements were absorbed into the Indian community, the Gceek 
warriors f'or example, were allowed to settle down in India and 
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they were accepted as k~attriyas. But there again the pattern 
was kept whereas today the ideas of equality and social progress 
may be ta~;:en as a challenge to the basic principle of Indian 
ethics. It is not to be expected ·chat Madhusudana' s ethics 
will contain any guicling principles in these matters, still it 
can, and perhaps, with justification be said that his type of' 
ethics is not adaptable and progressive. It seems to us that 
it still holds good for those few who are spiritually inclined 
but for the vast majority who ai•e not so inclined and yet do 
not necessarily wtt:nt to lead an i1mnoral life Indian thought 
will l1ave to ·devise an appropriate system of ethj_cs. 
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